


## INTRODUCTION

Pacific Sea Resources (PSR) was established in 1985 to undertake the archaeological recovery of Spanish galleons sunk in the Pacific during the Manila Galleon trade between the Philippines and America. After the initial research phase in libraries and archives in seven countries, PSR researchers focused on the *Nuestra Señora de la Concepción*, an Acapulco-bound galleon sunk in 1638 off Saipan in the Northern Mariana Islands.

The field program, begun in March 1987 and concluded in July 1988, was carried out by PSR's crew of thirty professionals from seven countries. The company used state-of-the-art equipment to survey and map the wreck site, computer systems to image-capture artifacts and record pertinent information, and a wide variety of specialized excavation tools to recover the artifacts. The comprehensive archaeological program was developed and implemented in close cooperation with the Historic Preservation Office of the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands.

This archaeological report describes PSR's archaeological program including historical research activities, site description, survey methods, diving systems, excavation techniques, computer technology, artifact registration and handling, conservation and restoration procedures, environmental monitoring program, and the wrecking process and artifact distribution. The report also outlines the history of the Manila Galleon trade and describes the circumstances of the *Concepción*'s loss. Finally, the report provides information on the recovered artifacts, focusing particularly on the *Concepción*'s jewelry and ceramic cargo. The jewelry is catalogued according to type with detailed descriptions, including perceived origins, correlations between the *Concepción* pieces and those located in museums and private collections, and the historical significance of the jewelry.

This five and a half year project has resulted in an assemblage of materials relating to the shipwreck, including all artifacts, paintings, charts and models, now known as the *Concepción* Collection. A Japanese resort company, Apex Corporation, currently owns the Collection, and is building a museum on the island of Saipan to display the Collection. In the museum complex the artifacts will be available for further study to supplement the information contained in this report. In addition, Apex intends to donate the Collection to the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands in the year 2030.



**THE HISTORY OF THE MANILA GALLEON TRADE**

by

Catherine Lugar, Ph.D.

- \* Origins of the Manila Galleon Trade
- \* System of Galleon Trade in the Seventeenth Century
- \* Experiencing Manila Galleon Travel
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
## ORIGINS OF THE MANILA GALLEON TRADE

### Spain's "China Ships"

The Manila galleons served one of the most enduring and longest commercial maritime routes. For two-and-a-half centuries, between 1565 and 1815, these legendary ships operated under government auspices, as state-owned, armed vessels of the Spanish crown, instruments of official and private communication, transport, and commercial enterprise in the distant eastern sector of the Spanish empire. Most importantly the galleons were merchantmen, laden with an extraordinary assortment of Chinese silks, cotton textiles and wearing apparel, porcelain, gold jewelry, exotic perfumes, and other fine treasures purchased from Chinese traders at Manila and destined for markets throughout the Spanish colonies in America and Europe. They also carried commodities of local Philippine production, including beeswax, various woven cotton textiles (both fine goods and heavier cloths) and gold, extracted from alluvial deposits in the islands. The galleons' destination, Acapulco, Mexico, was a small trade port on the southwest coast of the viceroyalty of New Spain which became upon their arrival a great commercial fair, where

merchants from Spain, Mexico and Peru competed for goods to market throughout the colonies and in Europe. The cargoes of the "China Ships" were exchanged for New World treasure in the form of silver bullion, bars and coin, the famed "silver dollars" or pieces of eight destined to circulate throughout the international commerce of the Far East.

In the mercantilist age of the 1600s, states provided monopoly benefits to their merchants and measured their commercial greatness by the size of favorable trade balances and the volume of precious metals in the royal vaults. The galleon trade drained silver eastward, which worried the Spanish government, and made the Crown sensitive to the position of Spanish merchants at Seville and Cádiz, who complained that Asian merchandise coming through Acapulco eroded their control of the American market. Consequently, the success of the exchange of "silks for silver" led to the imposition of restrictions which confined a highly lucrative commerce to an arbitrarily fixed maximum, known as the *permiso* (permission), including



*Manila galleon under sail off California coast*

limitations on shipping, a cap on the annual value of the merchandise sent from Manila, and a ceiling on the amount of the returns in silver obtained from the sale of the cargo in New Spain. In reaction, those interested in the trade habitually schemed to circumvent the regulations in order to make their investments pay. In the Spanish empire's commercial system, notorious for shortsighted policies which ignored economic realities and made smuggling all but inevitable, the Manila galleon trade was one of the more flourishing sectors of contraband and fraud.<sup>1</sup>

### The Origins of Spanish Trade at Manila


So near the fabled riches of the Orient, so far from Spain! The capital of the most distant outpost of the Spanish empire, seventeenth century Manila was heralded as the "antipodes of Seville,"<sup>2</sup> the polar opposite and rival of the city at the heart of Spain's commerce with her colonies. In its heyday Manila eclipsed Malacca, the international emporium of Malaysia, and made a bid to become another "Golden Goa," the

viceroyal capital of Portuguese India. Manila was larger and more secure than Macao, the Portuguese enclave and entrepot city on the Chinese coast below Canton. The Spanish Philippines were the most substantial and enduring of all European colonial enterprises which developed in the Pacific in the first wave of overseas expansion, in an era preceding 1750, when it was said that the sun never set on the Spanish Empire. The sole economic base for the colony was the galleon trade, for 250 years the pride of Manila and the envy of all nations.

The success of the Spanish in the Philippines was owed mostly to Manila's location on the eastern rim of the South China Sea. The vast Philippine archipelago lies north of Borneo, with its three largest islands and island groups of Mindanao in the south, the Visayas at the center, and Luzon to the north. Parts of the north coast of Luzon are only two days' sail from the Chinese mainland. The islands have long been a crossroads of cultural exchange. Centuries' old maritime routes brought the products of the Spice Islands up from the south, and the luxurious



The Pacific Ocean, by Abraham Ortelius, 1589



*The bay of Manila in the early 17th Century*

manufactures of the Chinese mainland, especially silks and porcelains, directly to its capacious harbor. Spanish merchants created a trans-Pacific trade linking this entrepot, a "magazine for the richest commerce of the world,"<sup>3</sup> to the colonies in the West Indies.

Rich and resilient, Manila was nevertheless deprived of the glory of a viceroyalty. Spanish policy confined the Philippines to subordinate status as a dependency of New Spain and to a restricted trade that seemed to defy all logic of imperial expansion. Historical circumstances governed Manila's destiny. Some of these were coincidences of time and place which had been operating well before the arrival of Europeans in the Pacific. Others were the consequence of European rivalry in the Far East and jealous and competing interests within the Spanish empire.

Prior to the European intrusion the Philippine Islands were relatively thinly populated by a variety of ethnic groups, some closer to the rice-cultivating civilizations of the Asian continent, others more dependent on the sea on which they ventured in their swift outrigger craft. Still others were essentially foragers in the hinterlands. These island people were visited by Chinese merchants, sailing in accordance with the prevailing winds, known by the Spanish as the



*Chinese and Filipino traders*

*brisas*, the northeasterly winds which blew from the end of October to the end of April, and the *vendavels*, the southwesterlies that predominated from April to October.<sup>4</sup> From their junks, ample trade ships, the Chinese bartered earthenware, stoneware, porcelains, silk and cotton textiles, beads, lead, tin, and other items in return for forest products, such as betel and coconuts, resins, yellow beeswax, and gold dust which the inhabitants secured in small amounts from scattered alluvial deposits.<sup>5</sup>

Initially a tenuous part of the South Asian trade with China and the Indian subcontinent via Malacca and Brunei (on Borneo), the islands were gradually drawn into this circuit through the advance of Islam which became a potent political and cultural force in the region after 1400 when the Chinese Court imposed severe restrictions on foreign trade. Moslem merchants moved through Sumatra and Java to Mindanao and as far as Manila, converting coastal chieftains and establishing their trade. Fortunately for the Europeans, by 1500 this movement had not yet sunk deep roots except in the island of Mindanao. The inhabitants of the Moluccas (the Spice Islands) and their northern neighbors were pagan enough to be ripe for conversion to Christianity and politically decentralized enough to permit the military conquest necessary to dominate the trade. Among the Europeans who began to enter the area in the late fifteenth and early sixteenth century, the Iberians (the Portuguese and the Spanish), were more interested in the question of aptitude for religious conversion than were the English or the Dutch, and they were able to reap powerful benefits from the religious conquest they sought.

#### **Expansion and European Rivalry in the Indies**

In the wake of the expulsion of Islam from the south of Spain in the fifteenth century, the rhetoric of Christian evangelization fired Iberian expansion, but the material interest behind it was the desire to discover a sea route to Asia to tap into already established trade networks. These had funneled desirable Asian commodities, especially luxurious textiles and valuable spices (peppers, cloves, cinnamon, nutmeg, mace) to Europe through the Red Sea via the Levantine countries (the Middle East) and the Mediterranean. The power the Iberians desired to topple was not so much the Moslem enemy, but the merchants of Venice whose dominance of this route had made Venice the great emporium of Asian goods and a sea power in the eastern


Mediterranean from the late Middle Ages. An even greater premium was placed on the discovery of a safe detour for the traditional Mediterranean route after the Ottoman Turks seized the central passage at Constantinople in 1453. By the time the Mediterranean and Levantine trade was restored around 1600, the Iberian adventures had produced an unprecedented explosion of worldwide commerce. In this process, the contribution of the galleon trade at Manila is often neglected.

#### **Competition for the Spice Islands**

Up to the fifteenth century neither Spain nor Portugal had been essentially a seafaring nation, but international maritime communities from their own and neighboring coasts furnished personnel for rival expeditions. Their objective was to pursue spices to their sources, and so they ventured in different directions; first the Portuguese by sailing eastward and then the Spaniards who, after a slow start, sailed to the west in their race to the other side of the globe.

The Portuguese edged slowly around the African continent between 1415 and 1487; Vasco da Gama reached Goa, India by 1498. Backed by the effective naval power of their well-armed merchant vessels, the Portuguese arrived in Malacca in 1511 and in the Spice Islands in 1512, completing a victorious campaign to establish a network of tribute-paying states and gaining access to the prized spices. This spice-based commercial empire was then administered from Goa. When trading contacts were begun with China in 1517, the lengthy Portuguese pipeline of riches, the "carreira da India," was in place, though a permanent trade post in China was not secure until 1557. From Macao, a settlement on the corner of an island near Canton harbor, the Portuguese organized a lucrative commerce with Japan, brokering Chinese silks for Japanese silver at Nagasaki. Trade with Japan was initiated around 1547, and flourished from about 1560 to 1639, when the Act of Seclusion compelled the Portuguese to withdraw from Japan. Although they never actually achieved the desired monopoly control of commodities, the Portuguese enjoyed nearly a hundred years of dominance in the transport and first sale of Asian goods in Europe, and developed a lively and longer "country trade" as participants in a variety of interregional exchanges in markets throughout Asia.

As the Portuguese sailed eastward around Africa, Christopher Columbus argued at the Spanish court of Ferdinand and Isabella for the



*Namban screen showing Chinese traders on board Portuguese vessel*

promise of a westward route to reach the Orient. While Columbus' own dreams were unrealized, military and spiritual conquest of the Spanish "Indies" in the Caribbean, the Central American mainland and isthmus, and South America opened another sort of treasurehouse for Spain. They discovered gold workings on the Gulf coasts and later made silver strikes, first at Potosi (Bolivia) in 1545, then at Zacatecas, Guanajuato, Taxco and other centers in Mexico, between 1546 and 1569.<sup>6</sup> New World silver, which was flooding into Europe by 1550, was the most important element in the creation of a viable Spanish trade with the East.

Spurred by Portuguese successes in the Indian Ocean, the Spaniard Balboa travelled across the Panamanian isthmus, reaching the Pacific coast in 1513, thus keeping alive the idea that these lands were merely obstacles to the eastern kingdoms. Ferdinand Magellan, who had sailed with a Portuguese fleet as far as the Moluccas, departed Spain in 1519, rounded the southern tip of South America, crossed the Pacific, passed the "Ladrones" (Isles of Thieves,

also known as the Isles of the Lateen Sails and later as the Marianas), and entered the *Western Isles*, as the Philippines were first known by the Spanish, at Samar on St. Lazarus Day in 1521. He perished at Mactan near Cebu in a clash with a local tribe. Survivors of his expedition headed south, island-hopping for supplies and trading for spices in the Moluccas (the Spice Islands) into 1522. Only one of the original three ships returned to Spain, by way of the Portuguese India-Cape-Lisbon route. The commander Sebastian del Cano claimed the profits of the trading expedition and became the first to circumnavigate the globe. The venture into the Moluccas and the return by way of the Portuguese route, however, brought Spain hard up against the Portuguese claims in the East.

Under papal diplomacy, Spain and Portugal had reached a working agreement about their respective spheres of interest. In signing the Treaty of Tordesillas in 1494, they had accepted a territorial division according to a line drawn at 370 leagues west of the Azores and Cape Verde Islands, a vague demarcation of uncertain

longitude. While it fortified Spanish dominion in the Americas, and would permit Portugal to substantiate its claim to settle Brazil, the agreement left the eastern hemisphere in question. Information garnered from Magellan's expedition established that more than one island group east of the Asian mainland was open to whoever could effectively establish hegemony, thereby prompting the Spanish crown to authorize a second expedition to replicate the Magellan route west across the Atlantic, this time under Juan Garcia Jofre de Loaysa, in 1525. Loaysa along with the veteran del Cano, his second in command, and others perished en route. The survivors made several landfalls, struggled without success at Mindanao and Cebu, and eventually surrendered to the Portuguese in the Moluccas. An equally ill-fated third expedition commanded by Alvaro Saavedra de Ceron sailed from the west coast of New Spain. Saavedra's expedition sighted the Ladrones and reached the southern Philippines, where they encountered survivors of previous expeditions, and traded at the Moluccas. Twice, in 1528 and 1529, they failed to find the northern route of winds and currents that would return them eastward to New Spain. In the interim, with Spain's attention more concentrated on the Americas in the 1520s, the Moluccas were yielded to Portugal with the signing of the Treaty of Zaragoza in 1529.<sup>7</sup>

Once the Portuguese Moluccas were formally declared out of bounds, the Western Isles became the paramount objective. In order to establish a claim by occupation, discovery of the *tornaviaje*, or return route across the Pacific, was necessary and the Crown posted a reward for it. In 1542, the viceroy of New Spain authorized a fourth attempt to establish an eastern base, under Ruy Lopez de Villalobos. They sailed November 1 from Navidad (near present-day Manzanilla), effortlessly picked up the prevailing easterlies and equatorial currents and passed among what they called the Jardines (part of the Marshall Islands) in January, 1543. Three short months out of Navidad, Villalobos reached Mindanao and named the island chain the Philippines, after Prince Philip (the future Philip II). However, the members of this expedition were doomed by hostile encounters with the islanders and bouts of bad weather which decimated their number. An attempted return in late August 1543 was thwarted by a disastrous storm 2,250 miles out in the Pacific, which forced them back. The remnants of the Villalobos expedition surrendered to the Portuguese at Ternate (Moluccas) from whence they were

peremptorily returned via Lisbon.

### Dutch and English Challengers

By the end of the sixteenth century the Iberians were no longer the only contenders for the Spice Islands. The general Portuguese model of trade and conquest was, after 1600, successfully imitated by the Dutch, who drove the Portuguese out of their own garrisons, or established others which effectively rivaled them.<sup>8</sup> In revolt against the Spanish monarchy and Hapsburg dominion since 1566, the United Provinces of the Netherlands extended their maritime expertise beyond the North Sea and Baltic to become active in the Mediterranean by 1585 and to enter the Pacific in the 1590s. With the Union of the Crowns of Portugal and Spain in 1580, Portuguese trade monopolies also became victims of Dutch aggression. Control of the Spice Islands was a rich objective. The Dutch improved upon the Portuguese system by operating under the auspices of a centralized body, the Dutch East India Company, the VOC (Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie). About the same time, the equally ambitious English launched their campaign for participation in the wealth of the spice trade with freebooting piracy to harass their rivals, and then adopted tactics more like the Dutch, with a network of trading factories reporting to a company headquartered in London. Neither the Portuguese, the Dutch nor the English invested much effort in actual territorial conquest, but settled instead for enclave settlements often at the sufferance of their trading partners.<sup>9</sup> Moreover the northern Europeans were equally indifferent to any serious cultural hegemony to be achieved through religious conversion. Although the Portuguese took seriously their obligations to bring the heathen into the Christian fold, as their commercial might dwindled, so did their capacity to support missionary work, especially in the face of the indifference or hostility to their efforts in Japan and China.

The Spanish role in the Pacific was of a different character than that of the Portuguese, the English or the Dutch. Beyond their enclave or trade post sites in the Philippines, they expected territorial domination, both secular and spiritual. Their prior experience in the West Indies and New Spain was the most important influence in the kind of colony they established; however, other factors also came into play, including the nature of their rivalry with Portugal, the timing of their arrival in the Pacific, and the location and characteristics of the inhabitants of

the archipelago where they settled.

### **The Legazpi Expedition: Securing a Base and the Return Voyage**

With pepper prices spiralling upward in Europe in the late 1550s, Philip II of Spain again urged the Mexican viceroy to commit men and money to a Pacific base for trade in spices.<sup>10</sup> After three years of preparation, a fleet of four ships under Miguel López de Legazpi put out from Navidad on November 20, 1564. Among the Augustinian clergy aboard was an experienced navigator and veteran of the 1525 Loaysa voyage, Fray Andrés de Urdaneta, who was instrumental in planning the expedition. Although initially reluctant to pursue the route (as was the Viceroy) because of the Portuguese claims to the region, he was nevertheless confident that the currents and winds for a return passage could be found in more northern latitudes than had been sailed in previous attempts.

Ostensibly a reconnaissance voyage, the Legazpi expedition was at the same time a full-fledged scheme for conquest and colonization. They transported missionaries to convert the natives and carried instructions which described arrangements for the spice trade they expected to conduct and the settlement they were to make, including details as to the nature of the houses, erection of a fort and location of the church they were to build. Proceeding south along the Mexican coast to 9 degrees, they headed due west, running with the easterly winds up to 105 miles a day. Early on, by December 1, the swiftest of two smaller boats, under Alonso de Arellano, disappeared well ahead. Later it would be tagged a renegade which had intentionally separated, sailed briefly among the Philippines and struck out independently to find the return route in advance of the commander's vessels. In mid-January, Urdaneta believed they were near the Jardines and they turned north, making landfall at Guam in the Ladrões on January 22.

After eleven tense days of uncertain welcomes and occasional violence by the native Chamorros in the Ladrões Islands, Legazpi formally took possession of the islands on behalf of Spain before heading onward to Samar, another eleven days' sail. Here they turned southward to enter the Philippines at Leyte Gulf. Their initial reception by the inhabitants was again mixed. New provisions were surprisingly difficult to secure, a situation which previous expeditions had encountered. The Spaniards had little comprehension of the fragile balances of food

supplies that existed in the subsistence economy of the islands, distracted as they were by the vision of the inhabitants' prosperity, namely "the gold which decorated the natives and the many hogs and chickens which roamed freely along the beach," reported by the men who scouted the territory.<sup>11</sup> They were also initially ignorant of the consequences of the actions of Portuguese who had been there previously, passing themselves off as Castilian Spaniards before pillaging coastal villages. While part of the expedition set off to explore trade on the Mindanao coast, the remainder had a hostile encounter with a Muslim trading boat out of Borneo. This ended fortunately, however, with the acquisition of a Muslim pilot as informant who took some of them coasting to Negros and Cebu, the scene of Magellan's demise. The chief village of Cebu Island was taken by force on April 27, 1565.

The ship *San Pablo* was prepared for the return voyage, carrying a cargo of cinnamon purchased at Mindanao. Departing June 1 from Cebu, commanded by a young grandson of Legazpi, and under Urdaneta's guidance, they made the San Bernardino straits at the southern end of Luzon in a week's time. They took a northward turn, passed the Ladrões on July 1, picked up the Japan current, sailed across the Pacific at around 42 degrees latitude, saw signs of land near the California coast as expected, and reached Acapulco on September 8, 1565. Urdaneta had chosen Acapulco over Navidad because of its extraordinarily safe, capacious harbor, timber-rich hinterlands, and access to the capital at Mexico City. With the completion of this voyage, the navigation between the Philippines and New Spain was established. A supply ship could be sent out to the settlement with secure knowledge that the return had been charted. However, eleven years elapsed before the trade was finally established. Military conquest and the foundations of the religious mission preceded the realization of commercial objectives.

### **The Beginnings of the Galleon Trade at Manila**

In the first despatches from the Philippines to the Audiencia of Mexico, the newly designated royal officials requested "coins and small bars of fine silver for trade in China."<sup>12</sup> As news of the Spaniards' presence, and their silver coins, spread among the islands, traders from Luzon appeared with provisions, samples of the available goods and information about the character of trade at

the place called Manila. Reports and sample shipments were forwarded to the Crown via New Spain in 1567 and 1568.

As months passed and the Spaniards' efforts to seek trade goods became more widely known, the Portuguese were alerted to their incursions and prepared to drive them out, convinced that a successful occupation of the Philippines by the Spanish would inevitably damage their own Asian trade.<sup>13</sup> A three-month blockade of the Spanish settlement at Cebu by a Portuguese fleet from the Moluccas (mid-October 1568 - 1 January 1569) resulted in Legazpi's removing his government from Cebu to the island of Panay. Although a serious threat, it was also an excellent opportunity for gathering more intelligence about Portuguese commercial movement in the area and deepened the commitment to secure a settlement and trade port. Legazpi urged the King in 1569: "If your Majesty looks forward to this land for greater and richer things, it is necessary to people it, and to have a port here..."<sup>14</sup> The Augustinian friar, Fray Martin de Rada, shared this conviction, saying "...Soldiers are not needed to conquer this land, for they do not consider [its] welfare..., but only how to amass wealth quick in order to return home... Colonists who intend to remain in the country must be sent."<sup>15</sup>

The Spanish intervened in the trade aggressively. The first foray against Manila in 1570 enabled the Spanish to make direct contact with Chinese merchants, also called *Sangleys* (traders). Martin de Goiti, Legazpi's deputy, was sent north with his lieutenants. Crossed signals at Mindoro led de Goiti to engage two Chinese junks; twenty Chinese were killed in the resulting skirmish. The cargo was confiscated long enough to review the goods:

The soldiers searched the cabins in which the Chinese kept their most valuable goods, and thence they found silk, both woven and in skeins; gold thread, musk, gilded porcelain bowls, pieces of cotton cloth, gilded waterjugs and other curious articles although not in a large quantity considering the size of ships. The decks of both vessels were full of earthen jars and crockery, large porcelain vases, plates and bowls; and some fine porcelain jars, which they call *sinoratas*. They also found iron, copper, steel and a small quantity of wax which the

Chinese had bought.<sup>16</sup>

De Goiti expressed regrets for the bloodshed and released the survivors. His subsequent parley with the Moslem chieftain at Manila dissolved in suspicions and in the ensuing violence the town was burned and the Spaniards withdrew. The following year Legazpi commanded a fleet of two Spanish ships and twenty-three proas, which met little resistance. The inhabitants again set fire to their town and fled the area. Spanish Manila was founded on these ruins in May 1571.

The spiritual conquest of the Philippines was slow to develop despite initial assertions that spreading the gospel was a motivation for the voyages. Some time elapsed before a critical mass of clergymen appeared in the islands. Between 1565 and 1570 the original contingent of five Augustinians was reduced to three when Urdaneta and a companion returned to Mexico, and then to two when their superior attempted a trip to Mexico and Spain in order to recommend that the Philippines be abandoned as an evangelical field in favor of the richer territories (in terms of souls to be won) of China and Japan. By 1570 scarcely 100 baptisms had been performed.<sup>17</sup> Part of this delay might be attributed to a greater restraint in pressing conversions after forty years of such work in the West Indies, but the lack of clerical personnel must also have played a role. Spanish religious orders responded to the Crown's subsequent call for missionaries and the Augustinians were followed by Franciscans, Dominicans, Jesuits and Augustinian Recollects. Five hundred thousand conversions were claimed by 1622.<sup>18</sup>

Religion, however inadequately assimilated or syncretically practiced it may have been, was the principal means by which the Spanish imposed their authority in the Philippines. Through the seventeenth century, between 254 and 400 priests served a Spanish-controlled Filipino population of 600,000.<sup>19</sup> The Crown subsidized the missionary enterprise, financing the expense of their transport from Spain and Mexico, contributing to funds for the erection of churches and supplies, and making direct payment to the secular clergy. Rhetoric aside, this work did not justify the cost of maintaining a Pacific colony. The gateway city to the Asian continent was to be primarily a center of trade, with clerics and ecclesiastical institutions as likely to participate as laymen.

Legazpi relocated the Spanish settlement's center from Cebu, with its irregular access to China goods, to Luzon. Although the 150 Chinese

residents on the island were an encouraging presence, the trade with China had a rocky start. Cautiously during the next monsoon seasons, the Chinese merchants, persuaded that they could trade freely and that silver was in abundance, gradually increased the amount and selection of the fine goods which they had once reserved only for the island chieftains relative to the cheaper wares, metals and common crockery, which they carried in their trade ships. The fine ware sold readily, since "we who are here have plenty of money and the Chinese need it."<sup>20</sup>

Two vessels were laden for Acapulco in 1572; their voyages were aborted by severe weather which forced them back to port. The first ships with goods typical of galleon cargoes arrived in New Spain in November 1573, carrying about 111 kilograms of gold, approximately 20 tons of cinnamon, 22,300 pieces of gilt china, 712 pieces of silks of all kinds, and a small assortment of curios.<sup>21</sup> "[The] silks [were] of different colors (both damask and satin), cloth-stuffs, a little gold, and a lot of cotton mantles, both white and colored; a quantity of wax, glazed earthenware and other knick-knacks such as fans, parasols, desks and numberless other little manufactured articles."<sup>22</sup>

From Mexico, however, the Viceroy reported that the merchants were initially reluctant to invest in Pacific trade. Legazpi's successor, Governor Lavezares, invited merchants to the islands with little success.

Commercial relations are now beginning to be established with the Chinese; but until this is definitely completed the hopes of the merchants here will not rise, in spite of all I do....[O]ne of the difficulties is that neither from this land [Mexico] nor from España, so far as can now be learned, can anything be exported thither which they do not already possess... And thus, to make a long matter short, the commerce with that land must be carried on with silver, which they value above all other things; and I am uncertain whether your Majesty will consent to this on account of having to send it to a foreign kingdom.<sup>23</sup>

Equally important was the matter of supplying personnel and shipping at the trade's

outset. It was difficult to secure colonists from New Spain and ships were in short supply.

Usually they are miserable little vessels, which draw but little water, and cost almost as much in employing them as a ship of six hundred toneladas---necessitating as they do pilot, master, mate and sailors.... And inasmuch as it does not appear that the merchants are inclined to buy and fit out ships with a cargo, I am not sure, if this business is to go on at your Majesty's expense, whether it would not be wise to have two ships of about five hundred toneladas constructed...<sup>24</sup>

Within a year or two most of the initial hesitations had disappeared. Although no official trade representation was made directly to the Ming authorities,<sup>25</sup> the Chinese came regularly, "twelve or fifteen ships...each year" with fine goods and provisions. "The prices of everything are so moderate, that they are to be had almost for nothing." An abundance of construction material somewhat allayed the Viceroy's reservations about shipping.<sup>26</sup> While silver production was booming in New Spain and Peru, caution lapsed momentarily on control of its flow eastward. A plan to make Manila a "free port" for thirty years in order to enhance its appeal to the Chinese was cast aside, as were worries that levying any duties on the import trade would threaten the supplies of provisions needed by the Spanish. In fact, by 1580 the Chinese were arriving in sufficient numbers that the governor imposed anchorage dues on their vessels as a token revenue measure. The matter of recruiting colonists was not so easily resolved. The burden of encouraging them, like the responsibility for supplying military reinforcements and other state expenses in the Philippines, fell upon the Viceroy at Mexico, and like the *situado*, the annual payment made out of the viceregal treasury for Manila, it was not always a high priority among his concerns. Philippine governors pleaded repeatedly for men and money in their correspondence with the Mexican Viceroy. Failing a response, requests were made directly to the King. Governor Francisco de Sande complained in 1576, "[in] these Filipinas islands, there are at present five hundred Spaniards in all, and if there were ten thousand, all would be rich.

As we are so few, we suffer many hardships, since we are among so many enemies."<sup>27</sup>

The few Spanish, disproportionately Crown officials and soldiers, were in a position to become very rich. While the initial reluctance of merchants to invest in the Philippine trade quickly receded, the composition of the Spanish population suggested that as a destination of colonists for permanent settlement it was certainly a very distant second choice after New Spain. Consequently, in this new area of conquest, dependent on commerce and the sea, the settler population was also disproportionately Basque in origin, like the colony's founder, Legazpi and his companions. By the mid seventeenth century, Basques constituted a strong majority and successful faction among the elite of Manila.<sup>28</sup>

The state's early policy of providing for private trade transport not only permanently encumbered the treasury for these expenses, but brought royal officials at Manila tantalizingly close to the commerce, despite all the prohibitions against it. Regulations issued in 1583 assigned local treasury officers as supervisors at galleon ladings in order to appraise and register merchandise, distribute cargo space, and appoint and examine pilots, masters and other officials.<sup>29</sup> During the first stable decade of trade, 1576-1585, the customary (albeit illegal) role of Crown servants was also well established, with the inevitable consequence of handicapping the participation of the public at large.

In the opinion of Juan Baptista Roman, an unusually scrupulous royal factor in 1588, the Crown would have done better to promote private ownership of ships as it was poorly served in subsidizing the expenses of a merchant fleet which only created convenient channels for official abuse of privilege.

In the former year of [15]eighty-five, Captain Esteban Rodriguez de Figueroa brought a new ship of three hundred toneladas to the port of this city, in order to freight it for [New Spain]; but instead of encouraging and aiding him in it, he was denied all protection....Consequently all those who intended to build ships were discouraged. The reason for this is that since the governors engage in trade and traffic, they do not want any ships belonging to private persons where heavy freights have to be paid...

Freighting two large galleons each year was a heavy and unnecessary expense to the royal treasury, for "one ship of one hundred toneladas is sufficient to bring the ammunition and soldiers to be sent from Mexico." It resulted in enormous losses to the treasury and, he concluded direly, "things will constantly get worse in this direction, unless your Majesty orders the matter corrected."<sup>30</sup>

Governors were repeatedly enjoined to refrain from the trade, but to little avail. Clearly almost all the difficulties which were to beset the conduct of the trade between Manila and Acapulco were present in the first years of the voyages: the dependency on New Spain for support, and on Chinese merchants to appear with the appropriate merchandise; the ambivalence about the flow of silver eastward; concerns about the presence of many "heathen Chinese" in the settlement; the difficulty of attracting colonists; the expense of the shipping; the vulnerability to enemies; and the illegal investment by high officials in the trade. Finally, its success attracted the attention of the Seville merchants whose monopoly of Indies trade was at the core of the Atlantic trade's mercantilist practices. As silver production peaked, the value of the Atlantic trade declined and the Philippines trade was suspect. However, the governors had already instituted a single purchase agreement with Chinese merchants, the *pancada*, in order to put a lid on prices, "to avoid, when possible, the withdrawal of the great sums of reals which are taken to foreign kingdoms," and this independent initiative was officially authorized in 1589.<sup>31</sup> A net of restrictions cast over the Manila galleon trade in the 1590s was designed to limit its growth, but instead it merely instituted a permanent state of surreptitious defiance of the conditions under which it was required to be conducted.

### Restricting the Trade

The extent and frequency of legislation applied to the galleon trade illustrated its success. In 1591 traffic was forbidden by the Spanish Court between China or the Philippines and the West Coast ports other than those of New Spain, thus excluding Peru, the Isthmus, and Guatemala. In 1593 Acapulco was designated the sole terminus in New Spain; and a *permiso*, or an allowable maximum, was fixed. This consisted of two vessels annually, officially up to 300 toneladas each, carrying merchandise not in excess of 250,000 pesos, with an allowable return of 500,000

pesos. Participation was confined to Philippine residents operating on their own account, not by commission, nor by venturing on their own to China, but making purchases at Manila under the *pancada* system.<sup>32</sup> Almost all subsequent legislation directed to the galleon trade simply clarified, reiterated, or modified the 1590s provisions. More than a century elapsed before the Seville monopolists' resistance to enlarging the *permiso* was broken, but only because the Manilans successfully argued that increases in the numbers of residents and rising prices for Asian goods warranted it. The trade continued to be limited, although the values of the *permiso* were raised to 300,000/600,000 pesos in 1702; 500,000/1,000,000 in 1734; finally, to 750,000/1,500,000 in 1776.<sup>33</sup>

The Seville merchants had good reasons to be alarmed. The curbs failed to contain the market for Chinese goods in the West Indies and beyond. The Manila-Acapulco trade in some years reached or even exceeded the values of European merchandise in the Atlantic fleets. In 1597 twelve million pesos were sent from New Spain for the galleon trade.<sup>34</sup> The legal maximums, designed to appease Seville without sacrificing Manila altogether, artfully and persistently undervalued the level of trade, all but licensed contraband, and made a permanent fiction of official trade statistics in the Philippines.

While the Spanish Crown paid to protect the private trade, it reaped few fiscal benefits from it. Without the *situado* (yearly allowance) remitted from New Spain, the public treasury would seldom have shown a positive balance. Commercial interests in Spain repeatedly mounted vociferous campaigns against the trade, which they regarded as a serious threat to metropolitan industry and to their own trade with the Indies, and as a drain on silver bullion which would otherwise come to the home country. Decisions to suspend or alter the trade were made in the Council of the Indies, in Spain, where strategic interests carried great weight. Barring major military defeat in the Pacific, a Spanish presence in the Far East was desirable, despite the consistent operating losses which should have made it expendable. Too poor to tax? Too rich to lose? The endurance of the trade suggests that more than strategic interests were at stake.

Operating as a colonial "mixed venture," the trade's longevity was the result of collusion between public and private interests. The framework of support for the state-subsidized galleons protected the continual westward flow of silver and eastward flow of Chinese goods.

Together they constituted a stream of treasure into which thousands of individuals dipped their hands in the expectation of extraordinary profits. Even though great fortunes were not always realized, on balance the galleon trade was, like the Portuguese *carreira da India*, a pipeline of riches which its creators and tenders were extremely reluctant to shut off.

The most consistent abuse in the trade involved the venality of officials, especially the governor-captain general, far from the watchful eye of his nearest superior, the viceroy at Mexico who however was equally adept at manipulating the system. "Disinterest," a characteristic meaning absence of greed for material rewards, was a rare virtue in the colonial governors of the seventeenth century.<sup>35</sup>

### **The Philippine Islands and "The Many Manilas"**

With entrepot trade the dominant economic activity, the Spanish Philippines did not mature completely into a colony of settlers and landed estates; instead its development was arrested at a stage closer to that of a society of conquest and plunder. By the time of Legazpi's death, in 1572, neighboring districts in the vicinity of Manila had been pacified.<sup>36</sup> With the distribution of *encomiendas* (rights to tribute-paying subjects) the systematic exploitation of the native population was established. These rights permitted worthy Spanish colonists, and, more rarely, elite Filipinos, such as chiefs and military commanders<sup>37</sup> to live in leisure off payments made out of meager Filipino surpluses and from their labor services. *Encomenderos* (encomienda-holders) seldom lived among "their" Indians (the term *Indios* was used for native Filipinos through most of the colonial era).<sup>38</sup> In fact in later decades, many of them did not reside in the colony at all. Consequently, outside Manila the Spanish presence was very thinly spread in the islands, except for the soldiers and priests in their scattered barracks and missions. The Philippines was a primitive "society of conquest" for many years with localized rebellions continuing well into the eighteenth century. The southern island of Mindanao, the most thoroughly Moslem in the region, was never more than partially subdued.

Manila in 1600 was a European settlement comparable to the viceregal capitals at Mexico City and Lima, a well-fortified, walled city, serving as the provincial headquarters for civil, military and ecclesiastical administration and dignified by monumental stone government buildings and churches. The size of the population fluctuated

over the decades but the numbers of native-born Spaniards and their creole offspring were seldom more than a small percentage of the total, for example, less than 2,000 in 1600. In 1620 the population of the city and immediate suburbs was said to be 41,400: 2,400 Spaniards; 20,000 Filipinos; 16,000 Chinese; 3,000 Japanese.<sup>39</sup> As late as 1810 there were only about 4,000 Spaniards.<sup>40</sup>

According to Antonio de Morga, who chronicled the early history of the colony and described society at the turn of the seventeenth century, there were five classes of Spaniards in the islands; the clergy or "prelates, religious and ecclesiastics (both secular and regular); the *encomenderos*," the first families of "settlers and conquistadors; soldiers, officials, and officers for war-services (both by land and by sea); merchants, business men and traders; and his Majesty's ministers for government, justice and the administration of the royal revenue."<sup>41</sup>

Merchants and traders were in the great majority among the Spaniards, but the Spanish were only a tiny portion of the entire varied population of Manila. The international trade created a cosmopolitan, polyglot society, more racially and ethnically diverse and transient in character than any in the Spanish Indies. The diverse peoples of the islands included Negros, Moros, Pintados (or Visayans), Tagalogs, each with different customs and languages. According to Fray Juan Cobo's colorful account of 1589, there were in addition:

Portuguese, Italians, natives of Crete and of the Canary Islands, Indians from Mexico, Negroes from Guinea...Moors from Africa...innumerable Chinese [who] differ among themselves as Italians differ from Spaniards. There are Japanese and Javanese and Bengalis...a great number of people from all other islands...[and] all sorts of blood mixtures...for the people blend with one another.<sup>42</sup>

Customs and policies of residential segregation created many Manilas in the settlement at the mouth of the Pasig River: *Intramuros*, the walled city of Spanish residents; the *Parián*, the Chinese quarter; the *arrabales*, the suburban districts of native Filipinos who lived in villages and hamlets amid kitchen gardens and surrounding rice fields. In Bagumbayan, a

district just beyond the southeast walls, lived middling sorts of colonists, mestizoes, foreigners and others who did not fit into the social order of the central city. Cavite, the royal dockyards and protected anchorage for the merchant fleet nine miles southwest of Manila on the bay, housed several thousand workers who constructed and repaired ships and seamen who served aboard the galleons and other vessels.<sup>43</sup>

The *Intramuros*, a city of Spanish authority and display, contained within its walls a central plaza, parade ground, buildings of state, churches and other religious institutions, hospitals, and private residences, totalling as many as 600 houses at the turn of the seventeenth century.<sup>44</sup> The home of most of the Spaniards who lived in the islands, it covered some fifty square blocks surrounded by a stone wall three miles in circumference, complete with parapets, small forts with gunworks, and six large gates which were locked each night.

However impressive, *Intramuros* was dwarfed by the lively confusion in the neighboring *Parián* of the Chinese. The *Parián* was, literally, a ghetto for the mass of Chinese merchants and artisans, most of them heathen Sangleys who had come on the trade junks to take up more or less permanent residence in the city. The majority of them were poor folk from the Fukien provincial hinterlands who had emigrated to make their living as manual laborers, and in all manner of trades imaginable served their own as well as the Spanish community: "...fishermen, gardeners, hunters, weavers, brickmakers, lime-burners,...and ironworkers";<sup>45</sup> butchers, bakers, grocers, "tailors, shoemakers, carpenters, painters and candlemakers." They had "restaurants [taverns] where they [sold] their own foods and meat shops for Spaniards...their own drugstores where they [sold] not compound drugs but herbs."<sup>46</sup> Their embroiderers, silversmiths, and jewelers were talented craftspeople and their painters skilled artists, even in reproducing the Christian iconography to adorn the many churches of the islands. Bishop Salazar reported in 1590: "When I came here there were no painters amongst them. Now they are so good at painting that they have done admirable work...images of the Child Jesus carved in ivory which are as perfect as can be...Soon we shall not need any more images from Flanders."<sup>47</sup>

Despite efforts to contain their presence, including periodic expulsion orders and several outright massacres in the wake of spontaneous rebellions (the most severe occurring in 1603 and 1639), the resident Chinese numbered from

10,000 to 40,000 for most of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Spanish society lived upon them as much as with them, in near total dependency, poorly disguised hostility and often fear.

At first the *Parián* was merely a space designated by Governor Ronquillo in 1581 to consolidate the stores of the silk merchant-wholesalers (thus the *alcaicería* or silk market), located within the walls in the far northwest quadrant of the city.<sup>48</sup> With the accretion of many wooden stalls and storage areas, it quickly became the central marketplace for the city. Shopkeepers and artisans lodged at their workplaces; swelled by the presence of the itinerant society at the trading season, it became a densely inhabited, confined space, half-bazaar, half-tenement district, exotic in the eyes of Europeans who were impressed by the unusual order of a place that was otherwise a hive of activity. Early constructions of wood, thatch and bamboo cane fared badly with frequent and destructive fires. A series of *Pariáns* rose and fell and by the time of the third (around 1593-94) they were rebuilt in the same general location, but just outside the city walls. Eventually the *Parián* outgrew this space and the area across the Pasig River in the neighborhood of Binondo and Santa Cruz became the center of Chinese commerce and other foreign traders. The Chinese, however, remained subject to special residential licenses; under the authority of officers appointed by the governor, they enjoyed a separate jurisdiction supported by a community treasury.

Much less numerous than the Chinese, the community of 3,000 Japanese were also required from the 1580s to the 1630s to inhabit a separate quarter of Spanish Manila, at Dilao, a suburb immediately east of the city.<sup>49</sup> It became a place of refuge for Christian converts exiled from their native land. However, with the abrupt termination of trade with Japan after 1640 the Japanese population became less significant an element in local society.

The non-Christian Asian residents were outside the framework of the Spanish realm, in a way quite distinct from the terms of incorporation into Spanish society which fell upon the native Filipinos. Tagalog-speakers were the largest single ethnic group on Luzon, but there were diverse others throughout the islands. The yoke of Spanish control did not rest lightly on Filipino society. They served their conquerors in many ways: tribute-payers in private and royal *encomiendas*; residents of concentrated villages

under the authority of missionary priests; provisioners of the rice staple and other necessary supplies through *vendala*; and conscript labor in the system of *polo*.<sup>50</sup>

As a result of the Spaniards' all-consuming economic interest in the galleon trade and the role played in the urban work force by the Chinese, the native inhabitants were exploited primarily in forced labor gangs for the heaviest forms of manual labor, cutting timber for the shipbuilding industry and serving along with slaves and conscripts as rowers in the galleys of the coastal marine service. In their experience such forced labor produced only more onerous servitude, and so the Spanish, who saw only their reluctance to work, regarded most Filipinos as a lazy and shiftless lot. Their world was relatively peripheral to the real business of the city, the Chinese trade. From this perspective, Manila was more like an enclave community, the majority of whose residents, the numerous Chinese and the power-wielding Spaniards, had their cultural and political horizons outside the islands.

Manila was twice the size of Macao (the archetype Iberian enclave of Asia), and anchored more firmly. In 1635, the Portuguese Antonio Bocarro complained about his countrymen's relations with the Cantonese up river from Macao and acknowledged that the trade relationship "is not a settled business, because it decreases greatly when the Chinese may resent something the Portuguese have done to them, like killing a Chinaman; this happens very often, because the Chinese exact money for everything." Macao was "not so well furnished with food supplies, of which many and good and cheap are available in the interior, because as we obtain them from the Chinese, when they have any dispute with us they immediately deprive us of them without those citizens having any means of going to fetch them elsewhere."<sup>51</sup>

In this respect Manila was very fortunate in its position and in its relationships with the Chinese and with the native Filipinos. The galleon trade was a powerful magnet which drew the Chinese and their goods to Manila. As galleon commerce was the principal livelihood of Spanish residents, although it did make strenuous, even brutal demands on native society, particularly in shipbuilding, other means of economic exploitation of the islands and their peoples were neglected. As a result, the extent of coercion which afflicted the Philippines in the first centuries of Spanish colonial occupation was driven by relatively narrow interests that left fewer marks on the islands than might have otherwise been the case.

## THE SYSTEM OF GALLEON TRADE IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY

### The Goods of the Galleon Trade

The trade goods aboard the Manila galleons came from a wide arc of regions on the periphery of the Philippines. The line of production began as far away as cotton fields of the Indian subcontinent, mulberry groves deep in the heartland of the Chinese mainland, pepper orchards of the Malabar coast, and forests of the most southern and distant islands of the Indonesian archipelago. However, the China mainland was the point of origin for most of the goods brought to Manila. The ports in Chekiang at Ning-po, Fukien, and southern Kwantung (Canton) were the centers of foreign trade, especially the coastal prefectures in the province of Fukien.<sup>52</sup> Amoy Island, on the coast, gave its name to a region which included the important inland cities of Chang-chou and Ch'ian-chou. The hinterland contained thriving centers of specialized manufacturing: potteries in northern Jangxi [Kangsi]; artisan workshops in towns and villages of the Yangtze river delta, especially the environs of Soochow city, the center of the silk industry; and the cotton districts near Sung-

chiang. The European presence in maritime trade after 1500 increased economic activity throughout the coastal area as well as deep in the hinterland.<sup>53</sup>

Even before 1500, however, Chang-chou was an example of one area which had begun to devote itself to many of the goods for the export market. It produced sugar and thus the preserved fruits highly esteemed in Manila. Raw silk was imported from the north and cotton from various places, even Luzon, for weaving into fabrics locally. Pots and utensils were made from iron mined in the area. Kilns were established which turned out a cheaper sort of pottery for foreign trade, and lacquered boxes and fans were manufactured for what seemed to be an inexhaustible demand from abroad.<sup>54</sup>

From the time of the first reports on the Chinese trade, the lists of the merchandise which arrived at Manila dazzled in their exotic character, broad selection and brilliant show. Antonio de Morga's catalog of the early seventeenth century described the "bundles of



*Concepción jewelry with spices*

silk...quantities of velvet...brocades of gold and silver...damasks, satins...cloths of every color...musk, benzoin, and ivory...pearls, rubies, sapphires and crystal-stones...fine crockery...beads of all kinds..." and concluded, in phrasing calculated to tantalize the imagination further, "...rarities, to recount all of which would mean never finishing, nor would masses of paper suffice for the task."<sup>55</sup> Manila also depended on the regional trade for the importation of most of its hardware, copper and cast-iron basins and kettles, nails, sheet iron, and tin, as well as what would today be called strategic materials, indispensable for ammunition stores, such as lead, saltpetre, and gunpowder. Many of the trade ships heading for Manila's harbor were known as "fruit junks," laden with necessary food provisions (wheat flour, preserved and fresh fruit), farm animals (buffaloes, geese, horses, mules and donkeys), and songbirds ("some of which talk...and they make them play lots of tricks")<sup>56</sup> all of which entered into the bustling local commerce dominated by the resident Chinese.

The Sangleys were aggressive commercial entrepreneurs whose willingness to please their customers delighted the Spaniards, generations of whom gloated in the tale of the Chinese wooden noses. As the Jesuit Diego de Bobadilla recounted it around 1640:

A Spaniard who had lost his nose through a certain illness, sent for a Chinese to make him one of wood, in order to hide the deformity. The workman made him so good a nose that the Spaniard, in great delight, paid him munificently, giving him twenty escudos. The Chinese attracted by the ease with which he made that gain, laded a fine boatload of wooden noses the following year, and returned to Manila. But he found himself very far from his hopes and quite left out in the cold; for in order to have a sale for that new merchandise he found that he would have to cut off the noses of all the Spaniards in the country.<sup>57</sup>

But the Chinese did not depend on sales of wooden noses to drive a good trade with the Philippines.

Morga, who wrote in the spirit of a critic,

not a publicist, tempered his celebrated account of the luxury trades at Manila with a tone of caution that played well for the growing numbers of critics of the galleon trade in Spain. In the "quantities of gold and silver, wound in skeins over thread and silk," he warned, "all the tinsel glitter of this gold and silver is false, and only on paper." Accounts of the "thousands of other gewgaws and trifles of little value and worth, yet which are rated highly by the Spaniards"<sup>58</sup> did much to stimulate perceptions not only of a range of delightful products of talented Chinese craftsmen, but also of the guileless pleasure with which the Spanish delivered over their silver for these somewhat suspect commodities. It hinted at a notable cunning in the Chinese merchants who purveyed them. The market for Asian goods in the seventeenth century depended on a certain manufactured predisposition and taste for consumer goods which in the blink of an eye were transformed from luxuries into necessities. This market was found in the Spanish West Indies and Europe.

Textiles--woolens, silks, linens, cottons, and various blends--were among the most important categories of goods in international commerce in the early 1600s and well into the nineteenth century, competing with spices in value per ton of cargo. Textiles represented as much as sixty to eighty percent of the total value of typical shipments of goods imported by wholesale merchants in the colonial era.<sup>59</sup> They were the equivalent of present day mass-manufactured goods which urban populations were accustomed to purchasing regularly and country folk acquired whenever they were able. In addition to the bolts and piece goods of material for fine dress clothing and interior decor, and the great variety in sewing accessories (threads, ribbons, trimmings, buttons, etc.), there was a surprising number of ready-made articles of clothing (shirts, tunics, stockings, kerchiefs, shawls) and household furnishings (bedlinens, quilts, coverlets, and canopies, drapery, rugs, cushions). There was also a range of course goods, cheap linens used in clothing for slave populations, heavy canvases for everything from sailcloth to packing materials. Demand for these items grew rapidly with the maturing of the colonial economies, and the galleon trade was able to supply all of them.

The American market for luxury fabrics was established well before the start of the Manila trade. By the mid sixteenth century it had become a stunning phenomenon of life in the New World. In the society of the conquest era, common soldiers who shared plunder could well

afford the trappings of elaborate dress which on the continent were reserved only to the aristocracy. Pedro Nobody could rival the *hijos de algo* (the gentry, literally "sons of somebody") in lavish personal adornment, if not in lineage. Elegantly attired mestizoes and fancy liveries for Negro slaves in the retinues of wealthy families were part of the measure of the bold counterpoint of disorder characteristic of the new hierarchy of a colonial society. In the 1540s "silks are so common here (in Mexico) that low-class journeymen and servants of both sexes as well as lovers and unmarried girls go about laden with silken capes, tunics, petticoats and mantles..." Even "tradespeople's wives and prostitutes wear more clothes of silk than a nobleman in Castile."<sup>60</sup> A rapidly expanding institution in Spanish America in the sixteenth century, the Church was an important customer for silk, requiring material for vestments and church decorations. The secular powers were not far behind. Silks and velvets festooned the chamber halls and draped the dignitaries of local and royal government from frontier towns to viceregal capitals. Once Chinese goods began to arrive with frequency at Acapulco, their appeal to consumers had no bounds.

By the 1630s, according to a memorial presented to the Council of the Indies by the Court lobbyist, Don Juan Grau y Monfalcon, the bulk of the "stapies" sent from the Philippines fell into six broad categories:<sup>61</sup>

(I) Unwoven silk, available in bundles of *seda floja* (loose floss), sold by the gross *pico* or *picul* in Asia, and by the *cate* in the Indies; and silk twists in *en madeja* (skeins) for weaving *en trama* (weft); it was an important source of raw material, considered to be better quality than domestic variety, for New Spain's 14,000 silk weavers in the industry center around Puebla de los Angeles and Mexico City.

(II) Woven silk textiles, in bolts and in lengths of great variety and texture, such as velvets (plain or embroidered), satins, damasks, taffetas, grograms, and picotes; this category also included ribbons, threads for embroidery work and other notions, as well as an extensive variety of clothing accessories, like stockings, petticoats, capes and headdresses.

(III) Varied cotton goods, fine-textured and inexpensive, which although inferior to the quality linens produced on the European continent were in great demand among common people.

(IV) Silk and cotton "blends," especially a wide assortment of decorative clothware and

bedlinens (quilts and coverlets and canopies), draperies or wallhangings, rugs and other goods of household furnishing.

(V) Various "products of the islands," commodities of Filipino origin which were acquired by the Spanish as tribute goods, predominantly textiles made from cotton or other cotton-like plant materials, which ranged from the gauzy lampotes to heavy canvas sheeting, as well as white and yellow beeswax.<sup>62</sup>

(VI) Miscellaneous articles and small wares, some of which were not of Chinese origin, shipped in lesser quantity than goods in other categories. Items from this list were exquisite porcelain wares, well-crafted furniture (cabinets, desks, stands) and elaborately painted screens. The relative bulkiness and fragility of porcelain, in contrast to shipments of textiles, discouraged its being exported in as great a quantity in the seventeenth century as would occur later on. After 1710, changes in the supply of goods to Spanish America, via the English licensed trade as well as increased smuggling, broadened the range of merchandise it was profitable to export. Chinaware destined for the Americas and Spain ranged from elaborate dinner plate services decorated to the order of the purchasers, to sets of cups specially designed for drinking chocolate.<sup>63</sup>


Also included in this catchall category were aromatic resins (such as *camanguian* as storax or benzoin was known in the Philippines) and animal secretions (musk, civet) and ambar, products which formed the base of perfume preparations. Last but not least in value was the jewelry and other items produced by the Chinese silversmiths and goldsmiths at Manila, whose pieces and artistic influence were highly esteemed in distant Mexico City in the early seventeenth century, where, according to Thomas Gage,

The goldsmiths' shops and works are to be admired. The Indians and the people of China that have been made Christians and every year come thither, have perfected the Spaniards in that trade. The Viceroy that went thither [New Spain] the year 1625 caused a popinjay to be made as a present to the King of Spain of silver, gold and precious stones with the perfect colors of the popinjay's feathers (a bird bigger than a pheasant), with such exquisite art and

perfection that it was priced to be worth in riches and workmanship half a million of ducats.<sup>64</sup>

The Viceroy, the Marques of Serralvo, could easily afford grand gestures such as this as he was reputed "to get a million a year, what with gifts and presents, what with his trading to Spain and the Philippines."<sup>65</sup> Gold was a product obtained as tribute by Spaniards from their Philippine *encomiendas*, but it was not sent in quantity, or so it was claimed, except in the form of *bejuquillos*, the slender golden chains "wrought by Malay natives for personal adornment," and pieces considered "presents" or personal property.<sup>66</sup>


Spices were conspicuously absent in the 1630s report, which served as a basis for discussion of the state of the trade before the Council of the Indies. In the period of the Union of the Two Crowns, 1580-1640, the European market was supplied by the Portuguese monopoly contractors who transported spices aboard the India ships directly to Cádiz or via Lisbon, from



*Gold shoe from the Concepción*

which they came in some quantity to the Indies on the Atlantic fleets.<sup>67</sup> Cinnamon, mostly from Ceylon, and pepper, originally from the Malabar coast of southwest India, were however staple items in Acapulco-bound galleons. Cinnamon was marketed in New Spain where it was an important component of chocolate manufacture, and pepper was a hardy commodity which could easily adapt to long range transshipment as far as Europe, but neither were considered especially profitable items compared to Oriental textiles. In the 1620s projects were advanced to increase state revenues by shipping cloves and cinnamon from the Moluccas via Manila and New Spain, although it is not clear to what extent they were successful. As late as the 1720s, during a period in which the Seville monopolists secured a temporary exclusion of silk textiles from the Manila trade, Manila merchants stubbornly resisted pressures to settle for a privileged spice trade as a substitute for the prohibited silks.

Finally, the Philippine lobbyist at Madrid, Grau y Monfalcon, overlooked an array of cotton textiles of Asian origin which were to become more important to the trade in later years. Late in the seventeenth century Manila merchants began to export more of a broad range of Indian cotton goods from the Coromandel Coast.<sup>68</sup> Calicoes, chitas, cambays, ginghams, and the large plain whites, popularly known as "elephants," found a growing market in the New World, especially at the low end of the consumer



*Gold chains from the Concepción*

scale.<sup>69</sup>


There was an important other truth in the caution in Antonio de Morga's early seventeenth century report noted above. The glitter of Pacific commerce can deceive. Over time, the galleon trade flourished, not just because it dealt in expensive exotica, or because it was able to enrich a select few, but because it supplied a broad assortment of clothwares with mass appeal for a diverse and widely dispersed population, which was almost deliberately starved for goods as a result of the rigid workings of the Spanish commercial system. In New Spain in 1641, for example, Chinese silk piecegoods marketed from a shop on the Parral mining frontier could undersell the Mexican Mixteca product.<sup>70</sup> Most importantly, the merchant wholesalers who handled the distribution of Oriental goods in the Indies had almost unlimited access to the silver currency in which they paid for their shipments.

### The Silver Stream



The bills for the assortment of Asian goods delivered at Acapulco by the galleon each year were paid in Spanish silver bullion and pesos, "ryalls of eight," mined and minted in the Americas. The capacity of the Chinese economy to absorb vast quantities of silver was the single most important phenomenon underlying the success of the Manila-Acapulco trade. Chinese demand for silver made the trade potentially damaging because it drained away silver which

would otherwise have gone to Spain. It also made the trade extremely difficult to curtail because of the certainty of profit.

For several previous centuries Europe had been funnelling stocks of precious metals eastward to resolve balances of trade.<sup>71</sup> In the Asian "graveyards" of gold and silver, the "two biggest reservoirs"<sup>72</sup> were India and China. Here the metals were hoarded by some, and also utilized in the innumerable economic transactions that eventually led to those countries being fully monetized by the fourteenth century. Handicraft production in Asia was voluminous, while at the same time Europe had no manufactured goods to market in exchange.<sup>73</sup> Late Ming China (1368-1644) had a population that was at least double that of Europe, a developed infrastructure of internal commerce and important merchant groups in long distance and overseas trade. China prized silver well above gold and this preference, first recognized by the Portuguese, was the key element which made the Spanish peso of such value throughout Asia in the "silver century," 1550-1700 and even later.<sup>74</sup> As one Portuguese commentator wrote, "wherever the Chinese sniffed silver, they brought mountains of merchandise."<sup>75</sup> A colloquial expression current among the Chinese residents of Manila put it most succinctly: "silver is blood."<sup>76</sup> Barely masking his contempt, Philippines governor Don Juan Niño de Tavora (1626-1632) observed of the Chinese, "their god is silver and whatever way they can get it is their religion..."<sup>77</sup> Even the



*Silver mines at Potosí*



*Silver bars and coins*

English had some spleen to vent on the subject. "They will as soon part with their blood as it [silver], having once possession," wrote a Factor of the English East India Company in 1636.<sup>78</sup>

These critical expressions stemmed as much from ethnic and religious prejudices as from concerns rooted in mercantilist principles of the age: the richest and most secure states were able to hold onto their bullion reserves. While the metaphor of "the outflow of silver as a harmful haemorrhage--as if Europe was paying for the luxury of spices and chinoiserie with her own life-blood"<sup>79</sup> was powerful when coupled with the cupidity of the Chinese, it was also misleading. At the same time it was recognized that silver, like a pilgrim, was only good "when it was in motion."<sup>80</sup>

Observers developed theories of flaws in the social character of the different peoples--an indiscriminate love of finery and unrestrained ostentation in the West Indies balanced by a cold and calculating passion for silver in the East--to explain the economic calculus which linked silk and silver. "The Far East at that period was the meeting-place of a world of cheap silver and a world of dear silver"<sup>81</sup> It was cheap where it was mined and dear where it was highly valued.

Beginning in the 1540s, New World silver produced the bulk of the world supply, an estimated 40,000 to 70,000 tons,<sup>82</sup> which rapidly doubled the existing amounts. The boom coincided exactly with the occupation of the Philippines. As silver production increased, the value of silver in relation to gold plummeted. Between 1580 and 1630 in the Spanish Empire, the bimetallic ratio of silver to gold hovered around 12 or 13 parts silver to one part gold. In China at the same time it ranged from 5.5 to 8 parts to one. Thus Chinese goods were comparatively cheap at their source and could be sold for double their value (at least) in the Americas or Europe.<sup>83</sup> It is estimated that from one-third to one-half of the product of the American mines worked its way to China.<sup>84</sup> Manila was the closest transit point in the east for the silver of the American mines, thus the galleon trade was the conduit for this silver flow. Given that there was both a legal, or permitted, trade, which was consistently exceeded, and a large but unknown quantity invested in clandestine shipments, the precise extent of Manila's role in diverting silver eastward is difficult to measure.

### Participants in the Galleon Trade

In principle, there were only two groups who

were parties to the galleon trade at Manila; Chinese merchants who supplied most of the trade goods in the Manila market, and Spanish residents, acting as the essential middlemen, who had the sole right to forward goods on the galleon to New Spain. The system was, however, as porous in this area as in others. Despite measures which were employed to restrict entry to the trade, there was considerable competition to overcome these barriers. One group of "interlopers" were Portuguese merchants from Macao who desired to become the chief suppliers of Chinese goods to the Manila market and managed to drive an increasingly active trade from mainland China in the 1620s to about 1634, despite the ban on such trade as a condition of the Union of the Two Crowns.<sup>85</sup> A much longer-term problem involved the erosion of the trading privileges enjoyed by Spanish residents at Manila by agents representing merchants of Mexico and Peru. Finally, there was the persistent corruption of the galleon trade in frequent attempts by the highest levels of royal officers in the colony to profit from it, notwithstanding the prohibitions against their involvement. The abuses of privilege in the galleon trade were local instances of the widespread fraud which was endemic to the Spanish colonial commercial system.

### Chinese Merchants

The mainland origin of most of the Chinese traders at Manila was the Fukien coast, particularly Chang-chou. The Spaniards called them "*Chincheos*, a corruption of the name."<sup>86</sup> The central government of the Ming Dynasty in this era discouraged foreign commerce, but at the coastal periphery merchant entrepreneurs and shipowners, with the collusion of officials, ignored this, just as Spanish colonists flaunted metropolitan edicts. Chinese merchants and mercantile agents operated under *commenda* (arrangements of commercial partnerships), with licenses from local governors for overseas trade.<sup>87</sup>

Little is known about early commercial transactions between Chinese and Spanish merchants. The *pancada*, the single purchase agreement introduced at the request of Spanish merchants, was implemented in the late 1580s and incorporated into legislation governing the trade in 1593.<sup>88</sup> Perhaps acceptable to the Chinese, the extent of government interference it created was soon vigorously opposed by Spanish merchants who sued for its removal in 1599.

The decree which arrived here relating to the pancada...of the merchandise and cloth which come from China, directing that it should be bought by one person, and that six persons would go with it and dispose of the goods in Nueva España for the citizens of these islands--being put into execution by the...governor, was carried to the royal Audiencia of these islands in course of appeal...in which court the suit is in progress.<sup>89</sup>

The official evaluations of Chinese merchandise were routinely conducted upon the arrival of the junks, as they were necessary in order to levy the import duties, but once the evaluations were completed, merchandise was "sold freely.... The ordinary price of silks (both raw and woven) and the cloths which form the bulk of their cargoes is settled in a leisurely way and by persons who understand the business, on both the Spanish and the Sangley sides."<sup>90</sup> By the close of the seventeenth century, the primary market was an open fair which occurred in April and May, in the period between the arrival of the Chinese junks and the sailing of the galleons.<sup>91</sup>

Early on the Manila trade was conducted mostly at Chinese risk. The suspension of the pancada allowed individual merchants to extend credit to their Spanish buyers and to wait for payment in silver on returning galleons. Morga, usually a hard critic of the Chinese, excoriating them as "a people without any religion or conscience and so greedy they commit innumerable frauds and tricks in their dealings so that it is necessary to be sharp, and to know the goods one is buying, so as not to be cheated," otherwise praised Sangleys as "skillful and intelligent traders, patient and level-headed, so as to do their business the better. They are ready to allow credit and give liberal terms to those whom they know will deal squarely with them and will not fail in paying them in due time."<sup>92</sup> The lobbyist in Spain on behalf of the Manila trade contended that in the 1630s as much as three-quarters of the trade was carried on credits extended by the Chinese.<sup>93</sup> As the Dutch discovered when they attempted to dissuade them from trading with the Spanish, the Chinese invested heavily in Manila, willingly sending their better quality goods. The port was near and reached with minimum risk and expense, consequently the returns were very profitable for

those financiers and suppliers of merchandise who remained in China.<sup>94</sup> At the other end, the numbers of Chinese residents of Manila swelled at the end of each trading season with mercantile agents and commercial travellers, their assistants and dependents. Those who stayed on formed the core of the Parián community and played an active role in the internal retail trade of the colony. In this way, galleon commerce created innumerable niches in the local economy and a good living for the Chinese immigrants who found places within it.

### Spanish Merchants

On the Spanish side, there was no other reason to come out to Manila except to adventure in the galleon trade. By 1600, "merchants and traders form[ed] the majority of the residents in the islands" who came "to invest in this business, exporting annually on the galleons."<sup>95</sup> Commercial life at Manila cannot be reconstructed on the basis of activities of individual merchants, as they are seldom glimpsed in the seventeenth century records.<sup>96</sup> A partial explanation for this is that Spanish attitudes around social prestige contained a strong bias against the mercantile profession that was deeply embedded in Spanish culture. In addition, prior to the creation of a *consulado* (merchant tribunal) in Manila in the late eighteenth century, which formally recognized qualified merchants as those with considerable capital who traded on their own account, the distinction was less clear between active merchants and those who derived some income from occasional participation in the trade. In the seventeenth century Spaniards of note who resided in the colony, those who were considered the body politic or citizenry, customarily represented themselves in formal communications as the "City and Commerce of Manila,"<sup>97</sup> a general rubric which ignored specific identification of merchants active at the time. Most Spanish gentlemen used a military title in preference to an occupational classification, and petitioned the Crown for gratuities and fee-earning offices in addition to whatever income they might have derived from trade.<sup>98</sup> Bartolome Tenório, a city official but also one of the richest merchants of the city in the 1630s with dealings in Macao, and Manuel Eustacio Venegas, the much-maligned favorite of Governor Diego Fajardo (1644-1653), were known to have made fortunes in trade.<sup>99</sup> Finally so much of the participation in the galleon trade was under conditions which were extra-legal at best that extensive record keeping was neither

customary nor advisable.

Nevertheless, trade was the dynamic sector of the Philippine colonial economy where all fortunes were to be made or lost and everyone who had the smallest opportunity to engage in it did so under whatever pretense they could arrange. Galleon trading, the most lucrative of all, was the special privilege the Spanish residents held as if by birthright. The government desired to have a permanent population composed of more than transient traders. The system of shared equity in the galleon trade, one of the few perquisites available to Spaniards who endured the hazards of the sea voyage and other hardships of life far from home, was an inducement to attract colonists and their families who would agree to the condition that they stay for at least eight years.

The policy discouraged some forms of transient trading, but encouraged the equally illegal practice of surreptitious commission trading, whereby Manila residents with no money of their own to invest accepted terms of six, eight, or ten percent as their fee for handling the business entrusted to them by others who resided in Mexico.<sup>100</sup> They, or others employed by them, travelled back and forth on the galleons, transporting merchandise to Acapulco they claimed to have purchased at Manila with their own funds, and returning with silver registered to their own accounts which they asserted was the proceeds of their sales at the fair. As the city council of Manila complained in 1628:

The agents here have only their own profit in mind and care naught about the great damage they do to the commonwealth. None bother to move here because without stepping outside their offices in Nueva Espana they make as much profit as they would if they were living in Manila.<sup>101</sup>

While commission work was customary business practice, it violated the ground rule that the galleon trade should be the prerogative of Manila residents.

The system encouraged subterfuge in other ways. The terms of the *permiso*, which capped the value of exports and limited shipping, further restricted participation in the trade. Once the *permiso* was implemented, lading space aboard the galleons became the most sought after commodity in the trade. In order to check the

tendency of governors to appropriate it, either openly for themselves, under various ruses, or to distribute it in lucrative gestures of patronage, a *junta de repartimiento* (board of apportionment) was instituted to allot *boletas* (tickets) as certificates of lading rights. The board was initially composed of the governor, who continued to wield great influence, the archbishop or a leading cleric who stood for him, city officials, treasury officers, and representatives of the merchants.<sup>102</sup> Merchants increased their representation on the board gradually in the eighteenth century.

The *boletas* served as warrants to be applied to *piezas*, units of divided portions of the bales or chests which composed the merchandise cargo of a galleon. Although *boletas* were divisible into as many as six parts,<sup>103</sup> the typical *pieza* represented one-quarter of a full chest or bale. The total number of chests and bales varied according to the hold size of the vessel selected as a galleon in any given year. Ships were also customarily considered according to their *toneladas de porte* (tonnage burden) and awards of lading space were sometimes referred to as so many *toneladas* in the galleon. Some records suggest that by convention six chests of silks, or eight "piezas" of cotton goods, was the equivalent of one *tonelada* of cargo.<sup>104</sup> The procedure of gauging the *arqueamento* (cargo capacity) of the galleon was an annual rite, undertaken by a committee of experts, which preceded the meeting of the board in charge of distributing lading space.

Under the *repartimiento* system, in order to place cargo aboard the galleon, one had to be a citizen of Manila; an official list of residents was maintained by the city government.<sup>105</sup> The *junta*, however, considered additional criteria in making the allotments, such as seniority and service in the colony, so that residents did not expect to receive equal shares. Many of them were too poor to exercise the allowance even if it were granted, but only certain categories of persons, widows, for example, were permitted to sell their *boletas* or portions to others.

Since the mortality rates were high among merchant-citizens who made frequent trips on the galleons and for those who served in the military in defense of the colony, there were always worrisome numbers of Spanish widow women and their families in Manila who were left with no means of support. For this reason, Manila widows constituted a special interest group with longstanding claims to share in the trade; a separate supplemental list of their names was maintained by the city.<sup>106</sup> The Regulations of

1734 which modified rules of the galleon trade (most of which had been introduced between 1593 and 1620), continued to recognize the right of widows to transfer their shares to active merchants; the same permission was extended to "the poor."

Consequently, commerce in the boletas was a thriving business on its own. Not all citizens exercised the privilege of trading, as they did not all have sufficient capital to invest in merchandise; those who did not ship in any given year were supposed to return their shares to the board, not cede them to others. Critics recognized that grants of lading space to non-merchants widened the circle of those who could be tempted to corrupt the system by selling their privileges to parties who were otherwise excluded from the trade. The most likely purchasers were merchants from Mexico or Lima, or their agents, who sought out citizen-boleta holders in order to obtain their shares. What became a common fraud in later decades was regarded as a bold abuse when it occurred in 1613.<sup>107</sup>

Merchants were also at a disadvantage in securing shipping space when faced with the interventions of higher authorities who demanded a share of the trade. In some cases this was recognized by longstanding custom which permitted senior officials to obtain lading space as an entitlement of office as in the traditions jealously guarded by *regidores* (city councilmen) and by the *cabildo ecclesiastico* (cathedral chapter).<sup>108</sup> Interventions also occurred on an ad hoc basis. For example, in 1628 the Mexican viceroy was alleged to have received galleon shipping privileges;<sup>109</sup> in 1637 a cargo was sent to New Spain to the account of the Count Duke of Olivares;<sup>110</sup> in 1636 the lobbyist for the trade at the court petitioned to be recognized in the distribution of space.<sup>111</sup>

The heavy hand of the governor frequently intervened to award lading rights to persons he protected or wanted to cultivate, charitable organizations he desired to favor, or individuals with needs which his largess could fill. This had occurred in the case of the galleons of 1613 in which space had been dispensed as gratuities to retired military officers and charitable institutions. They in turn had disposed of their privileges to Mexican merchants. In 1622, the traders among the average citizens complained because two of the city's hospitals had received toneladas.<sup>112</sup> In 1633, the governor was ordered to discontinue his practice of giving cargo space to his circle of affiliates as well as to sailors and soldiers aboard the galleons, to hospitals, charities, and

clergymen.<sup>113</sup> The merchants, represented by the city, insisted on a strict commitment to reserve 400 toneladas of cargo space for *vecinos*, citizens of Manila.<sup>114</sup>

To the extent that merchants had recourse of their own to exact the most they could from a system of distribution of limited lading rights, they made use of their access to whomever they could in order to obtain privileged posts on the annual galleons. In this way they might take advantage of the cargo shares enjoyed by the galleon officers, oversee their shipments aboard the vessel, conspire with the sailors to commandeer additional space or carriage of chests, and return with silver, some of it legally registered, other amounts hidden away or confided to the safekeeping of collaborators among the crew.

The experience of two Italian merchants in the 1590s is a rare account of the risks run in taking chances in merchant voyages to Manila through the Indies in the early years of the galleon trade.<sup>115</sup> The Carlettis, father and son, sailed in 1594 from Seville to the Cape Verde Islands where they purchased a lot of seventy-five slaves which they sold at Cartagena and there bought an assortment of merchandise. They made the passage across the Isthmus from Porto Bello to Panama and thence to Callao, the port of Lima, where they sold their European goods for silver bars. They came north to New Spain in a vessel carrying quicksilver "for the King's account," from Huancavelica, with the intention of buying more goods for the Lima trade at Mexico City. Arriving at Acapulco in June, 1595, several months after the galleons would have departed, they went overland to Mexico City, but after several months there, "God disposed," and the senior Carletti decided instead "to go the Philippines, he having felt that such a voyage would be useful," aware that "people in Mexico are accustomed to make that trip each year..." They were not able to travel openly as foreign merchants, for passage licenses, secured from the Viceroy, could not be obtained except by those who had declared their intention to emigrate, but this was only a minor hindrance. They bargained with the captain of a galleon at Mexico City who had received an appointment for the next sailing from the Viceroy. He agreed to transport them under the guise of their serving as officers of his ship, artillery constable (master of the gunners aboard) and guardian respectively, although sailors would be tapped to perform the paid duties under the captain's orders, in exchange for turning their salaries over to him. The matter of

carrying funds, "allowed only to those who live there or truly are going to that region to live," was the other obstacle and as easily resolved as the first.

So under the license that the viceroy gave us as being officers of the ship--which cost very little--we confidently placed the rest in the hands of the ship's captain, who was used to carrying such things for various people who shipped money. And a million gold scudos rode along that way despite the order and a sender was obliged to pay the captain two scudos out of every hundred. And as for the risk, they commended themselves to good fortune.<sup>116</sup>

### Clergy and Obras Pias

Contemporary foreign critics of the trade tended to dwell on the novelty and abuses involved in clerical participation, which others believed to be exaggerated. Le Gentil, the French scientist who lived at Manila for a time in the 1760s, corrected the version of the trade publicized by Richard Walter, the chronicler of the Anson expedition, which he thought misrepresented the role of the Jesuits in the trade.<sup>117</sup> Individual clergymen sometimes acted as merchants, in violation of the regulations; the religious orders and their members sometimes abused their privileges and traded in goods beyond what they were allowed to ship back and forth between their convents in Manila, Mexico and Spain; but the trade was for the most part conducted by merchants, not priests.

The primary form of the church's corporate participation in galleon commerce was through the *obras pias*. These were charitable endowments held by churches, convents and religious brotherhoods, funded by legacies and bequests, whose financial resources were tapped for loans to be used as merchant capital in the trade. By accepting premiums against loss, they also acted as marine insurers by underwriting the risk.

The organizations of the *obras pias* were especially important to the trade in the eighteenth century. According to Padre Joaquim Martinez de Zuñiga, who wrote on the galleon trade around 1800, by that time "breathing its last,"<sup>118</sup> the church endowments were employed in different ways: by "rich merchants"

who made purchases with "ready cash" and "insure their goods...against loss or wreckage of the vessel" with the funds of the *obras pias*; and by the poor who "borrow from the Obras Pias the money with which to purchase the goods for the Acapulco trade which usually comes out more expensive for them because at sailing time (which is when they get the loan) the cost of all goods rises."<sup>119</sup> While he admitted that the *obras pias* were "of great use to the Spaniards just arrived in the Philippines...[who] can start a business even without capital simply by applying for a loan from these lending institutions," he considered the rates "very exorbitant," between 22 and 50% for investments in the Acapulco galleon trade, as high as 20% for China, 25% for "the Coast [of Coromandel]."<sup>120</sup> The proceeds from the Acapulco fair did not always cover the cost of these credits, according to Zuñiga.<sup>121</sup> When *obras pias* investments did earn profits, they were returned to the community in the form of new money available for loan or in philanthropy, as in support of the city's hospitals and orphanages.

Over time considerable capital accumulated in these institutional funds which could not be matched by the resources of any one individual merchant or merchant partnership, as the latter tended to be shortlived in duration and subject to greater risk. Thus their presence in galleon commerce loomed large and seemed especially backward in the view of eighteenth century observers of the trade, particularly to Protestants who were critical of any role for ecclesiastical institutions which seemed to enjoy privileged positions in the commercial market. Spanish commentators also played up the participation of the *obras pias* in galleon commerce, not however by focussing on their activity as lenders to the trade, but rather on their role as beneficiaries of its proceeds. The maintenance of the *obras pias* was an important argument in Manila's defense of its trading privileges against the attacks of the Seville lobby. Whenever possible advocates of the trade drew on rhetoric which emphasized the religious mission in the Philippines as the strongest defense of their commercial interests.

Moreover, most but not all of the *obras pias* were administered by clergymen. The most prominent of the charitable organizations with the greatest amount of funds employed in the galleon trade was the Santa Casa de Misericordia, a voluntary brotherhood or religious association founded in 1596 for laymen. The members, the merchant and bureaucratic elite of the colony, used the organization to satisfy individual religious obligations (in carrying out works of

mercy), to support charitable operations (the women's house of retreat, for example) and most importantly in the prebanking era, as a source of credit to back their commercial investments.<sup>122</sup>

### The Mexican Connection

The eastern terminus at Acapulco was the single site authorized for transshipment of goods coming from Manila and for the fiscal control of the galleon trade, where taxes were collected and where the annual subsidy in support of the military and ecclesiastical establishment in the Philippines was shipped. Although the galleon trade was organized at Manila as if it were a proprietary privilege of the Spanish colonists there, the more powerful interests in Asian commerce were the merchant wholesalers at Mexico City who had direct access to the sources of silver and were part of the commercial network of consumer markets and silk manufacturing centers in New Spain. Mexican merchants distributed throughout the Indies silk textiles and clothing and accessories manufactured in the colony from imported materials. This trade was conducted independently of the Seville monopolists and allowed the merchants at Mexico to cease to be mere appendages of their Spanish counterparts.

Acapulco was a crucial axis in the development of this inter-colonial commerce. Peruvian merchants came to Mexico City to acquire stocks of Chinese goods and re-export them through Acapulco.<sup>123</sup> The Carlettis had planned such an expedition in their journey in the 1590s. Limits set on sea trade between Acapulco and Callao, the port of Lima, were imposed gradually after 1600 until all goods trade was prohibited in 1631.<sup>124</sup> The objective was to sever the route and thereby destroy the serious competition it presented for the Spanish merchants who traded the goods of the periodic Atlantic fleets. But the unreliability of the supply via the fleets in the mid seventeenth century only stimulated the perpetual contraband in Asian goods up and down the west coast of South America. Many small Pacific ports of Guatemala (colonial Central America) aspired to become smugglers' havens.<sup>125</sup> Weak enforcement of the ban on Peruvian trade from Acapulco allowed the coast trade to survive the prohibitions. Gemelli Careri found the Lima merchants to be numerous and quarrelsome bargainers at the Acapulco fair in 1697.<sup>126</sup>

Considerably less is known about the commercial activities and relationships of Manila

merchants in the seventeenth century than for the eighteenth. However, it is very likely that those who were the more firmly established traders, as opposed to those who ventured in the trade on an occasional basis, collaborated with and had strong ties of kinship and intermarriage to the merchants of the Mexican Consulado, the powerful corporate organization of the Mexico City wholesalers.<sup>127</sup> Relatively protected by the prohibitions against foreigners, or even non-Manilans, poaching on their trade privileges, as middlemen and freight forwarders via the galleons they had little reason to promote themselves independently of their Mexican partners. Together however the Mexican and Manilan merchants acted in concert to discourage those outside the circle of established interests. In the 1620s the Manila merchants adopted a more aggressive position in defense of their role in the trade by reclaiming a latent authorization to create a body of representatives to accompany the galleon cargoes as far as Mexico City and to remain there to conduct business.<sup>128</sup> The authority to do so had been issued as part of the series of decrees which had formalized the *pancada* system, the single purchasing of Chinese cargoes at Manila in the 1590s, but had never been implemented. The effect of the procedures they proposed to the government in the 1620s would be to "block the citizens of Mexico who are not agents of those in the Philippines,"<sup>129</sup> as well as to insure that they could capture the greatest returns on the sale of their goods in New Spain.


Everyone knows how much money is brought to the Philippines each year, just as everyone knows that most of this money belongs to the people in Nueva España, despite the profits of so many middlemen. The truth is that when, after a period of two years the accounts are settled, very few of us have made some profit, and in many cases not even the investment is recovered. This is the reason we are always forced to dig into our capital to pay for living and other expenses and why our wealth is dwindling, as is well known...<sup>130</sup>

Rather than be forced to accept whatever terms were offered at the time of the fair upon the arrival of the galleon in order to conclude their business in a timely fashion and return to Manila when the galleon sailed, the merchants from

Manila remained in Mexico. They could then delay their transactions, accompany their trade goods to Mexico City and release them in sales there over an extended period, thus taking advantage of changing market conditions.

In reporting this plan to the Crown, the governor of Manila in 1629 expressed his fears that if this were not well received at Mexico, the merchants there might adopt some retaliation against the Manila trade, such as refusing to make returns of silver.<sup>131</sup> In fact when the delegation of these agents of Manila (known as *comissarios* or *encomenderos*) set themselves up in Mexico after 1630, no outcry occurred there and permission to extend their mission was granted in 1635 and again in 1637.<sup>132</sup> It is not unlikely that the initiative had originally come

from the Mexican side. There were clear limits, however, to the aspirations of the Mexican Consulado to control the galleon trade. In 1637, they petitioned to be openly favored as recipients of the 250,000 pesos of the *permiso*. This may have been part of a strategy to raise the level of the *permiso* in these years, but in any case it was firmly rejected.<sup>133</sup> Nevertheless, the Seville merchants who repeatedly defended their monopoly against competition from the Manila trade for over a century had long recognized where the true center of power lay. In their vigorous polemic on behalf of maintaining the temporary prohibition of Pacific trade in silk cloth in the 1720s, they urged the Council of the Indies "to stay the hand which Mexico moves with the voice of Manila."<sup>134</sup>



The Pacific Ocean, by G.Tatton & B.Wright, 1600

## EXPERIENCING MANILA GALLEON TRAVEL

### Manila Galleons: Design and Construction

Aside from the intricacies of organizing the trade onshore, a vital part of the galleon trade was the voyage itself. The story of transporting the goods and participants across the Pacific is as fascinating as what occurred on either side of the oceans. Spanish shipwrights, steeped in the traditions of the Viscayan shipyards of Spain's northern coast, Chinese artisans, and the sweated labor of native Filipinos working with local woods and imported iron materials were the heterogenous elements in the production of the Manila galleons that were fabricated in the Philippines. It was, however, the consistent, covert defiance of regulations which also influenced the size and design of the ships in the trade. The Spanish galleons of the Atlantic fleet were armed escort vessels which usually carried cargo;<sup>135</sup> the Pacific counterparts were the largest of the merchantmen, and they were armed. The distinction is significant, for the term galleon is a descriptive, historical characterization, rather than a narrow technical identification of a ship. Pressures from Madrid, restricting annual sailings to one or two vessels of limited size, were resisted by governors and merchants who selected ships that were modified for Pacific navigation and the corresponding exceptional cargo needs, heavily loaded with merchandise and provisions for the five to eight month voyages to the New World. As there were fewer navigational hazards and threats of privateers in crossing the vast Pacific than existed in the shorter, more frequently traversed route of the Atlantic fleets, cargo capacity was the primary consideration. The ships seldom conformed to the size limits imposed. The result was the famed Manila galleon, a broad-beamed lumbering ark, with flattened stern to take advantage of the wind.<sup>136</sup> Three or four full decks, deep stowage hold and towering superstructures fore and aft gave it its characteristic half-moon appearance.<sup>137</sup>

These ships of the Manila-Acapulco route were widely known in the annals of world shipping for their superior size as well as their design, and thus enjoyed a romantic reputation even in their own time. The Spanish galleons in the Pacific, beyond even the carracks of the Portuguese India trade, were the largest vessels afloat in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Whereas after 1570 the Portuguese recognized

the greater efficiency of vessels of under 500 tons and began downscaling their carracks to three decks, the ships constructed by the Spanish for service as galleons had begun to expand by 1620 to the oversized vessels of 1,500 to 2,000 tons or larger.<sup>138</sup>

Ship construction manuals of the era specified precise dimensions for the galleons and explained the rules by which proportional measurements (hold and beam relative to length) and net tonnage capacity, or lading space, were calculated. For example, a galleon with an overall length of 110 feet, beam of 37 feet, and depth of hold of 18 feet, was reckoned to be a ship of 1,000 toneladas, a comparatively midrange-size vessel.

At the top end of the scale there was the example of the *Santísima Trinidad*, "upwards of 2,000 tons burden," with a gun deck of 167.5 feet, a breadth of 50.5 feet, and a hold 30.5 feet deep when measured at the poop.<sup>139</sup> In the Philippines, galleons were constructed according to specifications set by the requirements of the merchant shippers, a practice which generated complaints from the merchants of Andalusia.<sup>140</sup> A construction manual issued in Manila acknowledged the reality of pressures from commercial interests and admitted an allowance for a merchant ship almost two feet wider in the beam than was usually prescribed, "because it will be overloaded."<sup>141</sup>


The calculation of the amount of cargo stowage or lading space used a precise, elaborate formula derived from average proportional measures.<sup>142</sup> The model vessel of 1,000 toneladas burden carried about a third of that weight in ballast stones leaving 883 toneladas of space in the hold for cargo.<sup>143</sup> In the case of the Manila galleons, the Manila construction manual noted that cargo capacity was in practice reckoned according to the estimated space taken up by "bales in the permission," as well as the amount of "things needed for the long voyage."<sup>144</sup>

Thus the tendency to construct ever larger ships for the Pacific trade was exaggerated by the premium on cargo space in the annual sailing. Bales of trade goods competed for stowage area with the considerable amount of food and water provisions needed for crew and passengers on the long voyage to Acapulco. Although from 1600 onward the galleons were frequently in danger of

attack at sea by Dutch or English pirates, the vessels went relatively lightly armed. In constructing, outfitting and arming the galleons, efficiency and even safety usually ran a distant second and third to the desire to maximize profits from the commercial voyage. Usually on most of the trips the ships' guns were carried in the ballast hold. The main decks overflowed with chests and bales and stores, tolerated by the superior officers of the ship who themselves were usually transporting goods over and above the maximum allowed. The storage areas constructed on the half-decks made the vessels appear to be small villages at sea.<sup>145</sup>

important responsibilities of the governor-captain general. A good governor built many ships and despatched them in the appropriate season. The shipyards at Guayaquil (Ecuador) obtained supplies from throughout the wide reaches of the viceroyalty of Peru, but skilled labor was rare and costly.<sup>148</sup> The Philippines, however, had an indigenous boatbuilding tradition, could depend on immigrant Chinese artisans as well as Filipino labor and, except for iron, were abundantly supplied with the materials necessary to satisfy the demand for shipping. There was no lack of material and craftsmen to supply sails and rigging.

Excellent local timber, of great variety and



*Cutaway of galleon being loaded*


The business of ship construction, maintenance and outfitting was the largest single industry in the Philippines, supplying merchant ships, or galleons, as well as inter-island oared galleys which served as local supply ships and military carriers. No other activity consumed as many resources or mobilized as many individuals on a continual basis. In the 1620s and early 1630s the rate of galleon completion was approximately one a year, at a cost of 30,000 pesos each.<sup>146</sup> Galleon construction and support of the naval arsenal and fleet at Manila absorbed about a third of the annual expenses of the colony.<sup>147</sup> It was one of the most

high quality to suit any and every specialized need in the design of the vessel, contributed an important measure of distinction to the galleons' reputation for sturdy hulls, relatively impervious to cannonfire and shiprot. "Stout castles in the sea," Padre Casimiro Díaz called them. The framework was often made of molave, a hard wood similar to teak, nearly indestructible.<sup>149</sup> In 1619 Sebastián de Pineda, a naval officer with Philippines experience, reviewed the principal materials of construction in a report prepared for the Council of the Indies. Palomaria, light but durable, slow to rot (if at all) and splinterproof, was used for the futtock- and compass-timbers,

knees, capstans, gears, stringer-plates, snatchcleats and for the wales and prows. An 8-pound or smaller cannon ball would not pierce it. Arguio grew very tall and straight, like pine; strong and heavy, it served well for "keels, beams, false keels, wales, mastheads and pumps" as well as artillery works -- gunstocks, gun-carriages and wheels. Planking and sheathing, as well as masts were made from a wood known as "laguan." It was especially good for the mainmasts of the large galleons as it might come in a piece as much as 132 feet long and 10 feet in circumference. The ropewalk at Cavite produced rigging from the native abaca, "stronger than hemp and used white and unpitched," and gamu, the source of a distinctive black cordage. Even the canvas-like mantas, the cloth from Ilocos, was thought to be superior to any from New Spain or Spain for sails.<sup>150</sup> The use of coconut husk for oakum, caulking material, and a particular mixture of fish oil and lime, known as chunam, to careen the hulls, also adapted local practice to Spanish needs.

The foundry at Manila, established in the first years of the colony, supplied a great range of fittings and accessories for the ships, anchors, bells, etc., as well as cannon. Unwrought iron, the most difficult item to secure reliably, had to be imported from Macao, China or Japan, or as far away as India, and was occasionally in dangerously short supply. Iron gratings from households in the city were sometimes confiscated by governors for use in the shipyards.<sup>151</sup>

The least renewable resource used in ship construction was labor, employed chiefly in the brute work of cutting timber in interior regions and floating it to the coasts. Gangs of 6,000-8,000 men, dragooned under the *polo* (labor draft), served four to six week periods, in grueling turns of workdays that ran from midnight to sundown, felling, transporting, and roughcutting logwood, receiving little for their efforts but "beatings, and bad pay and worse provisions."<sup>152</sup> A report of 1701 acknowledged that woodcutting was "an unavoidable evil" which had contributed much to



*Shipyards at Cavite*

the depopulation and misery of Filipinos.<sup>153</sup> Some amelioration of the labor burden on the Filipino population in the region nearest Manila was attempted by removing shipyards to more distant locations in southern Luzon and the Camarines, but although this saved the expense of hauling wood to Cavite, the yards were more exposed to enemy raids by the Moro pirates of the southern islands. The exploitation gave rise to the saying that "there are no mines so severe as the shipyards."<sup>154</sup> These conditions continued with little relief for many years.

Cavite, about nine miles southwest of Manila, was the site of the royal docks and the anchorage for the galleons. It was also the principal shipyard of the colony and an impressive marine supply center and industrial establishment. In addition to some 1,000 seamen who served full- or part-time aboard regional shipping and in the galleons bound for New Spain, and 1,000 or more convicts assigned as galley slaves, the workforce at Cavite in the 1630s had over 1,000 men employed, about half of them in carpentry and the rest in ropemaking, cooperage, smith work and caulking. Less than 2% were Spaniards (usually masters), 10% were Chinese workmen and the rest were Filipino laborers, at least half of them doing rough carpentry, sawing and planing, all for only a few *reals* of silver and rice rations per month.<sup>155</sup>

Labor costs, however, were only a small portion of the total expense in support of the trade ships. Annual maintenance was an additional factor. The ships themselves had relatively short lives, with rare exceptions usually serving ten or twelve years at best. Construction was often done in haste to meet immediate needs for the annual sailing. Woods that should have been well-seasoned sometimes were not, or lead sheathing was ignored,<sup>156</sup> creating additional labor in annual careening. Opinion divided over where the galleons could be built, for longest service, in utmost efficiency, and at least cost, but those who advocated contracting shipbuilding out to the highly regarded Portuguese yards at Cochin, or to factors who cooperated with local princes on the southeast Asia coast did not always have time or political fortune on their side. Debate continued for many years, even after the Crown ruled against construction outside the Philippines after 1679. The struggle was more than academic, for the shortcuts adopted in building vessels contributed to anxiety aboard ship where "even in a milk-calm sea there's but a board betwixt Life and Death."<sup>157</sup>

Once construction was complete, galleons

were tested for maneuverability under sail. Occasionally newly-built galleons failed in their maiden voyages, usually owing to overloading or improper stowage of cargo, although advocates for the Filipino natives attributed the cause of these disasters to divine retribution for labor exploitation.

### Cargo Lading

The process of preparing the galleons for departure, especially the lading of merchandise was the proverbial "needle's eye" through which the trade of Manila was required to pass. The challenge was twofold: first, to assemble a cargo high in value and potentially profitable to all parties, which outwardly appeared to conform to regulations and the fixed limitations on the trade; and second, to manage its storage on a vessel which had also to carry its full complement of crew, passengers, weaponry, ships' stores and food and water provisions sufficient for the voyage of at least seven months. The normally indolent life of official Spanish Manila was interrupted for a brief energetic period to complete this annual task. The royal officers of the city closed the doors of the *Audiencia* (High Court) for the duration. The governor withdrew to his residence to complete his annual reports, and then, if personally inclined or specially charged, went out to Cavite himself to oversee the officials' administration of the ships' lading. A stream of traffic in barges, junks and smaller boats crossed the bay with merchants, supercargoes and chests and bales in tow, and the maneuvering for privileged placement began.

The Manila trade was notorious for dispensing with the volume of paper documentation usual in long distance trade. Efficient packing was a secure method of disguising contraband and other false lading. Duties and fees were paid upon a gentlemen's word and normally packages were not opened in either Manila or Acapulco. The king's accounts suffered, in getting shortchanged on the customs duties, when expensive goods passed for cheap, and the trade itself earned a reputation for dishonesty in its shipments, when inexpensive goods were passed off for higher quality. From the earliest days of the trade this kind of fraud was attributed to a special talent for commercial knavery on the part of the Chinese. Later the merchants of Manila were implicated in the so-called "trampas de China," a charge given wider publicity by the writings of the traveller-scientist Baron Alexander von Humboldt after his visit to

Acapulco in 1804. In all fairness, however, he himself had qualified the allegation: "it must be allowed that the commerce between two countries at the distance of three thousand leagues from one another, is carried on perhaps with more honesty than the trade between some nations of civilized Europe, who have never had any connection with Chinese merchants."<sup>159</sup> Ocean shipping favored large packages, but as shipments grew in size, they finally aroused the complaints of muleteers in New Spain over the carrying capacity of their teams on the overland route from Acapulco to Mexico City. The threats to break down chests at Acapulco were more effective in forcing shippers at Manila to adhere to regulation sizes than legislation alone.

Placement as well as size was also the object of legislation. The laws mandated that trade cargo should be confined to the main hold, giving room for the necessary equipment, ship stores and seamen's chests in between decks. These rules were generally flaunted. Galleon captains allowed more bales on board than the law allowed and permitted them to be stored on every deck and in every conceivable passageway and cranny of the ship. In displacing food and water provisions required for the long voyage to Acapulco they put everyone, including themselves, at risk.

#### Manning The Ships: Galleon Crews

In the early seventeenth century about 400 people usually sailed aboard each galleon, the majority of whom, on average 250, were the ship's officers and crew. These included some six senior officers, twenty special duty personnel, sixty sailors or able seamen and that many again apprentices and ship's boys, plus seventy-five men among officers, gunners and common soldiers in the infantry units.

The galleons sailed under the command of the fleet general, who was aboard the *capitana* or flagship. The position, which had the grandiose title "General of the Sea," conveyed enormous prestige, including the perpetual right to the military *fuero*, a coveted social and juridical privilege in the colonial era.<sup>159</sup> It was invariably a patronage post, which by the 1620s the governor at Manila had wrested from the viceroy at Mexico City. The position was coveted less for its prestige, which was substantial, than for its many financial prerequisites, primarily access to legal as well as illegal channels for enrichment. These ranged from allotments of cargo space to commissions entrusted by the local

merchants, to endless opportunities to indulge in graft of various sorts. Gemelli Careri, the diarist of a 1690s galleon voyage, stated that the least amount the general could expect to receive from his commissions alone was 25,000 pesos, besides which no doubt he had his own investments aboard. In the event two ships sailed, a post of admiral was awarded to the captain of the accompanying "admiral's ship."

According to critics of the system, the award of the superior patronage posts tended to reduce the captain to a straw man.<sup>160</sup> The position of senior pilot, in charge of navigation and the technical governance of the vessel, was in fact the most responsible post on the ship, and consequently paid good wages. Because of the lengthy navigation, and the need for experienced men on the route, the pilot always had one, two, or occasionally three assistants. In high demand, apprentice-pilots acquired skills necessary to rise to the senior command, but then often made an early retirement on the strength of lucrative investments in the trade. The mechanisms to maintain a pool of trainees were limited. Le Gentil, the French scientist who observed life at Manila in the 1760s, praised a recent governor's efforts to support a course of study in navigational sciences. "The Marquis of Obando...in 1750...founded a Chair of Mathematics for the advancement of the art of navigation. He died in 1754, and his school died with him... Manila obtains from Mexico the men who navigate its galleons."<sup>161</sup> It is evident from the names of pilots mentioned in the texts that many pilots in the galleon service were "foreigners," Portuguese, Italian, English, and French navigators with Pacific experience on whose behalf the usual rigid national restrictions were probably more easily waived.

In addition to the captain (general or admiral) and the pilots, the rest of the principals of the crew included a master, customarily the senior administrative officer of a merchant ship, second in command to the captain, according to Spanish naval tradition in the Atlantic arena. However its order in the hierarchy of function in the Pacific, where patronage overwhelmed the credentials of training and experience, is less clear. The master's second, the *contramaestre* (boatswain), was primarily the rigging master or supervisor for both equipment and the crew members who handled it, relaying most of his orders through his assistant, the *guardián*.

The galleon's silver master took responsibility for the treasure chests on the run from New Spain. He and an inspector-clerk and

a chaplain all had responsibilities which required some professional qualification. The corps of skilled workmen, the carpenters, caulkers, coopers, divers and munitions experts known collectively as the *maestranza*, and the supply personnel (a steward, a master of rations or allowances, and the water master), and the cooks compromised the rest of the specialized personnel. The work of the sailors, only a few of whom were Spaniards, was assisted by the mass of lowly apprentice seamen and ship's boys, most of whom were Mexicans, Filipinos or natives of other Asian countries.

Patronage appointments to positions on the galleons extended to minor officers as well and did not preclude payments for the privilege. In the perfunctory inquiry he made into the reasons for inventory shortages on his ship, a Spanish official who served as a westbound admiral in 1635 discovered that the boatswain's mate had incurred a debt of "three thousand escudos" for his post, but then compounded his obligations by converting the funds he carried in order to purchase ship supplies at Acapulco into merchandise to sell at the fair. His expectations collapsed when the proceeds from his trading failed to cover his costs. He was out of pocket and consequently his ship also ran short of rigging.<sup>162</sup>

Many native Filipinos used the galleons to escape the islands, abandoning the vessel on the Acapulco side.<sup>163</sup> Enterprising immigrants along the New Spain coast recruited their countrymen to work in palm wine distilleries which sprang up in this vicinity. When and if they decided to return to their homeland they joined a pool of casual labor in the port. Thus at Acapulco it was easy enough for Manila-bound passengers to contract for a Chinese cook and Filipino assistants for the voyage among the many Filipinos waiting there in the port, happy to work their way back to their native land in return for meals during the journey.<sup>164</sup>

Evidently, places aboard the galleons for both passengers and crew were almost as dear as lading space and were coveted for the same reason, the opportunity they offered to share in the proceeds of the trade. The possible returns varied, depending on where one stood in the hierarchy at sea and what connections to the merchant community one enjoyed on land. Everyone, from the most senior officer to the lowliest seamen hoped to turn some profit in carrying goods to the Acapulco fair, on a lesser scale perhaps but comparable to the base of 100% profits which the large commercial investors

expected to clear. Seamen prized their liberty to carry aboard one small chest duty free, a permission which was frequently abused as merchants persuaded impoverished individuals to use it to transport cargo for a nominal fee.

Every matter of position and responsibility on board the galleons was prescribed by custom, frequently reinforced by specific pieces of legislation designed to guarantee safe passage. A published general set of ordinances for the galleons appeared in the mid-eighteenth century.<sup>165</sup> Prior to that time, sailing orders were issued upon every voyage to the general of the fleet. The sailing orders in 1635-1636 addressed the importance of the commanding officer in maintaining harmony and general safety, insisting on the regularity of the rounds of watches and guards, and, as fire regulations were of great concern, attending to the confinement of the cooking hearths in the ship's center (the waist), and to enforcement of smoking prohibitions.<sup>166</sup> According to Governor Arandia's ordinances, the penalties for violating smoking rules were very severe.

Smoking cigarettes is absolutely prohibited. The captains are to take particular care that there are no disorders attending smoking in the cabins and berths... Anyone who is found smoking outside the permitted areas of the ship will be put in the bilboes for fifteen days on bread and water. And if anyone smoke a pipe or cigar without the prescribed precaution, he will be condemned to serve a year without pay on the same ship or in the galley at Cavite.<sup>167</sup>

The sailing orders typically stressed the role of the commander as a magisterial and paternal figure, responsible for the souls as well as the bodies of his temporary community. The chaplains, for example, served at his pleasure, saying mass and observing special devotions at his discretion.

The commander-general also had the final say on determining space assignments to passengers and crew, an area in which the rigorous hierarchy of shipboard life was especially apparent. With the exception of an arriving governor, no other senior official merited the kind of spacious cabin arrangements in the sterncastle

he enjoyed. The pilots and other senior officers shared quarters aft. Commonly an area in the prow of the ship was consigned to the artisans and the lower-ranked duty personnel. Overworked seamen who needed rest during periods of severe weather were berthed under the sterncastle.<sup>168</sup>

### Passengers

The composition of the passenger list varied according to the direction the vessel was sailing. Westbound the galleons transported merchant adventurers, missionary priests, troop reinforcements for the Philippine garrisons, and colonial bureaucrats, their families and other dependents. Infantrymen could be an unruly bunch, many of them creole and mestizo youths seized in Mexico in the levies that preceded the galleon sailings. Also aboard were groups of men with an even higher potential for disruption, convicted criminals destined for forced service in the galleys of the distant archipelago. Eastbound, towards New Spain, the galleons brought returning clergy and officials and their servants, as well as Chinese mercantile agents and cargo supervisors who might come to dwell for a time at Mexico City. Otherwise Asians came to Mexico as servants to merchants or other Europeans. Passenger accommodations were extended at considerable cost and by special license to only a few, mostly Europeans. A recommended fare around 1620 was 200 pesos for transport with a berth, 100 without. Impecunious travellers served their time as seamen or soldiers in order to make the voyage. Passengers took whatever accommodations they could best arrange, with the more influential people able to dislocate crew from precious cabin space. The remainder crowded together in "the prison of shipboard life," the vivid metaphor for travel by sea in the early modern era. As the author of one of the most colorful descriptions of Spanish seafaring continues about their quarters: they were confined in cramped compartments, on tiny cots, in "lodgings so closed in, dark and odoriferous that they seem to be burial vaults or charnel-houses...As the lodgings seem to be in the innermost recess of Hell (if they are not), it is perfectly appropriate that the doors and entrances be on the ground, so that those who enter them, do so by sinking."<sup>169</sup> Or worse, the hapless passengers were themselves put out onto the decks among the crew and military squadrons already distributed about the ship according to an order of rank.

Father Francisco Puig was among the

Jesuits exiled from the Philippines in 1768, who could expect no courtesies aboard ship under the terms of their banishment. All sixty-four were packed together with the ship's guard (a unit of twenty-five soldiers) in a space which might better accommodate twenty. "These quarters were so uncomfortable and so open to the cattle, pigs and other animals that we had to keep an eye on them day and night, for when we least expected it the beasts place themselves on our cots, especially on rainy nights."<sup>170</sup>

### Provisioning

The character and disposition of food and water provisions for so many, especially on the long voyage east, were matters of intense concern to everyone aboard. All were bountifully supplied, especially with fresh fruits and vegetables, in the first days of the voyage. The superior officers carried their own provisions and servants to provide for their meals. Passengers with means brought aboard generous stocks of live chickens and pigs, eggs, wheat flour, savory sausages and hams, preserved fruits and other delicacies, all obtained from the Chinese provisioners in Manila and Cavite. Less privileged passengers, who were not invited to the commander's table, contracted with other officers or their subordinates for meals. The rest ate together in *ranchos* as "messmates," making do with the common rations, a daily allotment of the simplest foods which alternated little between the "meat and fish days."

The standard rations at the crew's tables in the mid-eighteenth century consisted of: 18 ounces sea biscuit, 6 ounces jerked beef, 3 ounces fried pork, one-half ounce salt, one-quarter ounce vinegar (the allotment for ten people). On a "fish day," 3 ounces mixed *menestras* (legumes), 6 ounces fish and one ounce lard were distributed in place of the beef and pork. In the common rations, chicken was only dispensed to crew members in the sick bay.<sup>171</sup>

Diet depended to some extent on sailing conditions and ethnic preferences. Crews of native Filipinos were accustomed to their *morisqueta* (boiled rice) as an alternative to sea biscuit. Weather permitting, that is when fires could be lit and water boiled, it was prepared regularly; in mid-voyage when water conservation was essential, it was discouraged until the approach to the California coast.<sup>172</sup> Hardship was the rule. Most of the common rations were routinely undersupplied to the crew, whose malnourishment and ill treatment were notorious.

Sailing orders required the commander to withhold one-third of the ration complement for most of the voyage. It ensured a potential stock, however deteriorated, at the end, but at some cost to the daily dietary requirements en route.


Wormy hardtack, stinking water and salt meat so hard it had to be shattered with a hammer was the diet of those handfuls of men beaten by waves and whipped by snow and rain for long months. Toward the end of a trip the rats from the hold were a prized delicacy and bought at high prices by the famished passengers and crew.<sup>173</sup>

Crew members charged with storing, maintaining and dispensing the supplies had to be both responsible and equitable in their duties, as well as thick-skinned, in order to withstand the anguished criticism when stocks deteriorated and rations were shortened toward the end of the voyage. Guards accompanied the chief steward and the water constable when they dealt out the daily rations at the hatch doors. Toward the end everyone suffered from the inevitable deteriora-

tion of the staples and the deprivation of fruits and vegetables, and the most privileged subsisted on carefully hoarded treats of chocolate, wine and sweet preserved fruits. A bit of wine-soaked biscuit or a sip of sugar water was usually preferred to the rancid stocks and verminous gruel that comprised the fare late in the journey.

The storage and distribution of fresh water was undoubtedly the single most important feature of the ship's provisioning. The individual daily allowance of water was only about one-and-a-half quarts a day, one-quarter portion of which was considered to be for cooking purposes and consigned to a common store, with the rest allotted for drinking water.<sup>174</sup> This allotment was the bare minimum. Constant thirst was one of the many hardships of a sea voyage, exaggerated undoubtedly by the heavy concentrations of salt in the standard ration of preserved meat. A ship with 400 people aboard, passengers and crew, would require more than 30,000 gallons of water for a typical voyage of seven months (210 days). Spanish navigators had devised a desalinization process for seawater by 1600 but it was not feasible on a large scale and apparently not widely used.<sup>175</sup>

Over the centuries of the galleon trade a variety of water storage methods were employed,



*Storage jars recovered from the Concepción*

from the traditional wooden vats typical of the Atlantic to oversize bamboo canes and leathern vessels, popularized after 1750, and systems of water tanks or cisterns specially constructed for the larger ships. In the seventeenth century the Manila galleons had their own unique tradition for managing the supplies of water for the long eastbound voyage, an "extremely singular" method, according to Richard Walter, chronicler of the Anson expedition of the 1740s.<sup>176</sup> Wooden casks and barrels were cumbersome, took up valuable space in the cargo hold, and were subject to leakage and algae-growth, and so typically the galleons carried their water and other perishables in large earthenware jars, with black roping made from a native vine or rattan for both protection and lifting. The storage jars, which to the European eye seemed to be similar to the olive jars used aboard vessels in the Mediterranean, could be sealed securely with cork or other materials. They were exceptionally sturdy and resisted decomposition.

One jar held sufficient water for twenty persons per day, or approximately 5.5 gallons. As many as 2,000-4,000 might be put aboard, "proportionably to the number of people, and bigness of the galleon."<sup>177</sup> Nevertheless even thousands of jars would need replenishing several times over on the eastbound voyage. The jars were refilled at stopovers while the vessels coasted the islands within the Philippine chain. Once into the open sea, matting was sprawled across the decks and in the rigging during rain storms and squalls in order to catch water and direct it into gutters created from bamboo canes, and spill it into the jars.<sup>178</sup>

At Manila, the jars were imported from China, Thailand and Vietnam, as well as made locally, and supplied in great quantities by Chinese provisioners for the galleons. On the Acapulco side they were more difficult to come by, but they were considered an essential item for the journey. Arranging for the water jars was considered the highest of priorities for the "commissary fathers" charged with preparing the supplies for the groups of missionary priests sailing from Acapulco in the galleons. They were easily marked with their owner's identification. Scratched markings on the surface denoted the contents and the ownership.<sup>179</sup>

When rainwater failed, and water supplies depleted, short rations were introduced half-way through the long voyage. On the return voyage to Manila, though not as long by half there were still dangers of water shortage. The ration might be cut to less than a cup a day before the galleons


reached the vicinity of the Ladroneas.<sup>180</sup> The stop was anticipated with high hopes because of the availability there of fresh provisions.

According to the chronicler of the Anson expedition, "when the Manila ship first puts to sea, they take on board a much greater quantity of water than can be stowed between decks and the jars which contain it are hung all about the shrouds and stays, so as to exhibit at a distance a very odd appearance."<sup>181</sup> The almost decorative display, together with the topdeck stowage of merchandise and the densely compacted accommodations for the ship's crew and passengers, all contributed to the vision of the galleons as floating cities in miniature.

### Navigation on the Transpacific Routes

The early navigators were perhaps fortunate in their ignorance of the vastness of the Pacific Ocean and the terrors that could be unleashed by the heavy seas and fierce gales that swept across it. In the absence of instruments to determine longitude prior to the introduction of the chronometer in the mid-eighteenth century, the compass and the astrolabe were the most advanced technical devices available to the indefatigable practical pilots of the 1500s, who relied on their inventive use of intuitive reckoning based on simple observations. Compelled to establish a sea passage to the East that skirted Portuguese claims, Ferdinand Magellan's expedition for Spain pioneered the westerly route in the voyage that circumnavigated the globe in 1519-1522.

Magellan, with an apprenticeship at sea of only seven years in shipboard service in Portuguese Asia, operated with passionate conviction and good guesswork in his application of the method of "lead and lookout" in order to round South America through the straits that came to bear his name and enter the great South Sea (Mar del Sur) as the Spanish called the Pacific.<sup>182</sup> His ships were assisted in their north and westerly direction by ocean currents and the force of the southeast trade winds in the southern latitudes; at the equator the equatorial currents continued to propel them west ahead of the northeast trades. Their track -- consistently west by northwest into the area of the Ladroneas, less than 1,000 miles or a few short weeks from the Philippines if the winds were favorable -- established the permanent course of the westbound galleon route with relative ease. Later crossings which set out from the coast of Mexico stayed within the broad belt of the northeast



*Magellan on his voyage of discovery*

trades and further reduced the time. The more illusive navigational trick was to discover the return route east.

The chief obstacles were the variable winds of the monsoon season in the vicinity of the Philippines and the uncertainty about the location and force of an easterly current in the northern Pacific. A number of attempts between 1525 and 1550 were unable to withstand damage caused by severe storms and typhoons northeast of the Philippine island chain and were forced to put back in failure. Finally, in 1565 Andrés de Urdaneta, a veteran navigator of an earlier voyage, guided a ship of the expedition of Miguel López de Legazpi (1564-65), far enough north past the Ladrones to encounter the Japan Current and benefit from the prevailing westerlies in those climes to make for the northern California coast. The establishment of the eastbound route did nothing however to eliminate the grueling elements that conditioned it: severe storms, variable winds, extremes of temperatures, and the very length of the journey.

#### The Eastbound Experience

The eastbound route from Manila to Acapulco was extremely difficult because of

length, on average seven months, the danger of typhoons in the sailing season, and the absence of ports of call for reprovisioning or repairs. In his account of his experience, the seventeenth century traveller, Giovanni Francesco Gemelli Careri, publicized the route as "the longest, and most dreadful of any in the world."<sup>183</sup> Many of the harshest aspects of the journey, such as the cramped quarters aboard the ship, primitive hygienic measures and appalling sanitary conditions, poor diet, and punishing storms, were not untypical of other sea journeys, nor even much worse than life on land, but the sum of torments were exacerbated because of the unusual length of the time at sea. This in turn was a consequence of the natural forces that beat against the galleons in the eastward navigation.

Although navigators understood the need to gain the high latitudes to pick up the westerly trades, they were repeatedly set back by severe weather just beyond the Philippines, a pattern of failure that plagued the galleons throughout the history of the trade. The *arribada*, or forced return to port in a severely storm-damaged condition, was an all too frequent experience for those who sailed east.

The chief cause of *arribadas* was the predictable instability of the weather from June

onward, and the ferocity of the typhoons which could occur anytime between July and October. However, they needed the rising southern winds, the "vendavels," in order to ensure that they could maneuver the currents of the San Bernardino straits and head north east with ease. Consequently the galleons often held back after June 24, the date which was theoretically ideal for their departure, knowing that they might expect to run into foul weather at any time after raising their anchor in Cavite. Thus a successful voyage depended on a stroke of good fortune as much as navigational expertise.

Seafaring Spaniards in the seventeenth century called on a powerful tradition and elaborate set of religious symbolism in order to ensure their safety aboard ship. All their seagoing vessels had religious names and particular patron saints. They carried images of the saints on the routes, were dutiful about observing religious devotions during the trip and conducted formal ceremonies of thanksgiving at both the start and the close of their voyages, invoking the Almighty and the saints. All of these observances also served to help pass the time on the long voyages.

The annual galleon sailings, by all accounts the most important event in the life of the Spanish community at Manila, were embellished over time with dramatic ceremony which expressed both their civic mission and the faith their participants drew upon in setting out on their perilous course. Before departing Manila, on leaving the anchorage and dockyards at Cavite, the galleons first crossed nine miles across the inner bay to present themselves to local dignitaries by the city walls, while a procession of friars from the Church of Santo Tomás escorted a statue of the Virgin toward the ships. They formally received their orders from the governor and put themselves under the protection of the Virgin as they accepted the venerated image of the patroness aboard the ship. After the archbishops's blessing, prayers spoken, shouts of long live the King accompanied by cannons in salute, they turned round, passed Cavite and headed west out of the bay.<sup>184</sup>

In departing Cavite, it was customary for the galleons to sail together whenever possible. This directive was strictly interpreted coming eastward.

If both ships sail equally well, you will be well advised to sail in company, both because of what may happen in some great emergency as for the

encouragement of the people under your command in both ships if they can see each other every day.<sup>185</sup>


However, from Cavite, some discretion was allowed because of the frequency of storms in typhoon season which usually made it impossible for the vessels to remain in sight of each other, however much it would have given comfort to the people aboard. Veterans of the route argued that companion sailings eastward were risky even under less extreme conditions. On occasions when ships were becalmed, "no human recourse in the art of navigation" could keep the ships from separating.<sup>186</sup> By contrast, in sailing from Acapulco, "you will on no account part company...for general experience shows weather is usually favorable and does not prevent you."<sup>187</sup>

### The Inter-Island Passage

The first leg of the voyage toward Acapulco was the inter-island passage, "the great commercial artery of the archipelago,"<sup>188</sup> from Marivelas, a harbor islet at the Bataan peninsula in the North Channel entrance to the bay, to the Embocadero, the mouth of the San Bernardino Straits.

Moving first south by southwest, then east by southeast seeking safe channels, the time spent on this stretch could become protracted depending on weather conditions and the number of stopovers to lade additional cargo taken on as a courtesy to resident priests or minor officials posted to peripheral stations along the route. The galleons hugged the Mindoro coast until the open water above the Sibuyan Sea, plying eastward toward Ticao, beyond Masbate. Galleons often lay over at San Jacinto on Ticao waiting for opportune weather, wind and tides before running the strait.

Among the rare galleon passengers to publish an account of his experience, Gemelli Careri made the crossing in 1696-1697 during his round the world tour. He left Cavite on June 29 aboard the galleon *San Jose*, which was fully loaded with 2200 bales and considerable provisions. Six weeks elapsed in a leisurely trip through the "labyrinth of islands, 80 leagues in length and very dangerous."<sup>189</sup> They sailed only by day for the best possible visual navigation and dropped anchor each night. Stores of wood, water and greens were continually replenished. By the time they had reached the port of "Saint Hyacinth" on July 21, they had taken on more



*Chart of the Philippines produced by the British Admiral George Anson*

wood and an additional 200 water jars at Cape Santiago. At Marinduque they sent a Chinese sampan, an open galley widely used within the islands, to gather more provisions. While at San

Jacinto, a local official "presented the captain with 20 hogs, 500 hens and fruit." Another sampan arrived from Marinduque "loaded with refreshments for some Jesuits aboard." On a cruise up to

Ticao bay, they encountered an Augustinian priest who made them a present of fruit and Gemelli took the occasion to go ashore to bathe after dinner.

Meanwhile, the pilots waited for the strong south wind they needed to carry the galleon out of the straight against the current. On July 26 a "muster" was made, and after the inspection, sixteen people were put ashore, because they had failed to produce "licenses from the king to travel," necessarily secured at Manila from the governor at a cost of twenty pesos. Two hundred passengers remained on board. Additional water, "500 bombones of cane (eight spans in length and thick as a man's thigh)" was taken on. At this point, provisions aboard the galleon were extraordinarily profuse, literally hanging over the sides of native vessels tied up alongside her. "It was pleasant to see the ship like a floating garden with such abundance of fruit and greens brought from the neighboring parts, as also swine, and hens in their *caracoas*."

In the tedium of a week passed at Saint Hyacinth, those aboard the galleon sought diversion in cockfighting, a popular activity in the Philippines, "there being abundance" of the birds on the ship. As chicken was the only meat they were eating, Gemelli Careri did not find the spectacle of the sport at all pleasing. Already complaints about the food began. "The pilot's mate had words with a passenger he carried on his account who complained that his table was too poor." The captain punished both of them with some hours "standing in the bilboes [sic - iron foot-shackles]."

Finally on August 9, six weeks out of Cavite, a brisk wind from the southwest encouraged them to hoist the anchors and prepare to run the straits between the islands of Capul and Kaientan. The sailing orders obliged crew and passengers to take the sacraments from the chaplain and priests aboard before they ventured onward to the next treacherous stage.<sup>190</sup> With its whirlpool banked by rocks and reefs, this would be even more dangerous than the route just traversed. Just as Gemelli Careri's galleon was getting out of the passage, violent storms of rain came up and the currents turned wild. He became very frightened "to see the sea have a motion like water boiling over a hot fire," knowing that in these waters ships had been wrecked.

### **The Philippines to the Ladrones**

Once past the rock of San Bernardino and in sight of the Cape of Espirito Santo on the Palapag

coast, the anxiety of the first leg of the journey subsided. Having reached the open ocean, the crew coiled the anchor cables between the decks and generally secured the ship for the long voyage. The ship's boat was cast off, leaving one stored in quarters ready to be reassembled when needed, for example as a messenger boat at the other end of the voyage.

Acapulco bound, in the passage north to clear the Ladrones, the wind could blow hard and the sea might be rough, more "enchanted than boisterous" according to Gemelli Careri.<sup>191</sup> During alternate times, when calms left the galleons drifting idle, the crew prepared for the greater hardships ahead. The damaging character of the storms, apart from their severity and duration, was often in their frequency, coming in unrelenting multiples in rapid succession, until the galleon, crew and passengers were all in such pitiful condition that there was no recourse but to attempt to limp back to port in the Philippines.

The Jesuit father Francisco Puig hit a particular bad stretch of typhoons in 1768. After leaving the straits on August 19, they had sailed on course for about three weeks, "rather sluggishly due to winds and calms." On September 8, when they were about 100 leagues from the Marianas at 18 degrees north latitude, the "winds and sea became enraged.... Such a dreadful storm...the sun neither shone by day nor the stars by night." By the third day of wild gales and breaking seas, the structure of the ship began to give way. "What were then the four hundred of us to do in that struggle, battling against death in the darkness and tasting its bitterness the full in every sway of the ship." For some time they withstood the tortured play of the vessel, "wedged in or fastened as we were by rope or lashing rings so that the violent jolts of the ship would not dash us to pieces or toss us about like a ball from one side to the other." A pause in the storm during daylight on the third day allowed them to repair a pump and bale the ship, but they found in the return of the sun an unexpected torment. Their "skin began to peel," and their clothes, "wet with salt water fermented on [their] bodies in the blazing heat." As if struck with yet another plague, a "severe eye flux" spread among them, leaving all four pilots temporarily blind. At this juncture, the junta aboard the galleon met, the pilots as well as the commercial agents representing the consigners of the goods they carried, to discuss the course of action. With "the ship unmasted, the supplies putrefied and the goods ruined," they agreed to return. Approaching the Philippines on September 29

they were hit by yet another hurricane, again of three days duration. Nevertheless they pushed on obstinately, and ran the straits on October 11, where they lost an anchor in the currents, making their return to Cavite on October 22, almost three months from the time of their departure.<sup>192</sup>

Those who stayed at sea endured tensions which escalated with every succeeding gale. Every pitching and heeling movement of the ship was felt acutely; every creaking of the masts was observed intently. All other routines abruptly stopped during these watches. Cooking fires were not lit. The mass was not said. The pilots ceased to take their periodic observations. On Gemelli Careri's ship, while "the waves broke upon the galleon and beat terribly on its sides," groups huddled together through dark nights. During the worst storms statues of patron saints were brought out and passengers and crews prayed before them. "We lay under the main sail reefed... the image of St. Francis Xavier being exposed, the captain vowed to make an offering in the value of the sail worth 200 pesos." The saint prevailing, "three hours before day, the wind came about fair."

### Crossing the Gulf

North and east beyond the Ladrones, in the third stage of the eastbound voyage, the Spanish crossed the mid-Pacific, an area they termed the Gulf of St. Lazarus. Magellan had named the first island on which he and his men landed in the Philippine archipelago the isle of St. Lazarus, after the biblical character who figured prominently in the gospel of the day they arrived. Here the galleons battled against variable southeast winds with little relief from the storm patterns even above the thirtieth parallel. Gemelli Careri experienced bad weather in all but nine of his sixteen weeks in midocean beyond the Embocadero.

Father Cubero Sebastian, another eastbound, round-the-world voyager, who preceded Gemelli Careri by some thirty years, faced a gale in late October at 34 degrees north which lasted for eighty hours and came near to breaking the spirits of his companions. The pilot confessed to him in private afterwards that he had never seen "such a storm or such wild winds." As the gale intensified it "became so horrible that with the ship running before it under the bonnets the waves came over the waist from both sides and some over the poop with such noise that each wave striking against our ship's sides boomed like a cannon shot." In the dark night, "everything

was chaos." In the general panic religiosity slid dangerously into superstition.

All those on board begged me to conjure the evil spell and I told them that I would gladly do so if I could and then I asked them to make an act of contrition ...for their only hope lay in God's will. Our galleon plunged her bows twice in the waters until she buried her bowsprit and the water reached halfway to the waist and all aboard began to cry, "Mercy, Oh Lord, Mercy!" ...And all was weeping, tears and sobs.<sup>193</sup>

Even the aftereffects were severe. "All aboard the ship were so terror stricken that for days afterwards they went about trembling as if they were being shaken."<sup>194</sup>

The storms were fearful, but the rain was dearly welcome. Gemelli Careri observed that on a day when much rain fell, "the sailors went out naked to catch the water so that they filled all the empty vessels, therefore instead of shortening men's allowance of water after two and a half months sail, it was increased"<sup>195</sup>, this despite the seasonably cold temperatures at latitude 25 degrees north.

Between thirty-six and forty-two degrees latitude penetrating cold on sunless days caused the saddest spectacle: miseries suffered by the Filipino native crew and African slaves who shivered miserably in the cold northern winds and took refuge in the chicken coops when the decks were pelted with hail. A distribution by the captain of palm wine "to warm their stomachs" was the only relief to the sailors. Even warm clothing distributed at the king's expense soon after they had left the straits did not suffice.

There were times when a fine mist enveloped the galleon and the bales on the rain-soaked decks began to dissolve before the elements. Still three months shy of Acapulco, on Gemelli Careri's ship "the rain which fell all these days wet many bales and chests of silk and other goods from China to the great loss of the owners."

Battered by the wind and sea, increasingly sickened by the deterioration of the food, and dismayed by the precarious condition of trade goods in which many had their entire life's investments, passengers and crew also needed to resist a maddening tedium that set upon them in the moments when they were not contending with

the force of elements.

Shipboard life had a number of fixed routines which broke the long hours into smaller, seemingly less eternal units: the four-hour watches by the ship's guard; the changing of the hourglass by the ship's boys; the morning and evening calls to prayers; and the pattern of endless tasks in repairing and maintaining the galleon's hull, fixtures and rigging which were assigned to the crew. Any variation of the routine was treated as a cause of celebration. Gemelli Careri observed the bidding war at the catching of the first ocean fish, "exposed to sail [sic] to the highest bidder according to the custom..." The captain, who put up 50 pesos to make an offering to the Virgin, lost out to four sailors "who bid 5 pesos more and carried the fish." Although the catch offered a variation from the usual rations, the novelty paled. With "abundance of fish, the seamen grew weary..." and then tried other games with the sharks, throwing one into the sea, "with a board tyed to his tail...and it was pleasant to see him swim about without being able to dive down. Two others were tyed together...one ..being first blinded..and cast into the sea opposed the other that would have drawn him down, thinking himself taken."

There were other diversions, sacred and secular, all of which enlivened the sense of community on board and broke the tension of the long voyage. Holy days of the church, like the day of the namesake of a senior officer, were marked with special ritual, accompanied by feasting on special treats distributed by the honoree. On Gemelli Careri's trip, they celebrated the day of St. Michael's, "that being our captain's name. Extraordinary allowance was given and a play acted." He observed other occasions for festivities as well. The senior officers and pilots rotated among themselves a series of devotional exercises. First the pilot, the pilot's two mates, then the master and the general, each made their personal *novenas*, nine days of withdrawal from their usual responsibilities while they prayed for a good voyage. There was celebration for all on the evening of the first day of each one, "abundance of lights," a distribution of "sweetmeats to all the company," even "dancing and acting of parts made extempore."

However pleasurable and important were observations of these formal events, many of the daily "offhours" of the crew, officers, and passengers, were often spent in less virtuous activities. Gambling especially was endemic and the innumerable efforts to enforce the prohibitions against all forms of cards and dice

games were of little avail, since wagering was so popular. Gemelli Careri lost a pair of gold buttons on his voyage, while on another a general was reputed to win handsomely at cards.

### The Signs of Shore

Like Lazarus being recalled to life, those aboard the galleons emerged into a new round of activity in anticipation of the approach of the California coast. After many weeks of the numbing sameness of cramped quarters in the weather-beaten ship, plowing through the vast grey-green seas under stormy skies in the mid-ocean passage (typically three months), the galleon's lookouts studied the waters impatiently for indications of the proximity of land. A piece of seaweed or rotting driftwood floating past the vessel generated intense debate about its significance, but the truly authentic indicators, called *señas* or signs, were actually masses of seaweed they called the *aguas malas* and *porras* (kelp), in clumps large enough to be *balsas* (rafts). They came upon playful seals, "fish the Spaniards call *lobillo*, with a head and ears like a dog, and a tail like that they paint the mairmaids [sic] with."

The celebration which followed the appearance of the *señas* had no parallel on the crossing, not even the moment of the arrival of the galleon in port. On Gemelli Careri's ship, the sailor who was first to discover them "had a chain of gold given him by the captain, and at least fifty pieces of eight by the passengers and others." Then the sailors customarily took the ship's bell up to the galleon's prow and proclaimed a day of raucous good humor in which the usual hierarchy and command of the ship was overturned. In Cubero Sebastian's account, "...the sailors dressed up in ridiculous costume and set up a mock court and brought before it as prisoners all of the more important people aboard..." Three "judges" sat beneath a canopy on the deck to preside over a reading of offenses which expressed the sailors' frustrations with the harshness or pettiness of their superiors. The captain general was accused of withholding the water ration, the ship's surgeon of too frequent bloodletting as a remedy for physical complaints, the pilot for "quarrelling with the sun," and the chaplain, for seemingly precipitating the untimely death of his mates. "...[F]or it was said that those who visited [him] privately between decks were usually corpses to be thrown overboard on the following day."<sup>196</sup> Even passengers took their place in being accused. Gemelli Careri was ragged for eating

"too much of the fish they call cachoretas."<sup>197</sup> The sentences which were handed down were meant to be commuted in return for the condemned ones' sharing with the sailors and lowlier grommets "mony (sic), chocolate, sugar, bisket, flesh, sweetmeats, wine, and the like," the daintier treats which the more affluent persons reserved to themselves, to the envy of most of the crew. Reluctant offenders were threatened with keelhauling. But "everyone was laughing and it was a day of much gaiety ..."<sup>198</sup> which continued into the night. The joyfulness was a welcome respite, but in Gemelli Careri's opinion, it was premature.

While the discovery of the señas alerted the crew to the approach of a sheltering coast where storms were less threatening, the fourth and final leg of the voyage also had its somber aspect. The crew turned to a series of tasks to ready the galleon for arrival. The ship's boats were reassembled, and the cannons, anchor cables and mizzen mast were all hauled out of the hold where they had been since the galleon had come through the Embocadero.

Sometimes the numbers of those aboard rapidly decimated due to the exhaustion of supplies. The mortality rate could climb to thirty or fifty percent in the final weeks, without respect to anyone's rank or previous state of good health.<sup>199</sup> Corpses were thrown overboard, their feet bound with earthenware storage jars, with disturbing frequency.

There are two dangerous diseases in this voyage, more especially as they draw near the coast of America...berben [beriberi] which swells the body and makes the patient dye talking...and the Dutch disease [scurvy] which makes all the mouth sore, putrefies the gums, and makes the teeth drop out. The best remedy against it, is going ashore.<sup>200</sup>

Gemelli Careri, who was a man of metropolitan experience and an apothecary by profession, understood the cause to be "stinking provisions which began to breed diseases." Rudimentary knowledge of the connection between the shortage of fresh foods and the onset of severe physical deterioration did not mean that seventeenth century seamen were able to discover the appropriate antidote. Nevertheless the Spaniards who sailed the Pacific did attempt to

ameliorate the effects. There were some anti-scorbutic qualities to the quince paste provided to Magellan's men. Lemon juice and lemon syrup appear in the supply lists of Philippines fleets in 1617-1618, but in such small amounts in all likelihood they were considered to be remedies to be administered after the onset of illness rather than preventatives to ensure against it.<sup>201</sup> A Dominican friar heading west from Acapulco in the 1640s supplied himself with tamarind, a tropical fruit with an exceptionally high vitamin C content, because it was "wholesome and very medicinal."<sup>202</sup> Were it not for these sensible provisions, however limited, the mortality would no doubt have been even higher on the galleon route.


Severe dietary deficiencies which became pronounced after many months might have been tempered had the California coast been more inviting, but hostile inhabitants, inadequate anchorages, and the imperative to reach the terminus at Acapulco discouraged even a brief layover. Despite the advantages which Spanish settlements might have offered, colonization of the California coast north of Mexico was delayed until late in the eighteenth century when the galleon trade had already entered irreversible decline.

Signal fires could sometimes be seen in the hills along the coast of New Spain where lookouts were posted to alert Mexico City of the arrival of a galleon.

Upon the uncertain tidings of a great ship seen at sea, which may as well be an enemy, they begin their prayers at Mexico, which are continu'd till the arrival of the messenger with letters from aboard. When he arrives all the bells ring for joy; and this noise lasts, til a third express comes from Acapulco, who brings the viceroy advice of the galleon from China, being come to an anchor in the port.<sup>203</sup>

With obvious restraint to avoid the appearance of engaging in contraband, the ship did not enter ports anywhere along this stretch and paused only long enough "to land the messenger with the letters for Mexico and Madrid,"<sup>204</sup> accompanied by ailing passengers or anxious travellers who requested it. Occasionally the galleons were met by a "galiot sent out from Acapulco" or "some boat

of Indians come off with refreshments" furnished by coastal communities, but in Gemelli Careri's



*Starving passengers*


experience, "musket shots were fir'd to give notice...but it was all in vain,"<sup>205</sup> while they were held by calms and contrary winds in an agony of expectation and "insufferable heat" for over a week just above Acapulco. It was not until they were in sight of the port that they were met by a great bark which brought "fresh provision, which were an ox, fowls, bread, sweetmeats and lemons, sent by the governor..." and the next day, with "the wind holding fair," they entered through the great channel and came to anchor, in Gemelli Careri's case, 204 days from the date of their departure from Manila. Amid tears and congratulations on their safe arrival, the ceremonial routines, of gun salutes and thanksgiving Te Deums, initial cursory cargo inspections and religious processions, were formalities endured with enormous relief.

### The Port of Acapulco

Acapulco had little to recommend it beyond its fine harbor, a secure and deep anchorage for the galleons. The single towering ship, sometimes accompanied by its companion vessel, could ride gently at anchor, its stern secured to the sturdy trunk of a ceiba tree on shore. The rest of the port facilities were as simple as the anchorage, as the town was little more than a rude fishing

village, "small and of unpleasing aspect; the inhabitants are negros, similar to Kaffirs... In the middle of the plaza is...a parish church...and there are two chapels.... This is all there is to the renowned Acapulco."<sup>206</sup> The air, trapped by the surrounding mountains, was considered unhealthy, and the heat unbearable in the months (January to March) when the galleons were at anchor. Passengers were advised to stay long enough to steady their health after the voyage, but not too long lest they become ill from the place.<sup>207</sup> More than one conscientious royal officer sent to customs duty at Acapulco fell victim while on the king's service there.

The transients were a heterogenous lot. Mercantile agents arrived to deal with the galleon supercargoes. Clergymen gathered to prepare for their mission fields. Troop regiments assembled from the levies in New Spain to be sent as reinforcements for the Philippine garrisons. The galleon crew mingled with the muleteers of the pack train from Mexico City.



*Plan of Acapulco harbor with location of ceiba trees used for securing the Manila Galleons*

The town, from the chief officer of the fort and parish clergymen to the humblest Indian porter and African slave, lived on the galleon trade, as did Manila, but on a considerably smaller scale. Although millions of pesos came through the port at the time of the commercial fair, amenities were nonexistent and the few services there were, much in demand for the short season, therefore cost dearly. Gemelli Careri complained that no laborer would work at all for less than a peso a day.<sup>208</sup> As there were no inns in the area, passengers who came down early from Mexico City to prepare for the galleon crossing had to lease rooms at high rates and poverty-bound friars were encouraged to find housing with the local clergy.<sup>209</sup>

The most remarkable feature of the place was the extent and speed of its transformation during the galleons' layover. In the month between Gemelli Careri's disembarkation on January 20 and his departure for Mexico City on February 18, there was a rush of Peruvian traders and Mexican merchants, the offloading of cargo and its transfer to the ship for Lima or to the pack train for Mexico City, before all vanished, the Mexicans overland, the Peruvians by sea.<sup>210</sup> The natives of the town commemorated the sudden transition to the "down time"

between fairs by staging a mock funeral.

Thursday, the 7th the Porters of Acapulco made a sort of Funeral, carrying one of their number on a Bier, and bewailing him as if he were dead, because their harvest was at an end; for some of them had got three pieces of Eight a day, and the worst of them one.<sup>211</sup>

Given the crude state of the port's facilities in Gemelli Careri's time, it took as much as a week to remove the cargo from ship to shore. Storage facilities were limited. Supplies to be sent out to Manila were protected under a makeshift pavilion which apparently also sufficed to shelter some of the people to be transported. In the 1640s, according to Fray Navarette:

...they make a sort of Hut or Arbour of Boughs between the Sea and the Governor's Door as a Shelter for the People and Commodities that are to be ship'd...it consists of a dozen



*Merchants at Acapulco trade fair*

Poles stuck in the Ground, others across them at top, and over all Boughs, Hay and Leaves of Palm-tree for a covering.<sup>212</sup>

Unfortunately for the historical record, Fray Navarette, an exceptionally astute observer for his time, missed seeing the commercial fair at Acapulco, as the Manila galleons of 1647 were held back because of the threat of attack by the Dutch in the Philippines. He sailed west in April 1648, in a small vessel commandeered from the Peru fleet by the Mexican viceroy in order to dispatch the official assistance to Manila.

The "China Road" from Acapulco to Mexico City was the destination of most goods and people who came aboard the galleons, but an optional detour at Puebla de los Angeles led directly for the Atlantic port of Vera Cruz in order to make connections with the European bound fleets. Even for those passengers who were relieved to put aside their "sea legs," the overland route held another set of hazardous travelling conditions, nearly three hundred miles up into the Sierra Madre mountain chain, across swollen rivers with treacherous currents, through tropical heat and territory thickly infested with biting insects and poisonous snakes.<sup>213</sup> Those who were compelled to make a roundtrip on the galleons may have been inclined to think theirs was the better lot.

#### The Return Voyage Westbound

During the time of the commercial fair, the galleon officers and local officials supervised the work of repairing the galleons and taking on stores sent from the capital or ordered from the region of Puebla for the westbound trip. March was the latest departure deadline to ensure that the return crossing was completed before the onset of typhoon winds near the Philippines, which would endanger the galleon's passage

through the San Bernardino straits. A winter layover that would deprive Manila of silver for a year was unusual; the alternative, sailing late, and being required to put in at Samar, outside the straits, or forced by strong winds directly up to the north coast of Luzon, was also costly, in the risk it posed for shipwreck near the Philippines, or in the additional expense and time in portaging goods and people overland to Manila.

Skimping on supplies was another potential cause of a hazardous trip even on the comparatively easy westbound passage (three months on average). In a biting criticism of endemic defrauding of the state treasury, one Spanish bureaucrat who sailed as admiral in 1635 reported that he had discovered that his ship's boatswain's mate had invested funds for refitting the ship at Acapulco in China goods. But he had not found a good market for his wares and consequently had lost the value of his purchase without being able to replace the monies. Consequently the ship had sailed with no spare sails and inadequate cables.<sup>214</sup>

The westward run ahead of the northeast trades brought galleons to the vicinity of the Ladrone, usually within sixty days, where they expected to rendezvous offshore with native "Chamorros" who approached in their outriggers, eagerly offering fruits and water they were eager to barter for iron goods. If supplies were not running low, however, or they were behind schedule in their approach to the Philippines, they might pass by. After the establishment of a garrison and mission stations in the Marianas (as they were renamed in 1668), a stop was usually required, particularly if the galleon carried supplies, troops, or recently appointed officials for the fledgling colony. From there it was a matter of weeks to the straits, and return to Cavite, where exuberant welcomes greeted the "silver ship" with the same flourish of church bells and thanksgiving litamies which had celebrated its embarkation in the previous year.

## THE MANILA-ACAPULCO TRADE IN THE TIME OF CORCUERA

Sebastián Hurtado de Corcuera y Mendoza, governor of the Philippines during the time of the *Nuestra Señora de la Concepción* disaster, lent a colorful interpretation to the workings of the Manila Galleon trade. His political leadership in Spain's far away colony was an indication of his own powers and desires, and a reflection of the sentiment of the participants in the galleon trade in general.

Like the monsoon seasons which determined the voyages of the galleons, the Manila-Acapulco trade experienced only superficial regularity. The 1620s and 1630s were volatile decades for Spain's Pacific commerce, containing several sources of disruption. Increasingly the Dutch and English expected to extend their activities in Asia at Spain's expense, conspiring to divert Chinese trade from Manila. Portuguese merchants were more visible carriers of the Chinese goods to Manila. The resultant competition and greater risks bid prices up. Even so, losses to enemy ships preying on the Atlantic fleets apparently led merchants in New Spain to regard galleon cargoes from Manila as a more secure investment than the trade with Seville. In addition, the Spanish state pressured its colonies to contribute more tax revenues, including those derived from trade, in order to underwrite a costly war in Europe. These higher taxes were an incentive for increased contraband; more vigorous collection of duties provoked grievances and special pleading on behalf of a much battered commerce. Under the circumstances of fluctuating supplies and high risks, the complaints might well have minimized successful profiteering. The normally high level of smuggling in the galleon trade make any assessment of its value subject to considerable caution, but the coincidence of a relative increase in the numbers of vessels from China in Manila Bay and a new round of complaints from Seville merchants suggests that the 1630s was a flourishing moment for contraband in an erratic period.

In the 1620s the Dutch established a trade factory on Formosa (Taiwan) and preyed on the junks en route to Manila in the China Sea; the Spanish retaliated by setting up their own trading station on Taiwan. Portuguese agents at Macao exploited the reluctance of Chinese shippers to confront Dutch aggression and began to carry more merchandise from the mainland to Manila in disregard of prohibitions against their commerce in the Philippines. Displacing multitudes of Chinese, the Portuguese demanded higher prices


in a tighter market and created another link in the chain of transactions by middlemen. The grievances of Manila merchants persuaded the Crown to exert pressure on the Portuguese viceroy to condemn such activity, which eventually lapsed after 1633. The junk traffic from mainland China returned in 1634 and quickly climbed in the next years to as many as 50 vessels in one season.<sup>215</sup>

The Portuguese succeeded because of a sustained supply of silver from New Spain. The figures for Atlantic commerce suggest a depression in the European trade and declining output from American mines. An alternative explanation for the smaller returns to Europe is the shift of merchant capital into the Pacific arena, especially in the aftermath of the Dutch attack on the fleet at Matanzas [Cuba] in 1628.<sup>216</sup> Manila merchants began to sense growing investment pressures; the success of a proposal to create a permanent trade delegation in Mexico on their behalf was one of the consequences of the new business activity.

Another significant indicator of an expansion of the galleon trade in the early 1630s was the renewal of complaints by Seville's merchants about the drain of silver to the East and flaunting of the ban on trade in Chinese cloth to Peru. Seville had been aroused by the circulation in 1634 of allegations made by a merchant of the city of Puebla de Los Angeles (in New Spain), Francisco Vitoria Baraona, who claimed that three or four million pesos were being exported to the Far East out of Acapulco, and that the port continued to tolerate trade to Peru in Chinese goods.<sup>217</sup> This rampant smuggling and gross violation of the *permiso*, by a factor of six or eight times the allowance, caused a deterioration of the market for European textiles in the Indies and the destruction of Spanish silk manufactures, according to Seville. In response to the Sevillian merchants' charges, the lobbyist for the Philippines at the Spanish court, Don Juan Grau y Monfalcon, dismissed Baraona's charges as ignorant exaggerations, defended the necessity of the Asian trade and even advocated its expansion.<sup>218</sup>

This was the second of three important occasions in the history of the trade that Seville's grievances resulted in immediate, vigorous responses by the Crown. In the 1590's their petitions led to the first wave of restrictions which remained in force for the duration of the trade.

Following a period of prosperity in Pacific commerce, in 1718 Seville won a temporary ban on trade in silk cloth, nominally in effect until 1726, and both sides were caught up in a fifteen-year struggle of bitter polemics to renegotiate the terms of the *permiso*.



*17th Century engraving of Acapulco harbor*

The Crown's reaction in the 1630s cut deep and wide and centered on Acapulco. First, the coasting trade to Peru was permanently curtailed in 1634, except for ships licensed for particular purposes other than general merchandise trade. Smuggling persisted but the official ban forced merchants to adapt to the new conditions imposed on the market. The second measure was the appointment of an external official for New Spain, a visitor who was empowered to conduct an on-site investigation of trade practices at Acapulco and to initiate reforms to ensure compliance with the regulations. The galleon traders had most recently survived a special visitation and inquiry in 1628 that was made to investigate charges that the Viceroy at Mexico City was heavily involved in contraband. However the measures of Don Pedro Quiroga y Moya, appointed in 1635, were considerably more rigorous, and produced an outcry from the merchants of both Manila and Mexico City. His visitation produced a ripple effect that marked the Pacific trade for many decades afterwards.

At about the same time that the visitor Quiroga was appointed, Governor Corcuera was en route to his new post in the Philippines. Sebastián Hurtado de Corcuera y Mendoza (1587-1661) was of Basque origin but raised by an uncle

in the Canaries. He had fought in the Spanish army in the Flanders wars through the siege of Breda (1626). He then received a series of colonial appointments. In 1627, he was the military commander at Callao, the seaport below Lima in the Peruvian viceroyalty, where he also served as a treasury official. He was later promoted to the governorship of Panama (1632-1634), which included the key trade port of Portobello in the Isthmus. His responsibilities in these positions would have allowed him to acquire considerable knowledge of the practices of the Indies trade. Ambitious, astute, and at the height of his career at age forty-eight, he must have regarded the posting to the Philippines both as a military challenge and as a lucrative plum which he could artfully pluck and then expect to return to Spain and live in very comfortable retirement. Barely a year after his arrival in Manila, he petitioned the Crown in June of 1636 to grant his license to depart within four years. The permission was authorized in Spain in November 1638, but the appointment of a new governor and his travel to Manila was delayed.<sup>219</sup> Had Corcuera managed to adhere to his own agenda, he would have been spared at least some of the troubles which followed.

As it happened, Corcuera spent fourteen years in the Philippines (nine as governor, 1635-1644, and five, 1645-1649, imprisoned by his successor, Diego Fajardo.) During this time his career soared with the leadership of major campaigns against the Moorish enemy in the south at Mindanao and Jolo in 1636-1638, and then plummeted as a result of his having to take responsibility for the Spanish loss of the outpost on Formosa in 1642. In the mandatory inquiry into his term of office undertaken by Governor Fajardo in 1644, criminal charges were issued in the case of the Formosa debacle, and the serious nature of this charge was used by Fajardo to insist on Corcuera's incarceration.

The majority of allegations heard in the *residencia*, however, came from disaffected residents' reports of the many ways in which Corcuera was said to have drained public coffers and dipped into private pockets during his administration. Of course he consistently denied any reports of illegal trading. He insisted that he had pursued his mercantile endeavors only in the interest of the Crown.<sup>220</sup> Nevertheless his enemies charged that the proceeds of his multiple activities in Manila allowed him to amass a fortune, a portion of which he had been systematically forwarding via the galleons to New Spain. English merchants who anchored in

Manila Bay on the eve of the transition in government in 1644 were told that the extraordinary dearness of gold in the port was the consequence of the Governor's having "engrossed" it all, its price not falling until some time after the new governor had taken office. The value of Corcuera's estate in Manila in "goods and monies" seized at the time of his arrest was estimated at more than three million pesos.<sup>221</sup> When a devastating fire ripped through Acapulco in early 1648 another cache of his property became public knowledge. Thirty of thirty-six large chests of goods stored in the port were completely destroyed: "All that was Brass remain'd, but much disfigur'd; a thousand Curiosities were burnt, abundance of rich China Ware which to save it from breaking was pack'd up with Cloves, Pepper and China Ink. Corcuera lost several thousand ducats."<sup>222</sup>

Corcuera's autocratic style and usurpation of authority had alienated every branch of the local elite. Even the ecclesiastical establishment was aggravated, especially by his public conflict with the archbishop, which had culminated in his banishment of the prelate to an island in Manila Bay, and by his interference in disputes within and between the religious orders, including the favoritism he showed toward the Jesuits. Thus to contemporaries the abuses connected to the sailing of the *Concepción* in 1638 were merely part of a wider pattern of Corcuera's flagrant misconduct in office. He may have been more arrogant and less discrete in his dealings than other governors; but in matters of general corruption and interference in the galleon trade he was not unlike his peers. Advocates at Court

exerted pressure to order Corcuera's successor to release him from his imprisonment in Manila, and he returned to Spain through Mexico in 1649-1650.<sup>223</sup> Ultimately, Corcuera was able to demonstrate that Diego Fajardo had been predisposed to judge him harshly and the residencia was overturned. He resumed his career, serving for a time in Spain and finally as governor in the Canaries, where he died in office around 1660 far from the turmoil of the Philippines.<sup>224</sup>

Corcuera's regime coincided with a turbulent and occasionally prosperous period for the galleons, closing what has since come to be regarded as Manila's golden years. An earthquake in 1645 nearly levelled the city. By midcentury, the trade had slid into the bottom of a trough which lasted at least another twenty years. Fajardo reported to the King in August 1650 that the Dutch wars had taken their toll; New Spain provided insignificant material and human support for defense. The trade from China was reduced to only nine or ten vessels a year, with little merchandise. Shipping losses continued and the works at Cavite needed repair. A letter from the City of Manila concurred: the Philippines were in a miserable state.<sup>225</sup> Despite these setbacks, the Spanish held on to the Philippines, defending the trade at the core of her Pacific dominion, owing, as the historian Charles Boxer has pointed out, to the "superiority of the Basque sea-officers, the loyalty of the christianized Filipinos to the Spanish Crown, and the great strength of the Manila galleons built from local hardwoods."<sup>226</sup>

### Last Voyage of the *Nuestra Señora de la Concepción*

On August 10, 1638<sup>227</sup> two galleons completed preparations at Cavite for a trans-Pacific crossing in the torpor of late summer. They were the *Nuestra Señora de la Concepción* and her smaller consort, the admiral's ship *San Ambrosio*.

The flagship *Concepción* was one of the great ships of her day, reputed to be "the largest vessel which had been constructed up to that time."<sup>228</sup> Although the chronicles in which her fate was later inscribed fail to provide detailed information on her dimensions, because of her legendary reputation and the count of guns aboard her at the time of salvage efforts in the 1680s and early 1700s, we can justifiably assume that she was a 36-gun vessel with a 100 foot keel, some 150 feet overall, broad in the beam at 50 feet, with a depth of 20 feet to the bottom of her hold, ample room for the 1,200 chests of trade goods she had carried on her most recent trip to Acapulco.<sup>229</sup>

Most probably constructed for the galleon trade at Cavite between 1630 and 1633, she was christened for the Immaculate Conception of the Virgin Mary, the patroness of the city and cathedral of Manila, to whom seventeenth century Spaniards were especially devoted. Subsequent to the round trip of 1636-1637, she was likely to have been one of the galleons commandeered for military transport to actions south of the Philippines and to bring relief supplies to the fort in Terrenate in early 1638. Those ships had returned to port in mid May.<sup>230</sup> This would have put her into the Cavite dockyards for repairs and to be outfitted for the next Pacific crossing through June and July.

Expense reports for provisions for the galleons of 1638 purchased through Chinese food purveyors and suppliers of ships' stores record the acquisition of various staples between April and August. For the stock of rations doled out aboard ship there was wheat flour, dried beans, dried shrimp and fish, and cheese, sugar, lard and wood for the cooking fires. There were at least 566 live chickens, and some fresh pork, though no mention of live hogs. One hundred-ninety-five head of cattle were delivered from the local ranch of a Spanish woman, Dona Magdalena Ruiz. Reed mats, cotton thread (for sail repairs), an assortment of drugs to stock the ship's apothecary chests, tobacco and at least 1,900 earthen and


stoneware jars were requisitioned for the vessels.<sup>231</sup>

The acknowledged fraud and widespread deception which regularly accompanied the shipment of galleon trade goods was even more deliberately applied in the sailing of 1638, so that the exact nature of the cargo of the *Concepción* remains especially contested. Special circumstances conspired to make the 1638 sailings particularly unusual. The official most accountable for the galleons' fate, Governor Sebastián Hurtado de Corcuera, in the third year of his term, had set the conditions of this journey by a series of actions which defied local custom, law and nature. The ships were not carrying the usual merchant consignments, had no registration of their cargo and were sailing late in the season.

Upon his arrival in Manila in June, 1635, the governor had imperiously cancelled the departure of the two galleons his predecessor had prepared. He declared his intention to introduce a new system of bi-annual sailings and proposed that the level of permitted trade be doubled, raising it to 500,000 pesos in value of goods to Acapulco.<sup>232</sup> His interventions had coincided with a renewed effort to control illegal excesses in the trade by more thorough inspections and enforcement of regulations at Acapulco, under the supervision of a visitor-inspector sent from Spain to the port, Don Pedro Quiroga y Moga. While Corcuera waited upon a reply from the Crown which would authorize his plan, in 1636 he overcame the reluctance of the Manila merchants to send goods in a year when rigorous customs procedures might be followed and despatched two heavily laden galleons. Upon their arrival, contrary to what Governor Corcuera had assured the merchants would be the case, Quiroga had in fact proceeded with unusual zeal by weighing chests and opening bales. Having found merchandise improperly recorded and omitted from registers, the visitor-inspector declared the true value of the goods to be four million pesos, as against the 800,000 which was claimed by the merchants, and moved to confiscate shipments, impede sales and thereby block the return of silver for merchandise. In addition Quiroga had exacted heavy penalties, totalling 900,000 pesos for which the Manila merchants refused to be liable. In 1637 and in 1638 they found themselves

short of silver to make payments to the Chinese merchants, in suspense about the fate of their confiscated goods, pleading poverty and at odds with Corcuera. Thus they had resolved not to ship goods until the issues of their grievances would be addressed.<sup>233</sup> Corcuera wrote to the King in July, 1638, that despite proclamations he had issued calling on the merchants to prepare their shipments they had refused and he had so far put aboard only the rations and seamen's chests.<sup>234</sup> Bartolome Ruiz de Escalona, the treasury official in Manila, reported that the ships would sail without a register, "for as yet, the inhabitants have not registered a shred of cloth with which to lade them, as they do not know the condition of their property in New Spain."<sup>235</sup> Although in later years several merchants would present claims for their shares of cargo which were lost in 1638, the report by Escalona at the time and other documentation suggests that most of the goods aboard the *Concepción* belonged to Governor Corcuera and his close friends at Manila. Unregistered merchandise passed as personal property which went free of export duties.

The supervision of illicit cargo was perhaps the uppermost concern of Corcuera in his appointment of his nephew, Juan Francisco Hurtado de Corcuera as General of the Galleons in 1638. In addition to the General, Don Juan Francisco, a young man in his early twenties, the ship's master, Captain Juan de Montoya, was also a protegee of the governor. They were said to have been entrusted with trade goods by members of the governor's inner circle to be delivered to correspondents at Acapulco.<sup>236</sup> The entire cargo was reputed to be worth four and a half million pesos.<sup>237</sup> According to further revelations made in the course of the later inquiry into abuses in his administration, Corcuera had a great range of personal treasure on the *Concepción*, including exquisite valuables, like a gold ewer and plate of great worth which he had acquired by dubious means at nominal cost from an estate guarded in the probate court. He would later claim to be sending it to Spain as a gift to the King.<sup>238</sup> There were also more mundane trade goods, like 1,500 cakes of beeswax he was sending to Mexico.<sup>239</sup>



*Concepción getting underway in Manila harbor*

Passengers aboard the 1638 galleons may have been fewer than usual. The numbers of Spanish residents had been depleted in recent wars.<sup>240</sup> The governor should have been reluctant to grant licenses to return to Spain or Mexico as he was wanting for men and therefore not eager to support emigration, despite the worries over the crisis in the trade, however much he may have been besieged with requests from Manila residents. Surviving records provide names of only five of the passengers in 1638: the Jesuit Juan de Barrios, an intimate of Corcuera who sailed as the *Concepción's* chaplain; two other priests, Father Pedro Ruiz and Fray Pedro Hernandez, the latter identified as a member of the Dominican order; Martín de Cassanova, about whom nothing else is known; and a couple, Captain Joseph de Vides and his wife.<sup>241</sup> Vides was returning to Spain after a sojourn in the islands of at least fifteen years in the Philippines.<sup>242</sup>

The most important person on the *Concepción* was the general of the galleons. Although honorific, the position was the ultimate governing authority and required the exercise of benevolent supervision in allaying frictions among a potentially mutinous crew. It begged for one of experience in the command of men. Juan Francisco de Corcuera was one of several close relatives who had joined his uncle's entourage at the time of his appointment to the Manila post.<sup>243</sup> He had another kinsman who advocated for his interests at court, Iñigo Hurtado de Corcuera, uncle (and brother to Governor Corcuera), who had petitioned the Crown to appoint Juan Francisco to the command of a military unit to send to the Philippines, which he, Iñigo, would sponsor.<sup>244</sup> The best known of Governor Corcuera's young relatives and proteges was the other of his nephews, Pedro Hurtado de Corcuera, whom he had raised in Flanders, and considered his most trusted supporter. Pedro, a veteran of service in Europe, was a leader in the military actions in the Philippines at Mindanao in 1637, and died in October the same year.<sup>245</sup> Although Juan Francisco had taken part in the campaigns in Mindanao and Jolo in the two previous years, he apparently had no comparable European record, but he was given the post of officer of the Manila city regiment.<sup>246</sup> Nonetheless he was still considered to be "young and inexperienced in military and naval affairs" as it was said repeatedly in the charges later brought against the governor.<sup>247</sup>

We can imagine the scene at Cavite, where workmen, sailors, officers and passengers scurried

about in feverish activity in last minute loadings, jostling for places, stowing possessions and bidding farewells, and can conjure up the grand display on the part of church and state which marked the departures of galleons from Manila bay, but details of the narration of the outset of the journey are lost.

There is no evidence that the 1638 galleons encountered unusual or even the customary hazards in the course of the first leg of the voyage. In fact they must have had a strong westerly wind to have reached the Ladrões by 20 September. It was only after they had emerged from the strait and headed into the open sea that problems were later said to have developed.

According to the surviving accounts of what transpired after leaving the Embocadero, a few days out of the Strait of San Bernardino, the general "lost the respect and obedience" of his crew. The ship's officers aboard the *Concepción* fell to quarrelling with each other, "each one wanting to give the orders and be obeyed." The issue in some accounts was specifically the course of navigation they were to follow. In any case, the commander did not intervene successfully, and the crew mutinied. "Factions formed. Parties went at each other...there were deaths and injuries." With no one at the helm to control the ship, it broached in the wind. "The masts broke up to the bowsprit and all the rig went into the sea in an instant," leaving the badly damaged vessel at the mercy of the wind and currents which carried it toward the reef where it broke apart. The ship, its cargo and the people were lost. "Only thirty and some Spanish people escaped...all because of the lack of skill of the general. This would not have happened if the governor had appointed [instead] one of the many soldiers and deserving, experienced older people...as general of the ships."<sup>248</sup>


In the course of the later investigation, the principal point in contention was the cause of the ship's loss and the degree of responsibility to be apportioned to the commander, as opposed to the severity of the weather. A report on the tragic episode issued later from Mexico dwelt on the latter: "having reached the vicinity of the Ladrões, three hundred leagues from Cavite, they were hit by a storm."<sup>249</sup> However, the majority of accounts of the shipwreck brought forward seven years later in the course of a rancorous investigation of Governor Corcuera's administration emphasize the incompetence of young Corcuera as the principal cause of the loss of the ship. By failing to exercise the necessary authority, Don Juan Francisco lost command of

the crew, his ship, a valuable cargo, and countless lives. The governor himself was blamed for his nephew's irresponsibility, and for having selected a man with "too little experience" and "lack of courage." The fullest narratives tend to expose the multiple failures of the general for lack of authority over the men in his command as well as ignorant seamanship.

Evidence offered in the suit brought by the city council of Manila stressed the absence of bad weather. Those giving depositions insisted there was no storm at all and ventured that they could

course. But "the blame for this could be attributed to the general, a person with little courage or experience who did not order the pilot to follow the almiranta [the *San Ambrosio*] nor was he able to quiet the sailors who then mutinied..."<sup>252</sup> Captain Don Gaspar Pizarro de Arrellano, a soldier stationed in Manila, testified that it was said that the general did not have the courage to overcome the disturbances. There had been deaths and "the ship was lost, without a storm" occurring.<sup>253</sup>

The narrowly focused information contained



*The wrecking of the Concepción at Agingan reef*

not remember when such a disaster had occurred, implicitly on account of human error alone.<sup>250</sup> According to Juan de Campos y Rojas, Chief Clerk of the Mines and Registry, the talk around the city was that there had been much dissension aboard the ship and as a result the sailors had mutinied. "It had been many years since a ship on this route had been lost for lack of governance rather than the great storms which are feared."<sup>251</sup> Captain Pedro de Mora Salcedo had heard from some sailors that the ship had been lost because it had not stayed with the almiranta. The chief pilot had taken another

in these records supplied few answers to many obvious questions, such as the role of the chief pilot aboard the *Concepción*, the point at which the vessels had abandoned their sailing in tandem, what communication there might have been with the *San Ambrosio* up to that point, how far north they had gone, and whether they had been blown back down or directly toward the Saipan coast. Also missing were descriptions of the location of the site of the shipwreck, the circumstances of the vessel and its people in the final moments, a count of survivors and their immediate fate. None of these points can be addressed with any certitude. There could be any number of

explanations for these omissions; one is that there was a conscious suppression of factual material. If in the aftermath of the wreck, a court of inquiry had been commissioned to probe the circumstances, surely these elementary features of the event would have come to light. That there was none may be laid to the governor's political influence and all but dictatorial power in the colony, or to the time that elapsed between the wreck and confirmation of the disaster and to the general confusion reigning in Manila in those years. Ignorance of the area that prevailed up to that time may also have contributed to the failure of Manila residents to offer more specific information about the circumstances of the wreck.


The reports based on hearsay of what was known in Manila at the time conflicted in fact with the limited information furnished by survivors who returned to Cavite in July 1639. Their story as it was taken down by the chronicler of local events in the Jesuit house in Cavite began:

The ship was wrecked...by the fury of a tempest in the Ladrones Islands...on an island thirty-five leaguas (sic) away from the islands where our ships generally land on the return voyage. Besides those who were drowned, many were killed by the lance thrusts of the natives.<sup>254</sup>

In sum, the ship was wrecked along the shore of Saipan's southwest coast in a coral-fringed area open to the southwest that was only partially protected. At Agingan Point the winds and currents could come up unexpectedly strong. In these rushing currents, despite the proximity to shore, no effort to restore order nor recover control of the ship had been effective in preventing the grounding of the vessel. Of the persons aboard, many must have gone to their deaths quite suddenly in the sea. Of the remaining survivors who swam or drifted to the close shoreline, only twenty-eight Spaniards and an unknown number of other nationalities managed to avoid the fatal slings and spears of waiting islanders. The latter eagerly salvaged the iron they so highly prized, as well as other valuable cargo within range of beachcombing and diving. The history of these islands perhaps explains the reaction of the natives to the wreck of the *Concepción*.

## The Ladrones Islands

The Spanish in the Philippines in the mid seventeenth century actually knew very little about the chain of the Ladrones (Thieves), although they had been very aware of them since the time of Magellan's discoveries in 1521. Early on they were called the Western Isles, but they had been put on the map as the Islands of the Lateen Sails in recognition of the distinctive seaworthy canoes with their triangular sails, the flying proas, so called because of their speed, which appeared in small squadrons when any ship put in among the Islands. Galleons en route from New Spain called regularly to take on water and provisions offered to them in exchange for iron, which to the Spaniards' astonishment the islanders prized even above gold and silver.



*Galleon and proas*

The name "Ladrones" stuck from the time of earliest contacts because of the eagerness of the natives to acquire goods, especially iron, from Europeans and the pleasure they seemed to take in surreptitiously snatching whatever they admired. The extent of native thievery was exaggerated but widely believed. According to Gemelli Careri, for example, when European ships put in, "the inhabitants stole all they could, and then fled to the mountains."<sup>255</sup> An Italian merchant traveller who passed through the islands en route to Manila in 1596 wrote that they would call out "Chamarri, her, her," which he thought meant, "Friends, iron, iron."<sup>256</sup> Decades later, the Europeans began to call the inhabitants Chamorros, and their language Chamorro, after a term which they understood the islanders themselves used for individuals of

high status in their society.<sup>257</sup>

Spanish galleon navigators were not aware of secure anchorages in any of the islands and regarded the inhabitants as potentially hostile, so they did not remain long when they made their watering stops. Manila governors discouraged early colonization proposals and efforts by religious orders to be authorized to land in the islands, but eager missionaries occasionally conspired to minister to the heathens. A Franciscan missionary, Fray Juan Pobre, jumped ship in 1602 to live for seven months in a village at Rota with the family of an indio principal, his captor and "master." He consulted with a survivor of the 1601 wreck of galleon *Santa Margarita*, and compiled an account of local society.<sup>258</sup>

According to their own legends, the islanders had come from the south. As cultivators of rice, they were closer to the Philippine people than they were to the southern Micronesian societies.

The robust, naked inhabitants who approached visiting ships were considered to be generally peaceful peoples, admired for superior swimming and diving skills. "These islanders are expert underwater divers because, from the time they are born, they bathe and swim as much


under the water as above it."<sup>259</sup>

An industrious and cooperative society, they lived simply, fishing, building boats, and cultivating their gardens. The islands were thickly populated, but the communities were relatively small, villages of ten to one hundred houses, wooden constructions set on stone pillars, thatched with coconut leaves.<sup>260</sup> Although fishermen from the shoreline settlements traded their catches for the surplus agricultural produce of residents of the interior's hilly high country, the communities dwelt in comparative isolation from each other. The early missionaries regarded them as "pacific," but neighboring villages did engage occasionally in periodic warfare. The weapons in use, principally for fishing and hunting, were slings, with shaped stones or dried mud missiles, and spears, whose sharp ends were pointed by close shaving or had pieces of human bone fastened to them.<sup>261</sup>

Castaways, deserters and shipwreck survivors captured by the Chamorros lived as prized war booty retained by their masters in anticipation of future ransom for iron. They were prisoners, for they could not easily escape the islands, but in their condition of relative liberty



*Life in a Chamorro village in the 19th Century*



### *Fishing techniques of the Mariana Islanders in the 19th Century*

they were free to move about and to adapt to native life, in practice not very different from what Spaniards understood as *criados*.<sup>262</sup> The climate was benign, and the islands were rich in provisions. In fact, Fray Juan expressed a certain disquiet when he discovered that a number of black slaves had "chosen voluntarily to remain among the barbarian infidels...[s]ince the Spaniards treat them so badly.... When they are informed that the ships are coming and are asked if they want to return to Manila, they flee to the montes."<sup>263</sup>

The fate of the survivors of the *Concepción* disaster in 1638 was discovered gradually. No records of the ship have been located which estimate the numbers aboard who perished, nor list any individuals, prominent or otherwise who were lost, besides the general of the ship, Don Juan Francisco de Corcuera. Unless he withdrew before departure, Father Barrios, the Jesuit chaplain, was on the capitana. No mention of his survival has come to light. Other persons identified as booking space on the galleons--clergy, Vides and his wife--have disappeared from the documentation. Even if the ship carried less than a full complement of passengers, which might

have been the case, the vacuum of information about the victims of the incident is certainly enigmatic. On the other hand, considering that Manila in these years was rocked by a series of misfortunes, the loss of the galleon was rendered, while not insignificant, simply one more disaster. We only know that most of those aboard were lost.

### **Initial Reactions**

The alarm for the *Concepción* was first sounded in Acapulco upon the arrival of the admiral ship *San Ambrosio*, 30 January 1639. Consternation was rife over the state of affairs in the Philippines under Governor Corcuera with this his third consecutive dispatch of vessels in violation of trade regulations. The *Concepción*, reported to be carrying unregistered cargo of about 800 toneladas, continued to be expected, as no one knew for certain whether it had put back to Manila and would come the following year, had been lost to the enemy, or had made instead for the coast of Tierra Firme (Panama) or Peru.<sup>264</sup> The senior royal officer had his orders not to allow any unregistered cargo to be landed from

the *San Ambrosio*, nor from the *Concepción* should it arrive.<sup>265</sup> But in the end the admiral ship was allowed to return along with the patache which had sailed in 1637. The galleon of 1639, which reached Acapulco 8 February 1640, at last brought the confirmation that the *Concepción* had been lost in the Ladrones.

In Manila the time after the sailing of the galleons was filled with reports that repeatedly raised and dashed hopes. Anxiety over the galleons of 1638 first emerged in March 1639 when news arrived that "large pieces of planking, masts and the ribs of a vessel which had suffered shipwreck had been found near Paracali on the east coast of Luzon, opposite Manila. From appearances it [was] thought [to be] the *San Ambrosio*."<sup>266</sup> More disturbing evidence appeared at the end of May. A shipment of nails forwarded to Cavite was said to have been taken from a ship run aground on that same coast. More disheartening was the news of June 25: "the sea of Camarines is continually floating ashore there fragments of the wrecked ship which some think that they recognize as belonging to the flagship...others are of the opinion that the wreckage shows unmistakable signs of the two ships, both the capitana and the almiranta."<sup>267</sup>

One month later, in the afternoon of July 24, 1639, six Spanish survivors from the capitana arrived at Cavite. From the date of the wreck, September 20, the survivors had made their way from island to island until they reached Guam. There they were "well-treated," by the natives because "the Spanish are good men, and leave them iron when they pass here." From there,

the natives dispatched six Spaniards and two Indians in two boats, furnishing them with food from what they had. They commended themselves to God and crossed the open stretch of more than three hundred leguas (900 miles)...in but one fortnight - a wonderful thing if one will but consider these small boats are of much less burden and steadiness than pirogues and canoes and even smaller than they.<sup>268</sup>

They reached the Philippines at Samar, on the Palapag coast, where the Jesuits had a modest mission residence near concentrations of native villages.<sup>269</sup> They arrived "almost dead with hunger, thirst, and lack of sleep," but after some days they had recovered and set out in a Chinese

sampan for Luzon. "The Indians of Guam sent these Spaniards so that they could give the news and send for the other twenty-two Spaniards and some Indians and mulattos who remain alive there and also to carry them iron..."<sup>270</sup>

After months of concern, the confirmation of the loss of the rest of those who had been aboard was devastating, affecting many of the families in the neighborhood of Cavite and Manila.

As soon as the tidings were told in this port of Cavite, the sobs and cries were so many that all were stunned, for there is no one who has not lost a son, a father, a brother, a brother-in-law, a father-in-law, a son-in-law, or a husband. The loss has been one of the greatest that has ever visited these islands, because of the loss of men [sic/*falta de gente* = lack of people] and the poverty of the island.<sup>271</sup>

As for the *San Ambrosio*, there was still hope that it would reach Acapulco and return with the overdue relief. The *Concepción* survivors reported that "they saw it but shortly before they were wrecked, sailing on a good tack; and that it was a swift sailor, and seaworthy. They swear that it should reach New Spain. Pray to God that this has happened."<sup>272</sup>

The lateness of the season, however, overshadowed this generally optimistic report. The galleon of 1639, the *Concepción Cambojana*, had been undergoing preparations for an August departure for at least a month. These were now completed in an atmosphere of mourning and profound anxiety about the immediate future of the islands, in the fourth year of limited aid from New Spain, and the second in which no ship had returned.

The Chinese community at Manila was pulling back to the mainland. "On account of the lack of succor in these two years, many were returning, leaving their houses and shops deserted." While making their exodus in early August, two of their great ships in a fleet of five "were driven ashore by the great force of the wind," only twelve miles or so out of Manila. "Six hundred Chinamen were drowned, although a still larger number escaped [to land]."<sup>273</sup>

Set for August 4, the same storm also delayed the *Cambojana's* sailing for three days.<sup>274</sup> Just at the time of her departure, the

tension broke over the fate of the vessels returning from Acapulco. Customarily lookouts positioned on the east coasts of Luzon and Samar sent news of the sighting of ships approaching the islands. A report arrived in Manila on August 7 that two vessels, identified as the *patache* of 1637 and the *San Ambrosio*, had been sighted, not at the approach to the Embocadero, but off Cagayan on the north coast of Luzon. Wives removed their mourning, as the city exploded in celebration "in utmost joy, and all the bells were rung."<sup>275</sup> With this, "the Chinese, who learned the news on board their ships, disembarked, and returned to their shops and trading."<sup>276</sup>

The general jubilation accompanying the belief that there would at last be some resolution of the current crisis was of very short duration. On August 21 another message was received that both the *patache* and the *San Ambrosio* had subsequently been wrecked while putting in at the Cagayan coast at the port of Nueva Segovia. Although a portion of the cargo had already been landed, including some privately owned silver and chests containing the funds of the situado (the government subsidy), much treasure was lost, including an estimated 550,000 pesos from the accounts of persons in the city, in addition to a considerable loss of life. One hundred fifty persons, many of them new troop reinforcements, drowned.<sup>277</sup> Coming on the heels of the news of the loss of the *Concepción*, it must have seemed a disaster of incomprehensible proportions.

In this state of affairs, apparently little help could be mustered on behalf of the *Concepción* survivors in the Ladrones. The Acapulco-bound *Concepción Cambojana* may have left in ignorance about the shortlived good fortune of the returning relief ships. Intending to make its way as rapidly as possible to advise New Spain of the desperate condition in the islands, it is unlikely to have been directed to cruise the Ladrones en route in the hope of picking them up. The first vessel designated to undertake this mission was the *San Nicolas*, a relief ship for Ternate, the Spanish outpost in the Moluccas, dispatched in early November with an experienced chief pilot with orders to pass the Ladrones on its return from Ternate to collect them, but the captain of the *San Nicolas*, Andrés del Urbina,<sup>278</sup> was not able to complete his assignment. His ship ran into a storm, suffered serious damage, and made an emergency return to port where it had then lost its cannon, an event which earned Governor Corcuera yet another rebuke from his superiors.<sup>279</sup> Other events at home directed

resources and attention away from a mission to rescue the *Concepción's* survivors.

The final blow in the series of disasters to strike the Philippines in 1639 was an upheaval in late November involving the 35,000 Chinese in central Luzon. A contributing cause to this uprising was said to be Governor Corcuera's implementation of extensive licensing fees as a revenue-raising measure. The immediate cause of the insurrection was his levy of Chinese for agricultural labor in the Calambaya province 36 miles from Manila, "by force, and entirely against their will; many of them fell sick ...more than three hundred of them died...The time came...to pay their license-money and rent, which in all was more than twenty-five pesos for each one." Harassed by the officials, they broke loose in revolt.<sup>280</sup> Searching for ways to explain the chaos, which evolved into a civil war, deeper and more sinister signs of perfidy were sought. A pamphlet published at Madrid in 1642 alleged that Chinese had conspired with a pirate compatriot and plotted to capture the galleons from New Spain.<sup>281</sup> Lasting from November 21, 1639, until March 15, 1640, the war resulted in the following casualties: 40 - 45 Spaniards; 300 Indians; 22,000 - 24,000 Chinese, "including those who died in the provinces."<sup>282</sup> The rivers ran with blood and decomposing bodies for six months.<sup>283</sup> As the French traveller Legentil would remark with great Gallic understatement from his more remote vantage point 130 years hence, "the year 1639 was not favorable for Manila."<sup>284</sup>

### Remaining *Concepción* Survivors

Abandoned for a time, the situation of the Spaniards and other survivors who remained in the Ladrones was precarious.

Varying amounts of information are available on the fates of the six original returnees and the twenty-two Spaniards remaining in the islands. Juan de Montoya, master of the ship and protege of Governor Corcuera, was the only identified occupant of that first boatload to leave the Ladrones in May or June 1639 with the aid of Guamanians. Implicated along with other intimates of the governor in his network of corruption,<sup>285</sup> Captain Juan de Montoya distinguished himself in the repression of the Chinese insurrection of 1639-1640.<sup>286</sup>

Other survivors probably despaired over a quick recovery. Nicholas del Pino, a sailor originally from Cádiz, and Francisco Ramos, the boatswain's mate aboard the *Concepción*, were

two Spaniards to have returned by April 1640.<sup>287</sup> In the case of Ramos, his papers read that he had been a captive in the *Ladrones* until 8 April 1640 and had "reached the port of Cavite with some sailors from the lost ship in a boat which they had made."<sup>288</sup> The natives would have been unlikely to have given them much assistance as they were hoping to exchange the captives for iron upon the arrival of a rescue ship.

A fourth Spaniard, Esteban Ramos, chief pilot of the *Concepción*, and another sailor, nationality unknown, were among those who waited to be picked up by a passing galleon sometime after.<sup>289</sup> It may be assumed that Ramos' recovery occurred relatively early in the 1640s as he returned to his profession and was serving as pilot aboard a ship which engaged the Dutch enemy in 1646.<sup>290</sup> Misfortune continued to stalk his career as he was also pilot of the *San Francisco Xavier* which ran aground at Boronga in 1655. In both 1660 and 1661, galleon general Esteban Ramos failed to make the voyage from Cavite to Acapulco in the newly built, and coincidentally named, *Nuestra Señora de la Concepción*.<sup>291</sup>

This completes the roster of those known to survive among the "people of account," a category which generally designated "gentleborn" Spaniards, whose naming rescues them from complete obscurity. The "others," exact numbers unknown, are nameless. They include a sailor, perhaps the one mentioned above who spent some years on the island along with Esteban Ramos. He was possibly the same Tagalog-speaking Filipino sailor who provided important assistance to Father Diego Luis Sanvitores by teaching him the local language before he arrived in the islands and founded the Jesuit mission in 1668.

### **Thirty Years On: The Jesuit Mission and the Wreck of the *Concepción***

The indifference of Manila to the fate of "the richest ship...ever seen on that route"<sup>292</sup> can be explained by the general distress of the colony in the years immediately following the wreck and the cloud of corruption which hung about Corcuera's role in the lading of the *Concepción*. It is possible that in 1639, the details received at Manila of the extent of damage to the ship when it smashed against the reef had persuaded officials that virtually nothing aboard could have been recovered. The temporary incapacity at Manila in 1639 to furnish ships or men to retrieve survivors and cargo had left the vessel and the booty of its treasure to be plundered over time by

the islanders. While they were said not to value gold and silver as Europeans did, adornments among them were limited. Moreover their expertise in diving was notorious.

Thirty years later, however, interest in the *Concepción* was revived by the Jesuits, under the leadership of Father Diego Luis de Sanvitores who was determined to initiate a new field of missionary work in the *Ladrones*. Sanvitores had begun to plan a *Ladrones* mission field in 1662 on his first trip to the Philippines.<sup>293</sup> Good connections at the Spanish court were instrumental. The intervention of the Jesuit confessor to the Spanish Queen, Mariana of Austria, helped Sanvitores win her support. The islands were renamed in her honor.<sup>294</sup> His other illustrious benefactress was the Portuguese-born María Guadalupe de Lencastre (1630-1715), Duchess of Aveiro and wife of the Spanish Duke of Arcos.<sup>295</sup> In 1666, the mission's authorization papers arrived on the Acapulco galleon<sup>296</sup> and in 1667, he made a quick round trip to Mexico, returning with the workers he needed.

On the westbound galleon which brought Sanvitores from Mexico to begin his work was a Tagalog who had lived for seventeen years in the *Ladrones*, from 1638 until 1655. He passed on his knowledge of the Chamorro language to the missionary who in turn prepared a grammar and translation of the catechism into Chamorro while en route.

As I write this aboard ship, I am setting down the oral explanation of an interpreter -- a Tagalan both by nationality and by language. The man is intelligent enough and knows how to express himself, but cannot write even in Spanish letters. He luckily escaped from the shipwrecked *Concepción* and remained in the Marianas seventeen years living and dealing with the natives...<sup>297</sup>

Sanvitores' band, five priests, a lay brother and thirty lay catechists, encountered two survivors of the *Concepción* when they landed on Guam in the middle of June 1668, Pedro Casor, a Christian native of the Bisayan region of the Philippines who became a trusted companion of Sanvitores, and Lorenzo, a native of Malabar.<sup>298</sup> The first accounts by the Jesuits

also publicized the variety of small ornaments the natives had in their possession, which it was understood were the legacy of booty from the *Concepción*. In his letter to the Queen about events on their arrival, Marcelo Ansaldo remarked:

...[T]hirty years ago a ship which carried many little gold chains and many ivory crucifixes and other statuettes was wrecked here and many of these statuettes and chains were salvaged. To this day the natives barter these little gold chains or ivory images for iron.<sup>293</sup>

The survivors were instrumental in helping to create the record of certain miraculous events which entered in the contemporary Jesuit chronicles. The evidence of divine intervention which they perceived at every turn stiffened the resolve of the priests to persist in conversion in the face of increasing resistance from the natives. The Jesuit mission was believed by the Fathers to be the long-awaited fulfillment of the promise to bring the faith to the Ladrões which had been made by Spanish Christian castaways of the *Concepción*.

In Sanvitores' accounts, the missionaries' discovery of the *Concepción's* survivors was a propitious event, mediated by the Blessed Virgin Mary.<sup>300</sup> When the *Concepción* wrecked at Saipan in 1638, the Virgin had appeared in a vision to Taga, a chieftain on the island of Tinian, across the channel, urging him to care for victims of the wreck.<sup>301</sup> Subsequently Taga was baptized by Don Marcos Fernandez, a Spaniard from the ship, and given the name Corcuera, after the governor, a name which his descendants continued to use, and to associate with all governors of the Philippines.<sup>302</sup> The Virgin had encouraged Taga to become a Christian and, it was said, Marcos Fernandez promised Taga that he would ask for missionaries to be sent to the Ladrões on his return to Manila. Taga arranged for the group of six Spaniards to make their way to Guam from which, at Taga's intercession, the Guamanian chief Quipuha prepared the boat to send them across the sea.<sup>303</sup> Marcos Fernandez is not elsewhere identified among the six in this group, those who landed at Samar and arrived at Cavite in late July in 1639. The silence concerning him is surprising, considering his ties to the Governor. In any case after an interval of thirty years, his promise was carried through. As

the Jesuits understood it, yet a third, celestial "Maria" had showered favors on their mission and her intercession continued through the first difficult years, evidence enough that the Marianas were now ready for conversion.<sup>304</sup>

Quipuha, present when the Jesuits arrived in 1668, was baptized and given the Christian name Juan.<sup>305</sup> In August two priests were sent by request to Saipan and Tinian, where the Taga family also remained loyal supporters of Christianity far beyond Sanvitores time. According to local legend their homestead on the south coast of Tinian was said to be the site of "a great Christian convert house."<sup>306</sup>

Although five churches were constructed and 30,000 were baptized in the first two years,<sup>307</sup> the missionaries found the souls of their converts "inconstant" and their efforts regularly compromised by "the Devil" who "inflamed the natives." A four month war in Tinian spread to Saipan and Anaton. Implicated in these outbursts of violence was a nemesis of the missionaries, Choco, "the Chinese Idolator" whose vessel, a sampan enroute from Manila to the Moloccas, had to put in for repairs in the islands in 1648. He had failed to leave with his shipmates because, in the missionaries' black account of his past, he had allegedly murdered one of his companions and would have faced charges upon his return to Manila.<sup>308</sup> Since then he had lived among the Chamorros, preaching Buddhism and, upon the arrival of the Jesuits, resistance to Christianity, spreading the horrific "rumor... that the holy baptism was fatal to man because the holy oil and water were mixed with poison, with which the Fathers intended to take the life of anyone they baptized, especially the children, who being more delicate, could not resist its power."<sup>309</sup> Increasingly the priests sensed their peril, "menaced by death from sling stones, spears, and poisons, for wanting to baptize creatures many of whom think baptism is fatal for them," and believed themselves spared "many times only by miraculous providence."<sup>310</sup> Increasingly they relied on force of arms provided by the occasional despatch of a few soldiers, many from Pampanga units in the Marianas to secure their gains. A token force was "sufficient to introduce a healthy fear, as well as justice and government..."<sup>311</sup> In the midst of the violence at Tinian in [1668], ten of the secular companions of the priests had put themselves between the warring camps. The group, captain Don Juan de Santa Cruz, one young Biscayan Spaniard and the rest Filipinos, had but "three muskets and a small fieldpiece."

The latter had been left (as if reserved by God for such occasions) on the celebrated wreck in these islands of the ship *Concepción* in the year of 1638; it had been salvaged and was found by chance in a house on the island of Saipan during a search for the head of an image of Our Lady that some said was in it.<sup>312</sup>

### Early Salvage Operations

The Jesuit reports also revived the interest of the government in the shipwreck, especially in the heavy artillery which had been aboard. Although the discovery of the fieldpiece may have been a godsend at the time, it was part of a more systematic search through the islands, including the remains of the *Concepción*, undertaken by the Spanish from about 1670. The Jesuits themselves were not especially interested in salvage operations, but as the nominal superior authority in the islands they filed reports describing and narrating places and events of interest to the government. Sanvitores had seen wreckage by the village of Agingan during his trip to Saipan in 1669.<sup>313</sup> Other narratives gave more detail.

Saipan, now St. Joseph, where not a little has been left behind by the tide and struggle of the sea, in whose narrow strait...perished a Spanish ship called *Concepción*...even now refuse is seen in the houses and guns and anchors on the shore and round about.<sup>314</sup>

In June 1670, the Governor at Manila, Don Manuel de Leon y Saravía, passed on this Jesuit information to the Crown and suggested the recovery of the weapons.<sup>315</sup> In May 1670, the Marianas' military commander, Don Juan de Santa Cruz, who had recently completed a trip to reconnoiter the island for safe anchorages for the Manila-Acapulco galleons, was able to confirm with greater accuracy the site of the wreck and the situation of the guns.

The guns... are visible in nine brazas (about fifty feet) [of water] about a league and a half from the port of St. Joseph of Raurau... in front of... Agingan...

out about a musquet shot from the land.... You can see four anchors on the nearby beach.<sup>316</sup>

From 1671 onward, the Crown also pressed directly through the Viceroy at Mexico for the recovery of the artillery. Philippines' Governor Manuel de Leon y Saravia reminded the Crown that in order to comply with the salvage orders armed men would be needed, for otherwise the inhabitants of the area would not permit it, nor could the islanders be expected to help as they were not much given to work of any sort.<sup>317</sup> There were other obstacles as well. The waters were very rough and unpredictable near Agingan Point. Father Gayoso had related his moment of peril there on a trip between islands in 1671.

From Opián I embarked for Fumon, where with the favor of God I arrived, although I was nearly drowned on the point of Agingan, where the ship was lost, by the rushing of the currents and waves, helped by a brisk wind.<sup>318</sup>

However desirable the bronze guns were, experts were uneasy about projected salvage plans, considering

the unsheltered location and the lack of ports, the hurricanes and storms which continuously strike the islands, the known risk that would be suffered by the people as well as the boats, instruments and equipment necessary for such a laborious and long-lasting job, the little hope of success and the great cost which the royal treasury would have to bear."<sup>319</sup>

The side of reluctance prevailed. From the Marianas in 1673 the Jesuit Fathers assured the Crown that the projected salvage would be easy enough, provided they had boats, because the wreck was in shallow waters.<sup>320</sup> As the years passed, boatbuilding for inter-island and Philippines communication made salvage more feasible.<sup>321</sup> An expedition was planned in 1683, but a stretch of severe weather aborted it.<sup>322</sup> Finally a successful effort was launched in April 1684, in the midst of a larger operation to

pacify the islands north of Guam. Two Jesuits, Pedro Coomans and Mathias Cuculino accompanied Don Jose de Quiroga and 60 armed men and islanders. More than forty-five years since the disaster, sections of the ship's hull, weighted down by the heavy cannon, were visible just off the shore of the village. The inhabitants of Agingan had stocks of timber planking, anchor shanks and damaged anchors stored in their community, the refuse seen in earlier years. One of the Jesuits, Fr. Cuculino, sounded for the guns and found them all in 7 fathoms (forty-two feet deep) of water, placed on top of the ribbing and planking of the ship.<sup>323</sup> As Father Coomans reported to a correspondent at Rome, although rainy weather and harassment from a few hostile islanders set them back a day or two, their task, "to extract the guns which had lain for so long an interval in their derelict grave in the sea," proved to be relatively easy.

...Then [18 April], in our final advance, we reached the village called Agingan at the narrow channel between this island and Tinian...a government ship sailing from the Philippines Islands to New Spain was wrecked....The inhabitants had fled from the place and we had quiet and no danger to our bodies, beyond the emission of some missiles from slings...the next day [21 April] having returned to camp...before vespers he [Quiroga] gave

attention to salvaging the guns and having salvaged five of the smaller ones, on the next day found sixteen and another in the form of a crassior which they call a mortar, designed for firing bombs high in the air...<sup>324</sup>

In addition to these small ones, they were intent on retrieving the largest, each weighing about 4300 lbs. capable of firing 24 lb. balls. Although it was believed that the ship might have carried as many as 40 guns<sup>325</sup> they reported from the site that they could see only about twenty-five large guns. They proceeded to bring up one cannon per day each through the end of April and early May, but were cut off on May 5 by an islanders' attack. Accounts of the total number of cannons retrieved ranged from sixteen to twenty smaller pieces (*pedreros*) and ten to fourteen larger ones (*culverins*), all of bronze.<sup>326</sup>

Subsequently, two boats each loaded with ten pieces of artillery were delayed by the weather at Tinian where the men were ambushed in a careless moment. The boats were burned, and the guns were abandoned on the beach. Another twenty years elapsed before the governor at Guam, Antonio Villamor y Vadillo set about to retrieve the *Concepción's* guns at Tinian. The certificate filed in 1709 confirmed that he had sent to Manila a total of seventeen pieces of bronze artillery (four recovered in 1704 and thirteen in 1705) as well as eight anchors, all from the *Concepción*.<sup>327</sup>

## THE GALLEON TRADE IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

In the long run the galleon trade remained the staple of Spaniards in the Philippines for at least another one hundred years after the time of Governor Corcuera. It even experienced something of a boom in the 1690s, permitting a bridge of transition to the modest good fortune of trade throughout the Spanish Empire in the eighteenth century. The economic historian Pierre Chaunu has argued for the significance of the revival of trade first in the Pacific, and the possibility that it had even acted as a catalyst for recovery after 1700 in the Atlantic trade.

The old system of galleon trading persisted until the impact of the policies of the Bourbon dynasty, which succeeded the decrepit Hapsburgs in 1700, and took hold after 1750 to change the terms of the trade and expand the base of the economy by promoting agricultural development. The projects originated in Spain, finally tipping the balance in the struggle for control of the trade away from the colonists and toward Seville and Cádiz. With the initiation of direct sea voyages between Cádiz and Manila in the late 1760s, the unique character of the galleon as the sole regular link to the eastern and western sectors of the Spanish empire was destroyed. The second major innovation which undermined the traditional mechanisms of the trade was the establishment of the Manila Consulado in 1769.<sup>328</sup> For the first time, a body of established merchants assumed control of the annual galleon sailing at the expense of the direct supervision and interference of governors and treasury officers. Just as no one official could engross the cargo, the old perquisites, especially those which had allowed for the distribution of shares in the voyage to a variety of residents of Manila, were extinguished. The third attack upon the customary trade was the establishment of the Royal Philippine Company in 1785, bringing to fruition an idea which had a number of supporters in Spain since at least the 1730s. The Company had a wide area of activity, but its principal consequences for the galleon trade were the following: it created

alternative investments to galleon trading by promoting export crops and Philippine manufactures; it marginalized the more passive merchant practices at Manila by aggressively pursuing trade goods, setting up contracts with the Dutch and English East India Companies for spices and India cottons, respectively, and sending its own factor to purchase silks in the Chinese market at Canton; and it made incursions into the galleons' prized Spanish American market by sending Asian textiles via Cádiz to Vera Cruz, with the result that the next galleon cargo from Manila would find its sales much reduced in New Spain.<sup>329</sup>

However, the twilight years of the galleons, those after 1785, were also marked by a more general transformation of the commercial system of the Spanish Empire under Bourbon direction, which ended the antiquated pretense to trade monopoly and replaced the fleets by "free trade" throughout the colonies between 1748 and 1789. The entry points to colonial markets multiplied and the trade at Acapulco was no longer a principle axis of exchange. With the declared opening of the port of Manila to friendly nations in 1790, the privileged position of the galleons receded into the past.

Finally in the last years of the eighteenth and in the first decade of the nineteenth centuries, conditions of war and revolution, not simply administrative reforms, spearheaded change. The movement for independence plunged New Spain into rebellion beginning in 1810. The burning of Acapulco by patriot forces in 1813 razed the last of the colonial structures which underpinned the galleon trade in Mexico. In the same year, liberal revolutionaries in Spain declared a definitive end to the galleon line. The "China Ship" of 1811, detained in port for several years because of the hostilities, finally sailed from Acapulco in 1815 as the last of the galleons, ending the 250-year history of extraordinary navigation.

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31	<i>Shipyards at Cavite</i> , painting by Noel Escultura from the Collection of Alfredo Roces
36	<i>Recovered Storage Jars</i> , photograph by Maura Rinaldi
38	<i>Magellan on Voyage of Discovery to Philippines</i> , engraving by De Bry, Rare Books Collection, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.
40	<i>Chart of the Philippines</i> , from George Anson's <i>Voyage Around the World</i> , Printed 1928, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.
45	<i>Starving Passengers</i> , painting by Robert E. McGinnis, Courtesy National Geographic Society, Washington, D.C.
45	<i>Plan of the Harbour of Acapulco</i> , Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.
46	<i>Merchants at Acapulco Trade Fair</i> , painting by Robert E. McGinnis, Courtesy National Geographic Society, Washington, D.C.

Pg. Description

- 49 *Acapulco Harbour*, engraving by De Bry, 1616, Rare Books Collection, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.
- 52 *Concepción Getting Underway in Cavite Harbor*, painting by Roger D. Morris, Apex Collection
- 54 *Wreck Scene at Agingan Reef*, painting by Roger D. Morris, Apex Collection
- 55 *Galleon and Proas*, engraving by De Bry, Rare Books Collection, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.
- 56 *Guam Island Practices of the Old Inhabitants*, engraving from drawing by A. Pellion, around 1818, while on a voyage around the world with Captain Louis de Freycinet 1817 - 1820, Courtesy Special Collections, UCLA Library, Los Angeles
- 57 *Mariana Islands Practices of Old Inhabitants Fishing*, engraving from drawing by A. Pellion, around 1818, while on a voyage around the world with Captain Louis de Freycinet 1817 - 1820, Courtesy Special Collections, UCLA Library, Los Angeles

## NOTES

### Abbreviations Used In Endnotes

AGI	Archivo General de Indias (Seville)
AGN	Archivo General de la Nación (Mexico City)
ARSI	Archivum Romanorum Societas Iesu (Rome)
BR	The Philippines Islands, 1493-1898, Blair and Robertson, eds.

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1. On the Spanish colonial commercial system see Clarence Henry Haring, *Trade and Navigation in the Time of the Hapsburgs* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1918) or the more recent review in Geoffrey J. Walker, *Spanish Politics and Imperial Trade, 1700-1789* (Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1979), pp. 1-15. The Pacific trade has been relatively understudied with the exception of the classic account of William Lytle Schurz, *The Manila Galleon* (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1939; Dutton Paperback, 1959), a masterful and entertaining work. The intent of this essay was to return to original materials used by Schurz in order to impart, as he does so engagingly, much of the tone of the contemporary sources, as well as to look more closely at the trade as it was in the second quarter of the seventeenth century. Thus while his contribution is generally acknowledged he is not extensively cited. The author also relied on archival notes supplied to Pacific Sea Resources by other scholarly researchers. The reports and materials provided by Dr. Peter Earle and Dr. David D. Hebb were especially helpful and their contribution is most gratefully acknowledged.

2. Juan Grau y Monfalcon, "Memorial of 1640," in *The Philippine Islands, 1493-1898*, Emma Helen Blair and James Alexander Robertson, eds. (Cleveland: Arthur Clark, 1903-1909), vol. 29, p. 66 (hereafter cited as BR volume number:page).
3. "Admiral Hieronimo Bañuelos y Carillo's Relation [1638]," BR 29:66.
4. Diego de [Artiega], "Relation of the Western Islands called Filipinas," [Mexico, 1573], BR 3:190.
5. M. A. P. Meilink-Roelofs, *Asian Trade and European Influence in the Indonesian Archipelago* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1962); *The Chinese in the Philippines, 1570-1770*, ed. Alfonso Felix (Manila: Solidaridad Publishing House, 1966).
6. Lyle N. McAlister, *Spain and Portugal in the New World* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984).
7. Survey of early voyages in Nicholas P. Cushner, *Spain in the Philippines* (Quezon City/Rutland, Vt.: Institute of Philippines Culture, Manila University/Charles E. Tuttle Co., 1971) pp. 8ff.
8. Meilink-Roelofs, p. 120.
9. Fernand Braudel, *The Wheels of Commerce, Civilization and Capitalism, 15-18th Century*, vol. 2, trans. Sian Reynolds (New York: Harper & Row, 1982), p. 221.
10. Fernand Braudel, *The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II*, 2 vols., trans. Sian Reynolds, (New York: Harper & Row, 1972) 1:553 citing Earl J. Hamilton, *American Treasure and the Price Revolution in Spain*.
11. Cushner, p. 50.
12. "Letter from royal officials" BR 2:191.
13. Cushner, p. 64.
14. "Relation of the Filipinas Islands," BR 3:58.
15. Letter to Philip II, July 8, 1569, BR 34:225.
16. "Relation of the Voyage to Luzon," BR 3:76.
17. Cushner, p. 76.
18. Ibid., p. 97.
19. John Leddy Phelan, *Hispanization of the Philippines* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1967), pp. 41, 100.
20. Hernando de Riquel, Manila, [1573], BR 3:243, 245.
21. BR 3:247-248.
22. Viceroy to the King, December 5, 1573, BR 3:214.
23. Ibid., BR 3:212.
24. Ibid., pp. 212-213.

25. Spanish officers fresh from the American conquests believed China could be conquered with "60 good Spanish soldiers." Hernando de Riquel et al, "News from the Western Islands" [1573], BR 3:247.
26. Juan Pacheco Maldonado to Philip II, Manila [1575], BR 3:299.
27. BR 3:313-314.
28. P. Pablo Pastells, "*Historia general de las Islas Filipinas*," in *Catalogo de los documentos relativos a las Islas Filipinas existentes en el Archivo de Indias de Sevilla por D. Francisco Navas del Valle*, 9 vols. (Barcelona, 1934), 7(1): ccxxv-ccxl (hereafter cited as Pastells, *Historia/Catalogo*).
29. BR 17:27.
30. BR 34:399-401.
31. BR 17:28.
32. BR 17:29-50.
33. Schurz, p. 155.
34. Woodrow Borah, *Early Colonial Trade and Navigation between Mexico and Peru* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1954).
35. Casimiro Díaz on the interim governor, D. Juan Manuel de la Peña (1669-1670), BR 37:273-274.
36. Phelan, pp. 136, 144-45.
37. Cushner, p. 107.
38. Phelan characterized "Hispanization" as indirect, partial, but in the end more successful than the Spanish conquest in Mexico and Peru, pp. 153-159.
39. Robert R. Reed, *Colonial Manila: The Context of Hispanic Urbanism and Process of Morphogenesis*, University of California Publications in Geography, v. 22 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979), p. 33. The population of Mexico City [1683] was around 400,000, including 72,000 Spaniards. Irving Leonard, *Baroque Times in Old Mexico* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1966), p. 159.
40. Tomás de Comyn, "State of the Philippines in 1810," *The Former Philippines thru Foreign Eyes*, ed. Austin Craig (Manila: Philippine Education Company, 1916), p. 358.
41. Antonio de Morga, *Sucesos de las Islas Filipinas*, ed. J.S. Cummins (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971), p. 301.
42. "Father Juan Cobo's Account," *The Chinese in the Philippines, 1550-1770* pp. 134-135.
43. Reed, p. 62.
44. Morga, pp. 281-287.
45. Simon Lopez [1586] in Reed, p. 56.
46. Cobo [1589], *The Chinese in the Philippines*, p. 137.
47. *Ibid.*, p. 126.

48. Alberto Santamaría, "The Chinese Parian," *ibid.*, pp. 67-118; Gregorio F. Zaide, *The Pageant of Philippine History*, 2 vols. (Manila: Philippine Education Company, 1979), 1:435-439.
49. Reed, p. 53; Schurz, p. 117; 1620 legislation on size of population, BR 22:157.
50. Phelan argued that the Philippines were relatively unscathed by effects of conquest, but see Magino Sola, S.J. "Informe al Rey...[1659]: native population in the Pintados under Jesuit jurisdiction fell from 50,000 to 12,000 in the seventeenth century.
51. Macao in the same period had a population of 850 Portuguese families, "Macao in 1635, by Antonio Bocarro." *Seventeenth Century Macao*, ed. and trans. C.R. Boxer (Hong Kong: Heinemann (Asia), 1984), pp. 14-16, 21-22, 24.
52. George Bryan Souza. *The Survival of Empire: Portuguese Trade and Society in China and the South China Sea* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), p. 4.
53. William S. Atwell, "Notes on Silver, Foreign Trade and the Late Ming Economy," *Ching-shih wen't'i*, III, 8 (December 1977), 7. On the districts of the potteries, see Rinaldi elsewhere in this report. On Fukien, see Evelyn S. Rawski, *Agricultural Change and the Peasant Economy of South China*, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1972), pp. 66-68.
54. Rawski, p. 66.
55. Morga, pp. 305-306.
56. *Ibid.*, p. 306.
57. BR 29:307-308.
58. Morga, p. 307.
59. Peter Boyd-Boyman, "Spanish and European Textiles in Sixteenth Century Mexico," *The Americas*, 29:3 (1972), 335.
60. *Ibid.*, p. 334.
61. Grau y Monfalcon, Memorial of 1637, BR 27:55-212. On goods and prices in the early seventeenth century, see "Appendix: Buying and Selling Prices of Oriental Products," BR 19:303-319.
62. No other Philippines products had commercial value in New Spain, see 1720s arguments in BR 44:287.
63. *Ibid.* "Chinese porcelain is shipped in small quantity, being mainly an article of luxury...; moreover it is bulky and fragile." Elsewhere, porcelain is considered "low-priced ballast goods" along with zinc, alum, and radix China." See Souza, p. 46.
64. *Thomas Gage's Travels in the New World*, ed. J. Eric S. Thompson (Norman, Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press, 1958), pp. 67-68.
65. *Ibid.*, p. 70.
66. "Extracto Historial," BR 44:287. The "Extracto Historial" is a collection of material on the history of the galleon trade, comprised of papers considered by the Council of the Indies in its deliberations on its regulation. It was originally published as *Extracto Historial del expediente que pende en el Consejo Real, y Supremo de las Indias, a Instancia de la Ciudad de Manila...*(Madrid, 1736). A modern version is Antonio Alvarez de Abreu, *Extracto Historial del Comercio entre China, Filipinas y Nueva Espana, intro., notes and ed. Carmen Yuste*, 2 vols. (Mexico: Instituto Mexicano de Comercio Exterior, 1977). Sections

of the 1736 edition are excerpted in English translation in BR, vols. 30, 44 and 45.

67. On efforts to increase spice trade at Manila in the 1670s see Diaz, *Conquistas* in BR 37:235. But in the 1720s Manila considered that the Mexican spice market was fully satisfied by Spanish merchants at Vera Cruz, *Extracto Historial*, BR 44:287.

68. See Tapan Rauchanduri, *Jan Company in Coromandel, 1605-1690* (S'Gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff, 1962), p. 128; on cloth trade at Manila in the governorship of D. Manuel de Leon Saravia (1669-1677), see Díaz, *Conquistas*, in BR 37:276-277.

69. On varieties and markets for East India cottons, see Holden Furber, *Rival Empires of Trade in the Orient, 1600-1800* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 1976), p. 241.

70. Peter Boyd-Bowman, "Two Country Stores in XVII Century Mexico, " *The Americas* 28:3 (1972), 246-248.

71. Fernand Braudel, *Wheels*, p. 200.

72. *Ibid.* p. 198.

73. Om Prakash, "Precious Metal Flows in Asia and World Economic Integration in the Seventeenth Century," in *The Emergence of a World Economy, 1500-1914*, eds. Wolfram Fischer et al. Part I (Stuttgart: Steiner, 1986), p. 87.

74. Braudel, *Wheels*, p. 199.

75. *Ibid.*, p.198, citing Boxer, *The Great Ship*, p. 6: "Como os chinos sentirao prata, em montoes trouxerao fazendas."

76. The expression was "plata sa sangre" in the pidgin Spanish of the Chinese at Manila, according to Fray Sebastião Manrique, cited in Charles Ralph Boxer, "Plata es Sangre': Sidelights on the Drain of Spanish American Silver to the Far East," *Philippine Studies*, 3 (1970), 462.

77. Gov. Juan Niño de Tavora to the King, Manila, August 4, 1628, BR 22:248.

78. Boxer, *The Great Ship from Amacon: Annals of Macao and the Old Japan Trade, 1555-1640* (Lisbon: Centro de Estudos Historicos Ultramarinos, 1963), p. 1.

79. Braudel, p. 204.

80. *Ibid.*, p. 196, quoting P. Boisguilbert.

81. Boxer, *Great Ship*, p. 1.

82. Harry E. Cross, "South American Bullion Production and Export, 1550-1750" in J. F. Richards, ed., *Precious Metals and the Later Medieval and Early Modern Worlds* (Durham, North Carolina: Carolina Academic Press, 1983), pp. 403-404.

83. *Ibid.*, pp. 399-400.

84. Pierre Chaunu, *Les Philippines et le Pacifique des Ibériques* (Paris: S.E.V.P.E.N., 1960), p. 269.

85. Souza, *Survival of Empire*, p. 74.

86. *The Travels and Controversies of Friar Domingo Navarette*, ed. J.S. Cummins (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1962), 1:142.

87. Morga, p. 305.
88. Schurz, p. 76.
89. Souza, *Survival of Empire*, p. 68; see Gaspar de Acebo, notary public of the city, "Statement regarding the fulfillment of the decree of his Majesty. Cited in clause 31 of the governor's letter of July 12, 1599," BR 10:289.
90. Morga, p. 307.
91. Schurz, p. 78.
92. Morga, p. 307.
93. King to Palafox, Madrid, February 14, 1640, "Informatory decree regarding the question to what extent and on what plan shall the commerce of the islands with Nueva España hereafter proceed," BR 30:81-92.
94. Meilink-Roelofs, pp. 182-185, 264-265.
95. Morga, p. 307.
96. See discussion of business activities as source of livelihood of Manila colonists in 1599-1600 and the 1620s, Luis Merino, *The Cabildo Secular* (Iloilo:University of San Agustin, 1980), p. 57.
97. On the consulado, organized 1769-1771, see María Teresa Martín Palma, *El Consulado de Manila* (Granada: Universidad de Granada, 1981).
98. Population lists discussed in Merino 1) drawn up in 1599-1600 under the governor Francisco Tello, pp. 49-53; 2) the municipal list of 1634, pp. 106-118.
99. Tenorio was denounced around 1634 for carrying 13,000 pesos to invest in Macao, see , Interim Gov. Juan Cerezo de Salamanca, Manila, 10 August 1634, BR 24:313; Cushner, p. 108. Venegas was said to have once been a good man when he was just a rich merchant, but was hated as a powerful figure in Fajardo's regime. His mansion in the city later became the governor's palace.
100. Merino, p. 56; Capt. Joseph Navada Alvarado, et al, "Discussion regarding Portuguese trade at Manila," BR 25:111 ff.
101. Merino, p. 56.
102. In 1726 the junta of five men was officially increased to seven with the addition of a merchant representative. *Extracto Historial*, 1:320.
103. Le Gentil, p. 157.
104. Grau y Monfalcon, Memorial of 1637, BR 27:176-177.
105. In 1634 there were 421 adults (230 males), and 200 children (below the age of eighteen), plus 44 widows. See the "Matrícula de los vecinos efectivos, españoles residentes en Manila y pueblos extramuros de la ciudad, hecha por el Cabildo, Justicia y Regimiento de ella, por orden de su Gobernador Don Juan Cerezo de Salamanca, en 25 de Julio de 1634," Pastells, *Historia/Catálogo*, 7 (1), ccxxxv-ccxxxviii.
106. See "Memoria de las viudas que hay en esta ciudad de Manila, 25 de Julio 1634," *ibid.*, ccxxxix-ccxl.
107. Rios Coronel, BR 18:291.

108. See request for information about the custom of giving toneladas to the city council, King to Governor, Madrid, 27 March 1637, Pastells, *Catálogo*, 8, 108, and the affirming their rights, 28 August 1641, *ibid.*, p. 173.

109. Carmen Yuste López, *El Comercio de la Nueva España con Filipinas, 1590-1785, Colección Científica, 109, Fuentes Historia Económica* (Mexico: Departamento de Investigaciones Historicas, Instituto Nacional de Antropología e Historia, 1984), p. 31.

110. Pastells, *Catálogo*, 7(2):440, 8:105.

111. Pastells, *Catálogo*, 8:17.

112. Archbishop Serrano to the King, August 1622, BR 20.

113. Memorandum, Council of the Indies, July 15, 1633, Pastells, 7(2):356.

114. Memorial from the city of Manila [1640], Pastells, 8:163.

115. Carletti, pp. 69-91 is on the Mexican and Philippine portion of their journey. This merchant of Florence (b. 1573--d. 1636) went from Seville, with his father, Antonio, to the Indies in 1594, passed through the Philippines in 1596, en route to Japan, China, Macao (where his father died), Malacca, Goa, and returned to Europe via the Cape, St Helena, Holland, and finally to Florence by 1606. The *Ragionamenti* (Chronicles) were first published in 1701. See translator's note, p. xiv.

116. Carletti, p. 70.

117. Le Gentil, pp. 154-155.

118. Fr. Joaquin Martinez de Zuñiga, O.S.A., *Status of the Philippines in 1800* (Manila: Filipiniana Book Guild, 1973), p. 219.

119. *Ibid.*, p. 215.

120. *Ibid.*, pp. 205-206.

121. *Ibid.*, pp. 205-206, 215, 219.

122. Cushner, *Spain in the Philippines*, pp. 139-152.

123. Murdo McCleod, *Spanish Central America: A Socioeconomic History, 1520-1720* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973), p. 169.

124. *Ibid.*, p. 166.

125. *Ibid.*, pp. 165-170.

126. Gemelli Careri, A Voyage Round the World, Part VI, *A Collection of Voyages and Travels*, eds. Awnsham and John Churchill, (London, 1704), 4:501 ff.

127. Louisa Schell Hoberman, "Merchants in Seventeenth Century Mexico City: A Preliminary Portrait," *Hispanic American Historical Review*, 37 (1977) 479-503.

128. BR 23:48-49; Merino, pp. 55-56.

129. BR 23:49.

130. BR 23:48-49; Merino, p. 56.
131. Juan Niño de Tavora to Philip IV, Cavite, August 1, 1629 BR 23:50.
132. Pastells, *Catálogo*, 8:65.
133. Pastells, *Catálogo*, 8:107.
134. Memorial of the Consulado of Andalusia of 1723: "...se debió aquietar la mano o direccion, que Mexico mueve con voz de Manila" (see Extracto Historial 1:241) has previously been translated as "check the hand which Mexico moves at the command of Manila." BR 44:304. The interpretation that it is Mexico which moves but allows Manila to speak seems more to the point.
135. On the Atlantic galleons in the seventeenth century, see Carla Rahn Phillips, *Six Galleons for the King of Spain: Imperial Defense in the Early Seventeenth Century* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), pp. 44-45.
136. On the history of sailing ships in the Pacific see Roger Morris, *Pacific Sail: Four Centuries of Western Ships in the Pacific* (Southampton, England: Ashford, 1987).
137. Discussion of size and variations in Spanish and Portuguese terminology for carracks, naos and galleons in C.R. Boxer, *The Tragic History of the Sea, 1589-1622*, The Hakluyt Society, Second Series, No. CXII (Cambridge: The Hakluyt Society/Cambridge University Press, 1959), pp. 1-5.
138. *Ibid.*, p. 4.
139. Schurz, p. 340-341.
140. The Andalusian merchants in 1735 complained that between deck space in Manila galleons did not conform to usual dimensions because it was left to "the discretion of the builders and according to the end for which it was being constructed." *Extracto Historial* 2:438.
141. Joseph Gonzalez Cabrera Bueno, *Navegación Especulativa y Práctica [Manila, 1734]*, intro. and ed. Michael Mathes, *Coleccion Chimalistac de Libros y Documentos Acerca de la Nueva España*, vol. 31 (Madrid: Ediciones José Porrúa Turanzas, 1970), p. 316.
142. As an alternative to the typical European formula, Cabrera Bueno provides one in use in the Philippines in his era (1730s):  $(\text{Keel} + \text{Length}) \div 2 \times (\text{Beam} + 2) \times \text{Depth of Hold} \cdot .05 \div 8$ , in *Navegación*, p. 316. Compare Phillips, pp. 30-31, 229.
143. *Extracto Historial*, BR 45:82.
144. Cabrera Bueno, p. 317.
145. In 1723, a representative of the Consulado at Cádiz, a group of Spanish metropolitan merchants opposed to Pacific trade, declared that the practice of overloading the vessel by constructing sheds on the half-decks (combes) made the ship look like a "lugar poblado." *Extracto Historial*, 1:205.
146. Grau y Monfalcon, Memorial of 1637, BR 27:130.
147. Calculated from records of accounts, *ibid.*, 133-134.
148. Pablo Emilio Perez-Mallaina Bueno and Bibiano Torres Ramirez, *La Armada del Mar del Sur* (Seville: Escuela de Estudios Hispano-Americanos, 1987), pp. 100-109.
149. "Feodor Jagor's Travels in the Philippines," *The Former Philippines thru Foreign Eyes*, p. 75.

150. BR 18:169-188.
151. "Events in the Philippines, 1643-44," BR 35:176; Letters from the ship *Seahorse* at Manila in 1644, *The English Factories in India, 1618-1669*, ed. Sir William Foster, 13 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1906-1927), 7:224.
152. *Navarette*, 1:92.
153. José Vila, O.P. et al. BR 44:125-127.
154. Fray Juan de Medina, "Historia de la Orden de S. Agustín de Estas Islas Filipinas [1630]," BR 24:113.
155. Grau y Monfalcon, Memorial of 1637, BR 27:131 ff; Corcuera to the King, BR 26:231-251.
156. Pineda [1619], BR 18:171-172.
157. *Navarette*, 2:39.
158. Alexander de Humboldt, *Political Essay on the Kingdom of New Spain* (London: Longman, Hurst, Rees, Orme and Brown, 1811), 4:73-74.
159. Perez Mallaina on the same practice in seventeenth century Peru, pp. 26-27.
160. Guillaume Joseph Hyacinthe Jean Batiste Le Gentil de la Galaisiere [Le Gentil], *A Voyage to the Indian Seas [1761-1769]* (Manila: Filipiniana Book Guild, 1964), p. 160.
161. *Ibid.*, p. 135.
162. "Bañuelos y Carillo's Relation," BR 29:83.
163. Sebastian de Pino, BR 18:184.
164. The instructions by Fray Alavaro Benevente for Augustian commissaries in the late seventeenth century has been published by Manuel Merino, O.S.A., "El alistamento misionero en el siglo XVII o avisos para los comisarios reclutadores," *Missionalia Hispanica* II, 5 (1945), 359.
165. D. Pedro Manuel de Arandia y Santestevan, *Ordenanzas de Marina para los Navios del Rey de las Islas Filipinas que en Guerra y con Reales Permissos Hacen Viages al Reyno de la Nueva España, u Otro Destino del Real Servicio* (Manila, 1757).
166. Charles R. Boxer, "Sailing Orders for the Manila Galleons of 1635-1636," *Terrae Incognitae*, IV (1972), 7-17.
167. Shurz, p. 271.
168. Arandia y Santestevan, *Ordenanzas*, pp. 10-12.
169. Carla Rahn Phillips, "Life at Sea in the Sixteenth Century: The Landlubber's Lament of Eugenio de Salazar" (University of Minnesota, The James Ford Bell Lectures, Number 24, 1987), p. 8. Journal from a 16th century Atlantic crossing.
170. *Philippine Jesuits in Exile: The Journals of Francisco Puig, S.J., 1768-1770*, ed. and trans., Nicholas P. Cushner, S.J (Rome: Institutum Historicum S.I., 1964), p. 64.
171. Arandia y Santestevan, *Ordenanzas*, pp. 61-67.

172. Ibid., p. 63; Giovanni Francesco Gemelli Careri, *A Voyage to the Philippines*, (Manila: Filipiniana Book Guild, 1963), p. 139.
173. "El Galeon de Manila", in *Artes de México*, p. 27.
174. Arandía y Santestevan, *Ordenanzas*, p. 61.
175. Julian de Zulueta and Lola Higuera, "Health and Navigation in the South Seas: The Spanish Experience," *Starving Sailors: The Influence of Nutrition upon Naval and Maritime History* (Greenwich, England: National Maritime Museum, 1981), pp. 90-91.
176. George Anson, *A Voyage Round the World*, ed. Glyndwr Williams (London: Oxford University Press), p. 222.
177. Gemelli Careri, p. 127.
178. Anson, pp. 222-223.
179. Merino, "Alistamento," p. 355, 359.
180. Francesco Carletti, *My Voyage Around the World*, trans. Herbert Weinstock (New York: Pantheon Books, 1964), p. 79.
181. Anson, p. 222.
182. Harry A. Morton, *The Wind Commands: Sailors and Sailing Ships in the Pacific* (Middletown, Connecticut: Wesleyan University Press, 1975), p. 173.
183. Gemelli Careri, p. 131.
184. Le Gentil, p.162; Arandía y Santestevan, *Ordenanzas*, p. 7.
185. Boxer, "Sailing Orders," p. 13.
186. *Extracto Historial*, 1:270.
187. "Sailing Orders," p. 13.
188. Jagor, "Travels," p. 80.
189. Gemelli Careri's is the most extensive description of a seventeenth century voyage. Book Three of his *Giro del Mondo* appears in the Manila (1963) edition, pp. 131-173.
190. Boxer, "Sailing Orders," p. 12.
191. Gemelli Careri, p. 139.
192. Cushner/Puig, pp. 63 ff.
193. Cubero Sebastián in José Miguel Quintana, "A Journey from the Philippines to New Spain in the XVII Century," *Artes de México*, No. 143 (1971), 47.
194. Ibid.
195. Gemelli Careri, p. 148.

196. Quintana, 48.
197. Gemelli Careri, p. 161.
198. Quintana, 48.
199. The most extreme case of deaths aboard the galleon was the fate of the San Jose which was discovered drifting past Acapulco after a year at sea in 1657. All aboard had perished of disease or starvation, Schurz, p. 266.
200. Gemelli Careri, p. 163.
201. De Zuleta and Higuera, pp. 90-91.
202. Navarrete, 1:41.
203. Gemelli Careri, p. 169.
204. "The gentleman come ashore," that is the anticipated arrival of the galleon, was regularly remarked upon in the mid-seventeenth century Mexico City diary of Gregorio Martín de Guido, *Diario, 1648-1664*, 2 vols. (Mexico: Editorial Porrúa, 1953)
205. Gemelli Careri, p. 168.
206. Quintana, 48.
207. Merino, "Alistamento," 308.
208. Book IV of *Giro del Mondo* in *A Collection of Voyages and Travels*, eds. Awnsham and John Churchill, (London, 1704), 4:501 ff.
209. Navarrete, 1:38; Merino, "Alistamento," 308.
210. Gemelli Careri, *A Collection*, 4:474 ff.
211. *Ibid.*, 478.
212. Navarrete, 2:391.
213. Navarrete, 1:32-36; Humboldt on the "Asiatic Road," 4:4-5.
214. "Banuelos y Carillo's Relation," BR 29:83.
215. Chaunu, pp. 156-157.
216. "It is certain, and has been observed in Manila, that since the loss of the trading fleet of the year [1]629 [sic], and their unfortunate experiences with [storms in] the Northern Sea, the winterings, the disasters, the averias, the embargoes, the delays, and the burdens [imposed] at Sevilla, the merchants in Mexico have decided to export more to Filipinas than to España." Grau y Monfalcon, Memorial of 1637, BR 27:156.
217. J.I. Israel, *Race, Class and Politics in Colonial Mexico, 1610-1670* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1975), p. 101.
218. "Memorial to the King by Juan Grau y Monfalcon in the Year 1635," BR 25:48 ff.

219. Pastells, *Catálogo*, 8:30 and 8:99.
220. Corcuera to Quiroga, 20 August, 1637, Filipinas 21.
221. English Factories [1644] 223, 226.
222. Navarette, I:40.
223. See Guijo's notes on the Philippines governor's arrival aboard the galleon and sojourn in Mexico City in 1650, *Diario* I:86-109 passim.
224. A portion of the papers relating to the efforts of Corcuera to reverse the judgement of the residencia appears in Pastells, *Historia/Catálogo* 8:xix-xlii.
225. See letter of the governor to the King, 4 August 1650, and letter of the City of Manila [1650] in *Colin-Labor Evangélica de los Obreros de la Compañía de Jesús en las Islas Filipinas*, ed. Pastells S.J. (Barcelona, 1904), III:540-543.
226. Boxer, *Jan Compagnie in War and Peace, 1602-1799: A Short History of the Dutch East India Company*, (Hong Kong: Heinemann Asia, 1979) p. 23.
227. The actual sailing date of the galleons of 1638 is not known with certainty. Copies of the annual official correspondence bear dates between July 30 and August 31. A departure on or about August 10 is assumed since the ships had to have reached the vicinity of the Ladrones by the second part of September, the time of the *Concepción's* loss.
228. Casimiro Díaz, *Conquistas de las Islas Filipinas* (Valladolid, 1890), p. 402.
229. The *Concepción*, the admiral ship in 1636, was larger in the hold than her companion, the capitana San Juan Baptista. Corcuera to the King, Cavite, August 11, 1636, BR 26:288-289. The San Juan Baptista was seen at Macao, in September, 1638, by Peter Mundy, an English merchant adventurer, who described her as "about 700 tunnes." "Shee had about 500 Men and 24 peeeces of brasse ordnance." *The Travels of Peter Mundy in Europe and Asia, 1608-1667* ed. Lt. Col. Sir Richard Carnac Temple, The Hakluyt Society, Second Series, No. XLV (London: The Hakluyt Society, 1919), 3:60.
230. [Juan Lopez, S.J.], "Events in the Philippines, 1637-38," BR 29:43.
231. AGI, Contaduría 1218 (1638).
232. Corcuera to the King, Manila, June 30, 1636, BR 26:137; Cavite, July 11, 1636, BR 26:288-289.
233. Cabildo of Manila, 2 August 1638, Pastells, *Catálogo* 8:89; Edict of the King, Madrid, 14 February 1640, BR 30:88; *Extracto Historial*, 1:84.
234. Corcuera to the King, July 31, 1638, AGI, Filipinas 8.
235. Escalona to the King, Manila, August 31, 1638, BR 29:59.
236. "Testimonio en Relación de la Residencia que el Senor D. Diego Fajardo está tomando a Don Sebastián Hurtado de Corcuera," AGI, Filipinas 22, ramo 2 no. 19 (1645) fol. 47.
237. Francisco Tirol[monti] to the King, Mexico City, 8 July 1641, AGI, Mexico, 152, r.2.
238. Allegedly he had made the purchase out of the estate of the Auditor Alcaraz, using 5,000 pesos obtained as a gratuity from the Sangley community for rescuing Chinese hostages, BR 29:28; later he was charged in the residencia for obtaining it at a low price (1,872 pesos) from the probate court, Pastells,

*Historia/Catálogo*, 9:xxv.

239. A published summary of the charges in the "Residencia" of Corcuera appears in Pastells, *Historia/Catálogo*, 9:xix-xxx.

240. Bañuelos y Carillo, BR 29:69, 77. Cushner, *Spain in the Philippines*, p. 250.

241. AGI, Contaduría 1218.

242. Pastells, *Catálogo*, 6:239-240. Vides may have been kin to Silvestre Aybar, merchant, *ibid.*, 7(2):359. Vides and Aybar appear in "Matricula de los vecinos efectivos...1634," *ibid.* 7(1):ccxxv-ccxl.

243. Council of the Indies, 26 May 1634, *ibid.* 7(2):386.

244. Pastells, *ibid.* 7(2):370.

245. "The Conquest of Mindanao," BR 27:254, 270, 279; "Events in the Filipinas, 1637-38," BR 29:30. According to Navarette, his death was caused not by wounds received in the military campaign, but the misfortune to have been punished for his role in Governor Corcuera's scandalous conflict with Manila's archbishop in 1636. See Navarette, 2:392.

246. "Relation of 1635-36," BR 26:31-32; Diaz, p. 395.

247. "Testimonio," AGI, Filipinas 22, r. 2, no. 19 (1645), f. 46.

248. *Ibid.*

249. Tirol[monti] to the King, 8 July 1641.

250. See "Probanza fecha por parte desta ciudad de Manila en la demanda de capitules contra D. Sebastián..." AGI, Escribanía de Camara 409c, Quaderno 17, fs. 486-557.

251. *Ibid.*

252. *Ibid.*, f. 528v.

253. *Ibid.*, f. 539.

254. "Events in the Philipinas from the Year 1638 to that of 1639," BR 29:168.

255. Gemelli Careri, p. 141.

256. Carletti, p. 75.

257. *Mission in the Marianas: An Account of Father Diego Luis de Sanvitores and His Companions, 1669-1670*. Trans. with commentary, Ward Barrett (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1975) p. 22.

258. See Marjorie G. Driver, "Fray Juan Pobre de Zamora and His Account of the Mariana Islands," *Journal of Pacific History*, 18 (1983) and "Fray Juan Pobre de Zamora: Hitherto Unpublished Accounts of his Residence in the Mariana Islands," *Journal of Pacific History*, 23 (1988); both articles were reprinted as "Fray Juan Pobre in the Marianas 1602," Micronesia Area Research Center (MARC), University of Guam, 1989.

259. Driver, "Juan Pobre," [MARC], 1989, p. 15.

260. *Mission in the Marianas*, p. 21.
261. Gemelli Careri, p. 144; Driver (1983), 211; MARC (1989), p. 29.
262. Driver, "Fray Juan Pobre," (1983), 205, 213.
263. Driver, (1989), p. 26.
264. AGI, Mexico 35, Viceroy to the King, Mexico, 28 February 1639, f. 13; AGI, Mexico 75, Audiencia to the King, 4 March 1639, AGI, Mexico 152 (1641), Francisco Tirolmonti to the King, Mexico, 8 July 1641,
265. AGI, Mexico 326, Oficios reales (1639).
266. [Juan Lopez, S.J.], "Events in the Philippines, 1638-39," in BR 29:157.
267. "Events...1638-39," BR 29:166.
268. "Events...1638-39, 29:168-169.
269. Palapag is just beyond Cape Espírito Santo, a frequent first landfall in the Philippines. If necessary galleons entered port at Borongan. Description of Jesuit establishments in the region in Colín,-Pastells, 793-794.
270. "Events...1638-39," 29:171.
271. Ibid.
272. BR 29:171; Ayer Ms. Newberry Library, Academia Real de la Historia, Madrid, "Papeles de los Jesuitas," T. 84, n. 35.
273. "Events in the Filipinas Islands, from August, 1639, to August, 1640," BR 29:194.
274. Ibid.
275. Ibid.
276. Ibid. 29:195.
277. "Events in the Philippines, 1638-1639," BR 29:196.
278. Ibid. 29:200-201.
279. King to Corcuera, Zaragoza, August 4, 1643, BR 35: 165-166. The episode figured in one of the charges brought against Corcuera in the residencia. See Pastells, *Historia/Catálogo*, 9:xxiii.
280. "Events...1639-40," BR 29:202-203.
281. "Relation of the Insurrection of the Chinese," BR 29:257.
282. Ibid., BR 29:249.
283. Ibid., citing Díaz, p. 427.
284. Le Gentil, p. 119.

285. Charge seventeen mentions him in connection with murder of Don Bartolome Tenorio as Corcuera's "Theniente de la Compañía de Arcabuceros"; charge thirty five, Juan de Montoya, his "criado," Pastells, *Historial/Catálogo*, 9:xxiv.
286. "Insurrection of the Chinese," BR 29:215 and 253.
287. See requests for back pay and certification of service in Escribanía de Camara, 409D, ramo 4, on del Pino [1643?]; and 409A, fol. 4018 on Ramos.
288. Ibid.
289. Díaz, p. 402.
290. "Affairs in Filipinas, 1644-47," BR 35:230.
291. Díaz, pp. 570-571; Ana Maria Prieto Lucena, *Filipinas durante el Gobierno de Manrique de Lara, 1653-1663* (Seville: Escuela de Estudios Hispano-Americanos, 1984), p. 47.
292. Baltazar de Santa Cruz, "The Dominican Missions, 1635-39," BR 35:44.
293. *Mission in the Marianas*, p. 4.
294. Marjorie G. Driver, "Cross, Sword, and Silver: The Nascent Spanish Colony in the Mariana Islands," *Pacific Studies*, II, 3 (July 1988), fn. 18, 44-45.
295. *Mission in the Marianas*, p. 8.
296. Luís de Ibáñez y García, *Historia de las Islas Marianas* (Granada, 1886), p. 32.
297. E. J. Burrus, "Sanvitores Grammar and Catechism in the Mariana (or Chamorro) Language (1668)," *Anthropos* 49 (1954), 936.
298. *Mission in the Marianas*, pp. 5, 36; "Noticias de las Islas Marianas, 1670-1672," ARSI, Phil. 13, fol. 56; Sanvitores to Jesuit Provincial in Manila, 14 May 1671, ARSI, Phil. 13, fol. 68v. "Some Historical Figures in the Marianas During the Seventeenth Century," Appendix, *Vignettes of Philipinas Marianas Colonial History*, No. 1 (Manila, 1962), 48.
299. "Events that happened on June, 15, 1668 on the arrival of the Sanvitores Mission at Agana Bay: An Eyewitness Account by Brother Marcel Ansaldo, S.J.," trans. Felicia Plaza, *Guam Recorder*, I, Second Series (1971), 16.
300. "...the Most Holy Virgin preserved [them] for thirty years...when we found them ready to [help us]..." Letter to the Father Provincial at Manila, 14 May 1671, ARSI, Phil. 13, fol. 60.
301. *Mission in the Marianas*, p. 32.
302. Francisco Garcia, *Vida y Martyrio de el Venerable Diego Luis de Sanvitores* (Madrid, 1683), p. 207; Sanvitores, 1671, ARSI, Phil. 13, fol. 68.
303. Ibáñez y García, p. 33.
304. Garcia, p. 207.
305. Ibáñez y García, p. 33.

306. Kotondo Hasebe, "Saipan, Tinian ryoto no ibutsu oyobi iseki [Ruins and relics in the Islands of Saipan and Tinian]," *Jinruigaku zasshi* [Journal of the Anthropological Society of Tokyo], 43, 6 (June, 1928), 263.
307. *Mission in the Marianas*, p. 29.
308. Fr. Gayoso, 24 May 1676, ARSI, Phil. 13, fols. 145-146.
309. *Mission to the Marianas*, p. 35.
310. *Ibid.*, p. 31.
311. *Ibid.*, p. 35.
312. *Ibid.*, p. 33.
313. Sanvitores to the Father Provincial, 14 May 1671, ARSI, Phil. 13, fol. 66.
314. Narrative of those who were in the Marianas, 1667-1673, ARSI, Phil. 13, fol. 97v.
315. Manila, 10 June 1670, AGI, Filipinas 10, r. 1.
316. Don Juan de Santa Cruz to Governor of the Philippines, 21 May 1670, Real Academia de la Historia, Madrid (RAH), Col. Cortes.
317. AGI, Filipinas 10, r. 1; AGN, Reales Cédulas Originales, vol. 12, exp. 87 and vol. 13 exp. 122.
318. ARSI, Phil. 13.
319. Queen to the Viceroy at Mexico City, 30 April 1672, AGN, Reales Cédulas Originales, vol. 13, exp. 122.
320. Newberry Library, Ayer Collection, Coomans to the Queen, 1674.
321. Maggs Bros. Catalog, 1869.
322. Solorzano to Duchess of Aveiro, 20 May 1683, Maggs Bros. Catalog 1892.
323. Fr. Coomans to Fr. Noyelle, May 19. 1684, Lilly Library. Bloomington, Indiana.
324. Coomans to Noyelle, 17 May 1684, ARSI, Phil. 13, 272v.
325. Manuel Solorzano, S.J. to Joseph Vidal, Agadna [Guam], 25 April 1684, Maggs Letters, 1903 (London).
326. Father Gerard Bouvens to the Queen, 1 May 1685, AGI, Filipinas, 3.
327. Manila, 9 January 1709, AGI, Ultramar 561, 204.
328. See Martín Palma, *El Consulado de Manila*.
329. On the foundation and development of the Company, see María Lourdes Díaz-Trechuelo Spinola, *La Real Compañía de Filipinas* (Seville: Escuela de Estudios Hispano-Americanos de Sevilla, 1965).